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This thesis attempts to achieve three related aims. The initial aim 
is to uncover an anatomy of silence designed to draw attention to its 
different types, and help us understand its enigma a little better. This has 
resulted in a useful distinction between two types of silence which are 
designated the titles: Harpocratic and Larundic. Harpocratic silence is 
empty, mysterious and reflective. It offers no meaning of its own and 
therefore no fetters to reflection and creation. Larundic silence is full of 
meaning which it can communicate in more and less effective ways than 
language. The second aim of the thesis is to show that Larundic silence 
can communicate but only through interpretation, which leaves it open to 
exploitation. Thus a model is offered which is intended to preserve 
Larundic silences from radical readings. Finally, the thesis examines how 
silence is applied in the contexts of medicine, law and art. This focuses 
primarily on the category of Larundic silences which are more likely to 
arise in the fields chosen. Harpocratic silence is applied in other areas, 
namely music and religion.
Silence is demonstrated to be a complex and multi-faceted concept, 
with the capacity for meaning and reflection.
PROLOGUE
The Romance of 
LARUNDA AND HERMES
Larunda was a Tiberian nymph with the gift of the gab. She loved to 
debate with her friends and tell stories of their adventures. So much did she 
love to talk that her friends gave her the nick-name ‘Lala’, which in greek means 
‘Prattle’. She had many friends, even among the gods and goddesses of 
Olympus. One of those who favoured Larunda was Hera, wife of Zeus and 
goddess of the hearth. Their friendship provided Larunda with a love for home 
and family, and all the things around which the hearth forms a core. It may 
have been because of this love of the hearth, or because she cared enough for 
her friends to risk her own safety, that Larunda refused to assist Zeus in 
kidnapping her friend Jutema so that he might seduce her and cheat on his wife 
yet again. Not only did Lala refuse to help the King of the gods, she also 
warned Jutema of Zeus’ plans. This made the god angry, and he threatened 
Larunda with severe punishment if she continued to speak of his intentions. 
This frightened her, as it would any sensible person; she knew the wrath of 
Zeus could be fierce. But she was courageous and said: “Lord Zeus, I am 
aware of your strength and fury, but I cannot allow you to shame one of my 
friends, and break the heart of another.” So she went to Hera, because she 
knew Hera was not afraid of Zeus, and she told the goddess of the hearth what 
her husband intended to do.
Hera flew into a great rage when she heard the news, and pummelled 
Zeus with fire until he gave up his plan. Zeus was furious and knew who was 
to blame. He found Larunda and before she could utter a cry for help he tore
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out her tongue and silenced her forever. Unsatisfied that his revenge was 
complete, Zeus then banished Larunda to the Underworld where she would be 
forced to remain eternally silent. Then he called his son Hermes, the messenger 
of the gods, to deliver Larunda to Hades.
Larunda was devastated and frightened of what awaited her. An eternity 
of suffering where she could never communicate with anyone again; her fate 
was like that of Cassandra who would never be understood. But she wouldn’t 
allow this to defeat her. On their long journey to the Underworld Larunda made 
many attempts to communicate with her guide. She began by conveying minor 
messages to Hermes, pointing to her feet when she was tired of walking, 
patting her stomach to show she was hungry. At first, Hermes would not 
always understand. “Are you sick?” he enquired. She shook her head and 
picked a berry from a nearby bush and ate it, again rubbing her stomach. “Oh!” 
he cried “You’re hungry!”, and they stopped to eat in silence.
After a while she increased her silent vocabulary until she could have 
silent disagreements with Hermes, and entertain him with little stories. They 
struggled for understanding and eventually Hermes was able to interpret most of 
the silent vocabulary she invented, as well as understanding more complex 
things like emotions. He began to know when Larunda was homesick or sad, 
which she tried to hide behind her courage and resolve. “How brave she is”, 
thought Hermes.
Then one sunny afternoon the pair stopped to rest under a grove of olive 
trees. They were only a day or so from their destination and Hermes was 
unhappy. Larunda, who had learned to enjoy Hermes’ company, was aware of 
his sadness and was trying to work out a new story to cheer him up. They sat 
hidden under an ancient olive tree whose branches drooped to kiss the dusty 
earth, and Hermes embraced Larunda. “I have fallen in love with you my silent 
Lara.” She looked at him with great softness and he could feel her thinking “I 
love you too, Hermes”, and she put her hand on his to show him this was true.
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Then her look changed, and he knew she was thinking about Hades. He said 
“We don’t have to be separated forever, you must go to the Underworld, but I 
will live there with you and we will always be together.” At this Larunda’s face 
changed again, and once again Hermes knew what she was trying to say, that 
she loved him because he could understand her, that he was able to interpret her 
silence and know what she wanted it to say. They embraced again, and under 
the olive tree Larunda conceived the twin Lares, the Roman gods of the home 
and hearth.
Larunda is silent for eternity, but Hermes, the messenger of the gods, 
loves her and interprets her silence.1
1 I feel I ought to include an apology for the changes I have made to this story. Those 
familiar with Ovid’s original in Fasti II: 583-599, will know that his telling is different in a 
few ways. The first difference is that in Ovid, Hermes is referred to by his Roman name, 
Mercury. I have changed this in order to draw the relationship between this myth of Larunda’s 
silence and hermeneutics, named for Hermes the messenger of the gods. This is not a very big 
change, and not unforgivable, I hope. The second change is somewhat more important, but it 
has its roots in research. In the original telling, which is supposed to be that of Ovid who 
may have invented the tale, the story is not a happy one. In Ovid’s version Mercury “prepares 
to offer violence; with her looks in the place of words she entreats him, and in vain with her 
voiceless mouth does she struggle to speak. She becomes pregnant, and gives birth to twins, 
the Lares, who guard the cross ways and ever keep their watch in our houses.” (Ovid, Fasti 13, 
613-616; Henry Riley translation). The happier more romantic version I have used can be 
found in Michael Grant & John Hazel’s Who’s Who in Classical Mythology (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson; Great Britain; 1973 pg. 260). I have preferred this version because I hope to join 
silence and hermeneutic interpretation in a useful and productive union which preserves 
silences from the violence of misinterpretation. However, Ovid’s version may be equally 
appropriate if we consider how likely misinterpretation of silence is to occur, and the damage 
this can do.
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The Mysterious Origins of 
HARPOCRATES
Harpocrates is one of the names of “Horus the Child”, infant 
manifestation of one of ancient Egypt’s most important deities, Horus.
There was great love between Isis the mother goddess and Osiris the 
great god king. They flourished together, creating the moon and the stars and 
eventually the earth and all its inhabitants. Their creativity seemed boundless 
and they thought their joy together would never end. But a time eventually 
came when Osiris was challenged by his envious brother Seth, and a collosal 
battle ensued. Great blows thundered down from the heavens as the two gods 
battled for ultimate power -  only one could win. The battle went on for days 
and nights. Tragically, Seth struck the final blow, killed Osiris and won. Seth 
cut Osiris into many pieces and threw them into the Nile. When Isis foresaw 
her husband’s death in a dream, she turned herself and her sister Nephthys into 
kites who flew over the Nile looking for Osiris, to be with him one last time. 
Heartbroken, Isis also grew fearful that there was no heir to challenge Seth’s 
claim to Osiris’ position as most powerful god in the universe. With no one to 
challenge him, Isis would be forced to rule alongside her enemy, the murderer 
of her beloved husband. She knew there was only one thing to do. She had to 
use her great powers to accomplish what only the mother goddess could: she 
had to bring life out of death; to conceive Osiris’ son and heir even after Osiris 
was dead.
There is great secrecy surrounding how Isis, the mother of all, managed 
to become pregnant by her dead husband. The centuries of egyptian sun have 
bleached the story from our minds, its sand has ground away the hieroglyphs 
that reveal the secret. And perhaps it is best this way, left to silence. We know
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only that with her strong magic Isis was able to reassemble Osiris. Next, she 
used the wings of the kite she transformed herself into to create a breeze which 
restored breath to her cherished love. And after they lay together Osiris left his 
beloved and became king of the underworld for eternity. Isis, soon after lying 
with her dead husband, gave birth to Harpocrates, the child Horus who grew to 
be the greatest of all gods.
Isis held a celebration to present the new heir with great pomp and 
circumstance. All the stars in the universe were in attendance, each of the gods 
and goddesses, and even the creatures of the planets were invited to see their 
new king. And as each approached they saw Isis with the infant on her knee. 
He was small and delicate with a lock of hair on the right side of his beautiful 
shorn head. He wore a gold triple diadem crown, ornate with feathers and 
peaked with a disc of golden sunlight. But most striking, as the boy sat upon 
his mother’s lap, was the finger which he held in his mouth. He sat silently 
holding a finger of his right hand up to his lips. Subsequent statues would 
portray him in this way, with the finger in front of his lips in a request for 
silence, perhaps, at the question of his origin. Inevitably, some said that 
Harpocrates had no right to his father’s throne, as the question of his paternity 
was dubious. But most welcomed the little god and their honour expanded as 
he grew into the most powerful of the gods. The one who is the secret life and 
sustenance as the source of the Nile.
The myths tell that Horus’ mother Isis was impregnated by her brother 
Osiris after Osiris had been killed in battle. Thus, Harpocrates has become a 
god of impenetrable mystery. A god of silence2.
I have taken the liberty of fictionalizing the few accounts I was able to find of Harpocrates’ 
birth in a way that suits the purposes of the project at hand. The information is founded on 
accounts in the following texts: Hart, George: A Dictionary of Egyptian Gods and Goddesses; 
Routledge & Kegan Paul; London, Eng.; 1986; Mercher, Samuel A.: Horus Royal God of 
Egypt; The Lancaster Press; Lancaster, PA.; 1942; and Shorter, Alan W.: The Egyptian 
Gods: a handbook by.... Routledge & Kegan Paul; London; 1983.
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INTRODUCTION
“Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent.” These final 
words of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus3 caution us 
not tospeak of the unspeakable, to be silent about what is silent. However, it is 
the intention of this project to perform that very paradox: to talk about silence.
Wittgenstein’s closing line refers to a world which is beyond linguistic 
expression, where language can be seen as a whole. Understanding language, 
he says, must be accomplished from a perspective external to language, and 
hence from within the perspective of silence. Wittgenstein’s claim is that we 
cannot speak about this silence because there are no words with which to 
express it, it is the silence beyond words. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein did not 
intend to imply that silence beyond words is empty or meaningless. In fact, his 
silence is full of the information about words and language that can only be 
learned in silence.
Wittgenstein’s silence is silence which escapes translation because it 
belongs to the aspect of understanding which exceeds the limits of rationality 
and linguistic capability. He is trying to indicate a place where words have no 
meaning and so voices are silent. But, Wittgenstein’s silence is not inscrutable. 
He implies that knowledge about silence can be gained through linguistic 
means, by pushing at the limits of language until we discover we can go no 
further. Once we climb to the limits of language we can kick away the ladder 
and enter silence, where words are no longer useful. Having reached this point
3 Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', C.K. Ogden trans. Routledge 
Press; London England; 1922.
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language can be understood, and at the same time silence can be experienced in 
its fullness. Thus, the more we push at the limits of language the more we can 
learn about silence. From the opposite view, then, when we begin to explore 
silence outside its limits, and therefore within the limits of language, we realize 
there is a great deal we can say about it....
Silence is a far more important element in our lives than is immediately 
obvious. We tend to overlook silence, take it for granted and not pay it the 
attention it deserves considering what it can do for us. This is an 
underestimation. Silence is important in myriad ways: in meditation as well as 
communication, its applications are almost boundless. In order to explore the 
depth and richness of silence we must consider that there are many different 
types of silence to explore. It is certainly the case that there are silences which 
bear meanings that cannot be translated into linguistic form. Similarly, there are 
silences which are vast and empty and defy language altogether. However, it is 
also true that some silences are acts of communication so clear that they speak 
for themselves. For instance, the accusatory tragic silence depicted by Southey 
in his History o f the Peninsular War, where he describes “The frightful silence 
of depopulation p r e v a i l s . T h i s  haunting example illustrates how clearly 
silence can communicate specific ideas, such as tragedy, loss and accusation.
In general, it is true that we experience some sorts of silence all the time. 
Despite this, knowledge of truly pure silence is impossible to experience. In 
meditation, we try to still the mind, attempting to block out new thoughts and 
slow down our thinking processes; the tools used to accomplish this are usually 
the repetition of some word or the focussing of the mind upon a single object. 
But is this the same as the experience of pure silence? Or is it only the complete 
concentration of thought, more like standing still than being silent? The human
4 Southey, Robert: History of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. J. Murray; London; 1827. Pg: 
339.
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mind, it seems, is incapable of knowing the emptiness of pure silence. As 
Susan Sontag suggests, “...it would mean that the spectator was aware of no 
stimulus or that he was unable to make a response.”5
Nevertheless, we can experience silences which are other than purely 
empty. Plotinus said that in some cases “...there would be more truth in 
silence...”6. Aeschylus claimed in the Agamemnon that “Sole cure for wrong is 
silence”7. In Iphigenia in Taurus, Euripides spoke of “the letter, that though 
silent will declare...”8 And Trollope states, “There is a silence which may be 
more eloquent than the sounds which it follows.”9 All of these examples imply 
something remarkable about silence. They indicate that silences are able to bear 
meaning. These silences are not pure and empty. They are, rather, filled with 
meaning and intention which appear to be capable of communication. But how 
do we know silence can be meaningful? Probably because we regularly 
experience its meaningfulness. When they occur, silences can sometimes be 
hard to ignore. They can make us uncomfortable, they can make us safe, and 
they can convey information. When it is present, the meaning of a silence can 
be obviously present, even when it is difficult to tell what that meaning is.
There are many other ways in which the concept ‘silence’ is used, and 
usually these are ways which ascribe to it a certain kind of meaning. We refer, 
usually in political but also psychological contexts, to silence which
5 Susan Sontag: “The Aesthetics of Silence” in A Susan Sontag Reader. Penguin Books; 
London, England; 1982. Pp.: 181-204.
6 Plotinus: “The Fifth Ennead” in Enneads English and Greek. A.H. Armstrong trans. Loeb 
Classics Library. Heinemann; London; 1966-88.
7Aeschylus. A gamemnon, in The Oresteian Trillogy: Agamemnon, the Choephori, the 
Eumenides. Phillip Vellacott, trans. Penguin Books; London; 1959.
8Euripides. Iphigeneia in Tauris. Richmond Latimore trans. Oxford University Press; Oxford: 
1974.
9 Trollope, A. Orley Farm. Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1935, pg: xxxix.
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disempowers its victims or suppresses their true selves. Thus, we speak of the 
silenced and oppressed. There are, however, times when self-imposed 
silencing of the self is appropriate and useful to the situation, such as when 
doctors silence themselves to a degree when assuming the Hippocratic role. 
Hence, we speak of self-silencing as a commendable attribute in certain 
contexts. Other examples of the applications of silence will be seen throughout 
this thesis. These examples demonstrate the multifacity of silence, its ability to 
mean different things in different contexts and to different individuals.
To begin to illustrate the multifaceted nature of silence we can engage in 
a short experiment. Try reading the following sentence out loud: “the cat sat on 
the mat”. In reading the sentence out loud the reader does not appear to be 
engaged in an act of silence to the extent that speaking out loud is not silent but 
makes some sound. However, there is a way in which silence is present even 
in the act of reading out loud. By having submitted to the experiment and 
reading what one is told to read, the reader’s own sense of self and judgment is 
put aside to a certain extent. Complying with the suggestion to read a particular 
sentence causes the reader to temporarily suspend his or her own thoughts and 
ideas, and conform with those suggested by the author. Any act of reading is 
like this. There is always a degree of self-silencing which the reader undergoes 
in order to successfully understand the text. This is not a failure which usurps 
the reader’s critical judgement. Rather it is a necessity, as we well know from 
the frustrating experience of not being able to silence the mind’s stray thoughts 
and worries that distract us from reading. Such self-silencing is useful in most 
acts of understanding which require a degree of self-silencing in order to make 
room for the acquisition of new knowledge. This does not eliminate critical 
judgment. A critique of the text may follow upon the act of understanding, or 
may even occur simultaneously but quietly in the form of criticisms which 
emerge while one is reading a text. If critique does occur during the act of
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understanding a text, then this marks another way in which silence occurs: 
there is the silence in which the activities of the mind take place. Thoughts are 
silent until expressed aloud, and there are degrees to which these thoughts are 
silent. Thoughts which are at the forefront of a busy mind are less silent than 
thoughts which are in the background, and finally subconscious thoughts are 
the most silent of all. It follows from this that silence contains meaning in 
certain circumstances, such as when it contains meaningful thoughts. This idea 
will be addressed more fully in chapter two of part I.
The above experiment illustrates only four of the many ways in which 
silence is an active presence in our lives. It shows that readers use silencing in 
order to leave room for understanding a text. From this it follows that silence is 
also used in preparation for knowledge acquisition. Thirdly, it also shows that 
there is content in the silence of readers and thinkers, even though we cannot 
access this easily. And finally we have seen that the activity of the mind occurs 
on different levels of silence, from silent thoughts to even more silent 
subconscious activity. Thus, we begin to see that silence does things in 
thinking, reading, and much more.
However, to be understood, the things silence does must be interpreted. 
This is a rather difficult project because silence is ambiguous by nature; it defies 
easy interpretation. Silence’s ambiguity is what we might refer to as its slippery 
nature which makes grasping its meaningful content a difficult task. To help 
deal with silence’s slipperiness, this thesis will begin with an analysis which is 
intended to yield a vocabulary for silence. Thus, Part I will proceed with a 
construction of an anatomy of silence which divides the concept into two 
categories and various sub-categories. These are meant to account for the 
different ways in which silence is understood and used. Part II of the thesis is 
an analysis of interpretation of silence, and suggests a model for constructing 
safe or non-radical interpretations of it.
Chapter 1 contains the analysis for a vocabulary of silence. Here,
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silence is divided into two main categories: pure and impure silence. Pure 
silence is an enigmatic perfect silence which cannot be experienced except as an 
object of imagination. Impure silence on the other hand is the silence of 
everyday experience as well as extraordinary experience. Under impure silence 
we find the sub-categories of silence, named for the god and goddess in the 
myths above. These are, Harpocratic or empty silence and Larundic or full 
silence.
Larundic silence will be the primary focus of the thesis as I intend to 
explore how silence can hold meaning and how it can communicate its meaning. 
This implies a second category of impure silence, namely full silence which 
contains active meaning of its own. Larundic silence is communicative silence. 
This is silence which contains meaning that can be passed on to, and understood 
by others. Silences can communicate their meanings, but its inherent ambiguity 
makes silence difficult to understand. Thus, in order to communicate their 
meanings, silences must be interpreted by their percipients and this, we will see, 
is problematic. As a result, we are also concerned about the way in which they 
will be interpreted.
The following diagram gives a preliminary sense of the vocabulary of 
silence through the category analysis which will be expanded upon in chapter 1:
Silence
Pure silence Impure silence
Harpocratic silence Larundic silence
Empty/Passive silence Full/Active silence 
CommunicativeReflective silence Grammatical
Once the vocabulary of silence has been outlined in chapter 1, chapter 2 
will turn to an analysis of the possibility that silence can bear meaning. Using 
the works of Grice and Searle, it will be determined whether silences can be
properly said to be meaningful in the same way that sentences are meaningful. 
If this is so, then it will make sense to speak of a silent utterance as something 
which is capable of bearing and communicating meaning in a context.
Once this has been explained, it will be incumbent upon us to show how 
silences can communicate these meanings. To accomplish this, chapter 3 draws 
a parallel between silence and another indirect and ambiguous form of 
communication, namely metaphor. Silence will be compared and contrasted to 
metaphor to show that the two have similar characteristics such as ambiguity, 
vagueness and indirectness. It will also be shown that these characteristics can 
work in their favour as well as act as hinderance.
The comparison with metaphor will be followed by a discussion in 
chapter 4 and five on the value of silence and the continuum between silence and 
speech, res[ectively. It will be argued that silence has no inherent value, but 
acquires its valuation from the judgements of individual percipients within a 
given context. Because of this we tend to appreciate silence more in some 
contexts than in others. This is illustrated by a generally ambivalent attitude 
toward silence. This discussion will include an analysis of the various uses of 
silence.
Part II focuses mainly on the problems of interpreting silence. The 
inherent slipperiness of silence will be described in greater detail as the source 
of the difficulties of interpreting silence, as distinct from interpreting language. 
Silence does not offer the clues which make interpreting language a less difficult 
task. As a result it is necessary to institute some conditions which will make 
interpreting Larundic silences less likely to fail. The conditions are the eight 
features of the model for interpretation of silence advocated in this thesis. They 
are as follows: 1) The context of the silence will provide useful information as 
clues to its meaning. 2) It is necessary to be aware that we tend to resist making 
efforts at interpreting what on the surface appears will yield little benefit to our 
output. As a result we must recognize that silences which appear relevant to us
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deserve the extra attention to be understood. 3) Relevance is important to 
silence in a second way. In this way interpreters must be careful to ensure that 
their interpretations of a silence truly f i t  with the independent meaning of the 
silence. This entails further that, 4) Larundic silences must be seen in their best 
light as being coherent and meaningful. Both of these restrict the interpretations 
that can be applied to a Larundic silence by ensuring that the interpretation 
remains true to the meaning the silence contains. This entails that the meaning 
of the silence must be taken seriously. Moreover, it dispels the belief that 
silences can be ascribed any meaning at all by the interpreter, because it draws 
attention to the silence’s own meaning. This is how Larundic silences can be 
protected from being treated as Harpocratic silences, i.e. as blank slate silences 
upon which any interpretation can be applied.
Gadamer and Wittgenstein are excellent sources of material on 
interpretation and guidelines for language use. From them we see the necessity 
of using the mutual-interdependence of external and internal conditions for 
protecting silences from radical readings which ignore fit and best light. 
Wittgenstein reveals the importance of context (1); and (5) Gadamer directs us 
to understanding how implicit judgements, what he calls prejudices, are a 
necessary part of interpretations. He warns us that these are part of the 
individual and suggests we cannot escape them so we ought to include them as 
functional aspects of our interpretations. But, to protect the act of interpretation 
from the tyranny of personal caprices, Gadamer builds into his theory of 
philosophical hermeneutics certain safe-guards which promote balanced 
perspectives. 6) As such he includes the external forces of tradition and history 
to the act of interpretation to prevent opportunistic interpretive readings of an 
object, such as a silence. 7) He also reminds us of the importance ofbeing open 
to the thing-in-itself which bears a meaning of its own. Any interpretation must 
consider and restrict itself tothis meaning or it will not be correct.
Finally, 8) the concept of practical reasoning will round off the model by
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permitting a degree of flexibility to the way in which the rules contained in the 
model are applied. This concept is loosely based on Aristotle's idea of 
phronesis, which is characterized as the ability to apply universal principles to 
particular situations. There are no universal principles for the interpretation of 
silence, only general rules which appear to make the task less prone to error. 
Phronesis permits the flexibility required for applying general rules to particular 
contexts without either sacrificing the particularities of the individual silence, 
nor contradicting the principle which supports the rules, namely to create 
accurate interpretations of silences.
These eight rules will be discussed in their respective chapters in part II. 
There will necessarily be some overlap in the chapters in order to provide 
continuity. An exposition of the model for constructing accurate interpretations 
of silence will follow once the individual rules have been discussed. Then part 
III will show how the model can be used in four areas of applied silence: 1) 
silence in medicine; 2) silence in law; 3) silence in music; and 4) silence in 
religion. This is not an exhaustive list of areas in which silence plays a 
significant role. On the contrary, silence is part of every thing and every 
activity. We will explore just a few of these here.
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PART I: 
UNDERSTANDING SILENCE
CHAPTER 1:
THE VOCABULARY OF SILENCE
1.1 Introduction:
This chapter will outline the vocabulary used to discuss silence in the 
rest of the thesis. Analysis of the vocabulary of silence will reveal many of 
the features that make silence rich and complex. Following this, the 
multifacity of silence will be explored and compared with different valuations 
of various silences.
1.2 Defining Silence:
Definitions are not easily formulated, and defining a concept so broad 
as the concept of silence is a virtual impossibility. Certainly there is no simple 
example of what silence is; we hear sounds as long as we are conscious. The 
dictionary definitions are helpful, but they are not complete. They only hint at 
the breadth of silence, and do not account for ordinary usages of the term. 
How does a dictionary definition such as “absence of noise; refraining from 
speech”1 help us understand why ‘silence is golden’? What is needed for the 
beginning of an understanding of so difficult a notion as silence, is what 
Aristotle referred to as an ‘essentialist’ definition2; a definition which explores 
the nature of that to which the word refers.
Collins Reference English Dictionary. William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd.; Great Britain; 1992.
2Aristotle, 402a25, 1030a6 - bl3 & 1034b20 - 1038a35.
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Adam Jaworski, in his book The Power o f Silence3, raises just this 
point, but states that we ought not to try to define silence because it is too 
complex a notion to be defined. He believes we cannot assert a final 
definition of silence because its essence is too ambiguous. Thus, Jaworski 
adopts a ‘non-essentialist’ approach according to a Popperian, anti- 
Aristotelian model. He chooses this approach to avoid what Popper4 called an 
infinite regress of definitions or verbalism, in which one can define the object 
ad infinitum5. Jaworski’s project is to write a theoretical account of different 
communicative aspects of silence from a functional rather than structural or 
essential perspective. In other words he is more concerned with how silence 
works than with what silence is. For this he uses references both in and 
outside of linguistics. From the beginning, Jaworski rejects any final 
definition of silence because he feels it is too expansive a topic to ever be 
pinned down to a strict definition
Jaworski’s point is well taken. It seems that there are some definitive 
statements one can make about silence, though many of them contradict one 
another. For example, silence is absence of noise but one can be silent without 
being noiseless, such as when one talks about something to cover up not 
talking about something else. Also, as we shall see below, silence can be 
communicative even when there is no intention of using it for this purpose. 
However, some silences fail to communicate because they are ignored or not 
respected, as in silences which go unnoticed or the silences of oppressed 
people. So, many descriptive statements can be made of silence, which
Jaworski, Adam: The Power of Silence: Social and Pragmatic Perspectives. Language and 
Language Behaviour series vol.l. Howard Giles ed. SAGE Publications, Inc. Newbury Park, 
Calif. 1993.
4 Popper, Carl. Objective Knowledge. Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1972.
5 Jaworski, pg: 29.
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prevents us from issuing a single definitive statement about it. Nevertheless, 
there is one thing that is certain
“...silence is not just the absence of a significant piece of 
behaviour. It is not just emptiness.”6
It is possible to construct a broad classification of types of silences 
through an analysis of how silence is used. This is the understanding of 
silence offered in the first part of this thesis. As a result no specific theoretical 
perspective will be chosen for the analysis, as Jaworski suggests, because 
doing so would make the approach too narrow and create the risk of obscuring 
important aspects of silence. Also, it is not suggested that this analysis of the 
different categories of silence is exhaustive, again because that might 
harmfully restrict the concept. “Definitions can be undesirable if they 
foreclose speculation.”7 So what is offered below is not a definition, it is more 
an exploration or an account of a truly elusive topic.
1.3 Not Defining Silence:
We conceive of silence in two different ways: pure and impure. Like 
the ideas of perfection and nothingness, we have no actual experience of pure 
silence, only an idea of what that might entail, perhaps a sort of emptiness. “A 
genuine emptiness, a pure silence are not feasible -  either conceptually or in 
fact.”8 We do have experiential knowledge of impure silence. Impure silence 
can be what is thought of from day to day as the lack of excessive noise, like
6 Samarin, W.J.: “Language of Silence” in Practical Anthropology 12(3), 115-119; 1965 
p. 115.
7 Downie, R.S. “Definition”. Journal of Medical Ethics 1994; 20:181-184. Pg: 184.
8 Sontag 1984, 187.
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grateful parents whose children have finally gone to sleep. The yelling has 
stopped, but there are still sounds of the wind outside or the flames in the 
fireplace. We can expect no purer silence than this passive silence, for though 
the sounds around us may be successfully removed there will still remain the 
sounds of our own breathing and the beating of our own hearts. Further still, 
there must always be the movement of thought through the mind making even 
internal silence impossible to achieve9.
However, there is more to impure silence than mere quiet. It is also the 
active silence of meditation, symbolism and communication, as the symbolic 
minute of commemorative silence reveals10. Impure silence is itself sub­
divisible into two general forms: passive, which is silence we perceive as 
empty, quiet or peaceful; and active, which is not empty at all but imbued with 
meaning to be deciphered and interpreted. Active and passive silence may just 
as easily be referred to as empty and full. Passive silences contain no meaning 
and thus cannot communicate meaning. Active silences do contain meaning 
which they are able to communicate with the help of interpretation. Passive 
silences are empty of meaning, active silences are full.
When it is passive impure silence inspires self-examination. When it is 
active, it can have meaning and thus is the object of regular interpretation. So 
impure silence is subdivided into two general categories: passive/empty and 
active/full. Both are important, both have their benefits, and neither is more 
significant than the other. Perceived as empty, silence presents a challenge by 
forcing the perceiver toward self-examination; it holds up a mirror for 
reflection and self-determination. Where nothing is offered, the task of the
9 As an aside, it occurs to me that it would be interesting to know whether people who are 
deaf are ever completely so, or if they are capable of some hearing, as shadows are visible for 
people who are blind.
10The composer, R. Murray Schafer called these minutes of silence "the deliberate celebration 
of stillness, which, when observed by an entire society together, is breathtakingly 
magnificent." See Schafer, R. Murray. The soundscape: our sonic environment and the tuning 
of the world. Knopf; New York, N.Y.; 1977. Pg: 254.
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perceiver is to create. This is an existential perception of silence, inspired by a 
Neitzschean11 responsibility for self-determination; it empowers perceivers to 
fill silence with their own understanding of things. Such silences offer the 
perceiver no limitations and present no barriers. On the other hand, silence 
perceived as full is a silence of limitations and barriers. This silence contains 
meaning, meaning which the perceiver must interpret and often meaning 
which can never be fully verbalised. In this case, silence is an extra-linguistic 
form of communication. The limits imposed by full silences are not negative 
influences, but bear the positive value which any act of communication has. 
Thus, full silence is worthy of examination because it is a form of 
communication, whereas empty silence is a worthy subject for study because it 
is a productive form of self-reflection.
1.4 Mvths of Silence:
The god and goddess in the myths above serve as powerful symbols for 
passive/empty silence and active/full silence. Harpocrates12 was the god of 
silence as enigma, mystery and secrecy. This is most likely because of his 
mysterious origins and the secrecy which surrounds them. Greek and Roman 
statues of the god often portray him with one finger over his lips in the gesture 
of silence, to illustrate his connection with mysterious silence. However it is 
likely that this was a misapprehension on the part of Greek and Roman 
appropriators who saw statues of the infant god with his finger in his mouth to
^Nietzsche, F.: The Will to Power, W. Kaufmann trans. Vintage Books; New York, N.Y.; 
1986.
12Harpocrates may or may not have been the namesake of the quintessential silent hero Harpo 
Marx. See Amoldy, Edouard & Dubois, Phillipe: “Harpo Marx or the mute who speaks 
(without uttering a word)” in Wordlessness. Bart Verschaffel & Mark Vermink eds. The 
Lilliput Press; Dublin, Ireland; 1993. Pp: 99-114.
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symbolise his youth13. Regardless of his origins, Harpocrates serves as a 
symbol for the sort of silence we would call empty/passive silence, the sort of 
silence which is mysterious, empty or vast. We can refer to this kind of 
enigmatic silence as “Harpocratic silence” after the mystery which surrounds 
the god. Harpocratic silence evokes an enigmatic presence felt as an 
inscrutable and expressionless god; a void which appears impassive to our 
prayers; it is empty silence.
In contrast, the goddess Larunda’s silence is an expressive silence, one 
which attempts and succeeds at communicating ideas despite its wordlessness. 
This may still be a mysterious silence but it is more forthcoming than 
Harpocratic silence. Larunda managed to reveal her thoughts to Hermes with 
eloquent demonstration and vivid expression. To this sort of expressive 
silence we give the name “Larundic silence” which represents the possibility 
of communicating ideas without speech. These are the silences which speak 
as loud or louder than words.
In keeping with the myth recounted above, we couple Larundic 
silences with hermeneutic philosophy. This is because Larundic silence relies 
on interpretation in order to make communication possible. We shall see in 
Part II of this thesis that hermeneutic interpretation is necessary for 
constructing a set of self-conscious rules for the interpretation of silence. 
Such rules would help prevent Larundic silences from suffering the violence 
of radical misreading, and create the possibility of understanding silent 
meanings.
The myths of Harpocrates and Larunda provide us with the beginning 
of a vocabulary with which to discuss silence. Henceforth, we will use 
Harpocratic as a label for empty silence and Larundic as a label for full silence 
which communicates. There will be overlap in these two categories, most
1 ^Mercher, Samuel A.: Horus Royal God o f Egypt', The Lancaster Press; Lancaster, PA.; 
1942. Pg: 132.
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especially where full silence is opaque, and does not communicate in any 
obvious way.
Problems arise when Larundic silence is mistaken for Harpocratic 
silence, or full silence misidentified as empty. This misapprehension permits 
the interpreter to construct radical or opportunistic interpretations of the 
silence which violate its meaning. The idea of a radial interpretation will be 
expanded upon in Part n. These are readings that are not considerate of the 
claim to meaning made by an intentional silence. The radical reading can 
occur accidentally, or it can be an opportunistic interpretation applied to the 
silence to satisfy the interpreter's specific objectives. To avoid radical 
readings, communicative silences will ideally be recognised as meaningful, 
and interpretations will remain within the parameters established by their 
meanings. This does not preclude creativity or critique in interpretations, but 
requires careful attention to certain restrictions when constructing 
interpretations of silences. Thus, a description of a hermeneutic model for 
silence designed to avoid radical interpretations must be considered.
1.5 Harpocratic Silence Or Passive/Emptv Silence:
In Heidegger and Wittgenstein: the poetics o f silence14, Stephen S. 
Bindeman offers a phenomenology of silence in the works of Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein. He begins the work by describing silence as an empty 
phenomenon which has the result of driving the perceiver towards self­
exploration. He also delineates the effects and benefits which arise from 
confronting empty silence with creativity. The silence to which Bindeman
^Bindeman, Stephen L. Heidegger and Wittgenstein: the poetics of silence. University Press 
of America; Washington, D.C.; 1981.
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refers is the type of silence which would fall under the rubric of Harpocratic 
silence because it is mysterious and inexpressive.
The ‘empty silence’ Bindeman refers to is not pure silence, but a 
subset of impure silence. Bindeman’s notion of silence is a silence of 
meditation and is empty and passive, but this encourages self-exploration in 
those who are confronted with it. For this reason Harpocratic silence can be 
viewed in a positive light as ‘reflective silence’. It holds up a mirror to the 
one who faces it, and forces that person to reflect upon what she already 
knows and understands. We could not call this silence purely empty because 
in a limited way it has content. It contains the sounds around it which may or 
may not influence the pattern of thought of the person who is confronted by it; 
such as when a composer is affected by the songs of birds singing outside a 
silent room. It is also full of the thoughts and ideas of the person who is 
driven to self-reflection by the absence of any outside influences, such as 
those presented by an overt act of communication. In fact, the only thing 
empty reflective silence lacks is direct intentional influence from an external 
source. Inner thoughts and sounds are present even when silence offers no 
overt act of communication, therefore reflective silence is not purely silent, it 
is only mistaken for this because it is empty of communication.
Bindeman’s suggestion of a creative response to the emptiness of 
silence15, demonstrates that silence can be a nothingness which compels 
reflection. The thinker, when confronted with an empty silence, like the 
absence of a reply to a question, is forced to look back upon what she does 
know in order to escape the void. Self-reflection can result in restructuring the 
question in such a way as to make it open for a reply. Alternatively it can 
direct the thinker to knowledge already in her possession, but overlooked. 
And, finally, it can point out the limitations of what can be understood or 
known, causing a revelation of Socratic ignorance and an understanding of
15 Bindeman.
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one’s finitude. In this sense it is possible to get something out of nothing, like 
Job finding faith before the silence of God. Empty silence thus compels an 
active response in the percipient who can use knowledge and creativity to 
construct a meaning for the silence.
Nietzsche writes of the death of God, an event Bindeman (and others) 
translates into the end of a fixed way of understanding the world. Faced with 
this nihilism human beings become responsible for creating their own 
rationale for the world; we must create our own logic because there is no 
longer any predetermined logic applied to the world for us. Bindeman calls 
the silence of the dead God “the abyss, the absurd, the nothingness”16, which 
inspires dread in the observer. However, confrontation with the nothingness- 
silence of the dead God has the interesting effect of forcing the listener back 
on herself, requiring her to return to her own thoughts; otherwise she would 
be lost with nothing intelligible to work with. This is the nature of empty 
silence. The silence which acts as a mirror for the recollection of former 
ideas, memories of information already in one’s possession, and which causes 
one to think about what one already knows in order to learn and understand. 
Thus, empty Harpocratic silence can inspire creative thought, but the creativity 
does not come out of nothing -  it is instead the product of knowledge we 
already have. We do not find new information, but rearrange information 
which is already in our possession17. The dread of the abyss can therefore 
strengthen the observer who does not allow it to engulf her but who uses it as a 
mirror for self-examination and self-creation.
The passivity of empty silence inspires the observer to examine 
knowledge which she already owns. She can play with this remembered 
information and rework it in new permutations which help change her
16 Bindeman, pg: 1.
17This is a paraphrase from Bindeman who makes a similar point with reference to how 
Wittgenstein described the job of philosophy: “Philosophical problems are solved not by our 
discovering new information, but simply by our rearranging what we already know.” Pg: 52.
24
understanding, and allow her to grow. It is like trying for hours to figure out a 
difficult question: you might take a break and speak to a colleague about it, 
and the conversation may bring in a new perspective which makes the answer 
clear when you return. Yet in the case of emptiness, unlike one’s colleagues, 
the silence is passive and provides the observer with a blank slate on which to 
draw her own conclusions in new ways. Harpocratic silence is passive, but 
that makes the observer active because her mind needs something to work 
with -  absolute nothingness is absurd to an active mind.
Philosophers cover silence with questions even though some things 
just cannot supply us with answers. There are some questions which when 
asked are met with silence; some questions to which the best reply is most 
likely no reply at all18. This is not necessarily because they have no answer, 
but because there is no proper fixed answer for them. It is enough to pose the 
question, in fact it is imperative we do so, but there need be no definite 
response to it. Instead the answers grow and multiply like vines until they 
overlap and intertwine. The silent response permits this kind of growth of 
ideas. Thus, when the question ‘how could the Holocaust ever have 
occurred?’ is posed, the fact that there is no definite answer permits any 
number of possible answers and allows the topic to be explored and thought 
through. It is difficult questions like this which are best dealt with in silence 
because they are too lofty, too ambiguous and too profound to admit only one 
single true reply. Instead, posing the question opens the possibility of 
exploring all sorts of replies and emotional responses to the issue at hand. 
Being met by Harpocratic silence directs the poser of the question toward 
discovering the various dimensions of the issue.
“Silence sets this thinking in motion”19, but it requires that we have the 
ability to listen and perceive that it is actually there before we can experience
18For more information on this see chapter 15 on "Medical Silence".
19Bindeman, pg: 1.
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the effects of the emptiness of the silence. Thus, Bindeman suggests that it is 
incumbent upon us to cultivate the correct way of listening in order to hear 
silence, whether it be empty or full. This is a training few of us acquire 
because of the dread of confronting the emptiness of Harpocratic silence, like 
the ultimate silence of death. Instead we are quick to fill silences with words 
or sounds, and never become accustomed to, nor benefit from, the effects of 
silence. Ways of listening to silence so that they are not ignored or 
misunderstood, is the central problem of the second section of this thesis.
Bindeman says that Heidegger and Wittgenstein have tried to answer 
Nietzsche’s challenge by defining humans as users of language. Humans as 
natural users of language want to fill emptiness with words to prove that we 
are alive, and to show that we are in control because of our superior use of a 
communicative tool which other animals do not possess. This partially 
explains why we are not comfortable in the presence of silence and so cover it 
with words -  it is in our nature to do so.
"Man likes to make sounds to remind himself that he is not alone.
From this point of view total silence is the rejection of the human 
personality. Man fears the absence of sound as he fears the 
absence of life."20
But, Bindeman says, Heidegger and Wittgenstein themselves were not afraid 
of silence. In their work they uncovered questions but were silent about the 
answers. They left the questions unanswered because they wanted us to do the 
work for ourselves. Thus, Bindeman calls Heidegger and Wittgenstein the 
ultimate teachers because their silence teaches us how to think, just like the 
silence of God taught Job how to find his own faith21. The silence, or lack of 
response from the teacher requires the student to return to what is already in
20Schafer, pg: 256.
21Book o f Job. A New Translation According to the Traditional Hebrew Text. Kethubim 
trans. The Jewish Publication Society of America; Philadelphia, Penn.; 1980 (5740).
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her possession, and ruminate upon it, allowing it to grow on its own without 
outside interference, viz from the imposition of someone else’s rationality.
Bindeman says that there are two types of behaviour on the part of 
perceivers of silence: passive, which registers what is offered; and assertive 
which asserts or tells the way things are, applying order to what is presented to 
it22. With regard to silence it is clear that assertive thought belongs most 
readily to empty Harpocratic silence, and passive thought to full Larundic 
silence, but there will be overlap. Full silence sometimes requires respectful 
assertions, that is assertions which stay within the parameters of its meaning; 
whereas empty silence requires the openness and attentiveness of passive 
thought in order to be recognised at all -  it is only in being passive and still 
that empty silence can be recognised. The best way to distinguish truly 
Harpocratic silences from difficult Larundic silences is to allow the passive 
mind to listen attentively and allow the silence to make itself known.
Thus, we must keep silent and be aware of what our conscience tells 
us. This requires the right mood. The right mood is openness23. But 
openness creates the possibility of loss of self, if one does not listen carefully 
to one’s own conscience. Therefore, we must cultivate another kind of 
hearing in order to break away from the voices of others; a kind of hearing 
which can appreciate conscience’s silent, non-verbal call. This will permit the 
percipient of a silence to perceive the meaning of the silence without losing 
critical perspective of it, as will be shown in Part II.
Bindeman uses the example of Zen poetry because it is deliberately 
simple, almost unfinished, for the express purpose of making the listener use 
her own imagination to fill it out. The symbol makes us guess at what is truly 
being said. Thus, understanding a poem is the gradual fabrication within the
22Bindeman, pg: 48.
23 See Gadamer for the importance of openness. A discussion of this appears in chapter two of 
this thesis.
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emptiness until something evolves more or less complete. Zen Haiku poetry is 
based on intervals, pauses and silences. Thus, the poem is created by its 
listener, with the directions given by the poet. The poet situates the listener on 
a path, then allows her to find her own way24.
Cicada’s Shrill
How silent and still!
Into the heart of the rocks sinks
The cicada’s shrill. _ Basho25
The restraint of this Haiku reminds us of the sound of a Cicada, which 
in turn may lead to memories of hot summer days. Upon further thought the 
ideas expand, perhaps toward the eternal silence and stillness of rocks, and our 
own deaths when we, like the shrill of the cicada, will sink into the heart of the 
rocks and the earth. Its meaning is revealed to us indirectly, not told to us. 
Leaving the meaning to silence allows our imaginations to create the rest of 
the poem ourselves. A similar point can be made about Chinese prints and 
water colours, where the edges of the work disappear into a haze, implying the 
rest of the world, but leaving its fullness to the assertive imagination of the 
spectator. This inspires spectators to create the rest of the feeling on their 
own, and to wander the cliffs or countryside of their own imaginations. The 
emptiness prompts creativity, not passive observation.
This is why we believe we can gain new knowledge in silence. 
Perhaps because it is only in the quiet that we are open to all the knowledge 
we already possess, and are able to leave room for contemplation and creation. 
It seems paradoxical to think that we can gain something new by examination 
of what is old. And yet we do not release this idea, probably because it is
24 Bindeman, pg: 9.
25 Haiku from Yasuda, Kenneth. The Japanese Haiku: Its Essential Nature, History, and 
Possibilities; in English with Selected Examples. Charles E Tuttle Co.; Rutland Vt. & Tokyo, 
Japan; 1957. Pg: 185.
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affirmed for us in the experiences of those such as Descartes and other 
recluses who have emerged from silent solitude with fresh insight and novel 
ideas. They have explored their murky silences and have emerged, not empty 
handed, but with all sorts of new and good ideas. No one speaks to them, they 
listen to nothing and yet they emerge with something new. There is something 
almost mystical about what the mind can do in silence, creating new ideas 
which lead to original thoughts. In silence we follow the paths of familiar 
ideas and are led into the unfamiliar terrains of knowledge. It is not just that 
the ideas were there waiting to be found. They are created by the joining of 
ideas, they are the offspring of more familiar thoughts. This is creativity 
similar to Aristotle’s notion of phronesis26. They are concepts bom of a 
current problem which cannot be solved by usual means and requires a sort of 
wisdom which creates something new by merging familiar with foreign to 
create novel. These ideas spring fully formed from our silences as Athena 
sprang from the brain of Zeus, formed deep within the silence of his mind 
until she broke out unable to be suppressed any longer.
We have no direct knowledge of pure silence so we must study its 
effects as they occur in the form of Harpocratic silence. “We cannot know 
silence because we cannot know what it is. But we can describe the effects of 
silence.”27 When we feel the effects of any silence we try to guess at it, look 
for its sense or order. Where no order exists we guess at nothing, as a result 
what we ‘find’ is only what we have created; the order does not exist until 
consciousness sees or searches for it. Thus, in an empty silence the only order 
which exists is the order we assert. Empty silence remains passive while we 
work upon it. This sums up the problem with silence nicely: where we find 
no limits of order we can interpret the situation any way we want. This leads
0 f \ See The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics, as well Gadamer and Bernstein on the idea 
of phronesis.
on Bindeman, pg: 54.
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us directly to the problems of relativism and the absolute freedom to impose 
our will. When the silence is Harpocratic it is acceptable for us to take 
liberties with it because its emptiness gives the interpreter freedom to create 
whatever meaning she wills. The same is not true of Larundic silence, where 
imposing one's will violates the obscure boundaries that help build a faithful 
interpretation of the meaning of the silence. In full silences boundaries do 
exist, both externally and internally, but they are obscure. Unlike language, 
where words used as symbols help create these limits. Silence is more 
slippery so the limits are more difficult to find. The danger is in treating full 
Larundic silence as if it were empty Harpocratic silence by imposing one’s 
own will upon it without being sensitive to the limits its meaning brings. 
Openness helps prevent this confusion. The understanding required for 
identifying silence at all, also shows us how to listen to the silence in order to 
determine whether it is empty or full. It is possible to then recognise the clues 
for faithfully interpreting the meanings held within the full silence.
1.6 Larundic Silence or Active/Full Silence:
Larunda’s tale directs us toward an idea of silence which implies 
fullness rather than emptiness. Larunda’s communicative silence refers to acts 
of silence which are types of linguistic acts; and thought of in this way silence 
is open to being imbued with meaning.
We call these meaningful acts “Larundic silences” as they are the 
expressive silences which Larunda communicated to Hermes. Interpretation 
of the linguistically ‘unsaid’ is still shared communication and a passage for 
information. The very idea of an act of silence, or the act of being quiet, 
implies a degree of intentional content in the silence. Thus, a Larundic silence 
is one that may have intentional meaningful content which the utterer wishes
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to issue as a communicative expression. The significance of Larundic silence 
must not be overlooked, as doing so would eliminate a useful form of 
communication; one which is able to cross the barriers of different languages28 
and linguistic fallibility. However, Larundic communication cannot stand on 
its own, its content must be interpreted to be understood. Just as Larunda 
relied on Hermes to interpret her silences, Larundic silences depend upon 
hermeneutic interpretation to make their content known. In Part II we will 
explore how meaningful acts of silence are understood through interpretation, 
and the problems which this entails.
This section will first inquire into some of the uses of Larundic 
silences both as aspects of linguistic communication and as a form of non­
verbal communication. The exploration will begin with an illustration of the 
problems associated with a need to use interpretation to understand silent 
communication. This will be followed by a description of the two 
subcategories of Larundic silence; 1) grammatical silence, which participates 
in language; and 2) communicative silence which conveys what words cannot 
express provided its audience can learn to value its ambiguity and interpret its 
meaning.
1.6.1 An introduction to the problems o f interpreting Larundic silences:
Larundic silence can mean different things in different situations. A 
silence can mean (or stand for) anger, joy, sorrow, confusion or certainty. 
Larundic silences can also act as symbolic, representations or metaphorical 
depictions, of ideas which are not easily communicated through linguistic 
means, or whose force is greater when not made verbal. This situational 
variability entails that Larundic silence relies on its context to communicate its 
meaning. The primary reason for this rests on a significant characteristic of
n o
See Benadava, Salvador: “Sens et Bon Usage du Silence” in Le Francais dans le Monde 
126. Pp: 13-6.
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silence: it is slippery. Silence offers very little information on its own of 
which the interpreter can take hold, and so the interpreter is left to try to 
understand the silence from the events surrounding it. This makes silence 
slippery because it evades the interpreter’s cognitive grasp. From this it 
follows that silence is understood only indirectly and is dependent upon the 
interpreter’s ability to make the effort required to respond to the contextual 
information surrounding the silence. Such effort helps delimit radical from 
non-radical readings of the meaning behind the Larundic silence. It is not 
always likely that interpreters will be inclined to make this effort, however, 
and this is probably why silence is so frequently misinterpreted. Thus, 
Larundic silences are variable in meaning and understood only indirectly 
through interpretation, which makes it difficult to capture their meanings at 
all.
When we make any kind of interpretation we normally carry with us 
our own baggage of prejudices, preconceptions, intellectual history and 
traditions, among other things. Where a great deal of external information is 
given to us by the object of interpretation, we are more likely to abandon this 
personal ‘baggage’, provided 1) we pay attention to the information given, and 
2) the information is not overly obscure. Silence by nature reveals very little 
information to use as guidelines for interpretation. As a result, the interpreter 
must look to other sources for information to be able to construct an accurate 
interpretation. The best source of information is the context (both mediate and 
immediate) of the silence; but because the interpreters’ own baggage is easier 
to grasp, in most cases they will impose their own interpretation upon the 
silence before paying attention to what is really going on. The problem then 
arises that radical or opportunistic interpretations of the silence are easily 
constructed. These are interpretations which do not fit the Larundic silence’s 
own sense of meaning and as such do violence to it.
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Consider this true life example regarding going beyond what is most 
readily evident for making accurate interpretations of a situation. Medical 
diagnoses are acts of interpretation. In this case an emergency room 
physician, Dr. R, received a female patient, Ms. B, who was complaining of 
dizziness, nausea, headache and a loss of co-ordination. She also said she felt 
a strange tingling feeling throughout her body. The patient had previously 
undergone treatment for breast cancer and was concerned this might be 
related. After performing a basic physical upon Ms. B, Dr. R concluded that 
she was suffering from a flu virus which was epidemic in the city and had in 
some cases affected the inner ear of its victims thus causing dizziness. He 
recommended rest and that Ms. B consult her family physician if the 
symptoms persisted over a week. Ms. B, unconvinced that her symptoms 
could be this severe without being serious decided instead to consult a 
neurologist immediately. The neurologist, Dr. L, saw a completely different 
diagnosis in the patient’s symptoms. He ordered a CAT-scan which revealed 
a large tumour pushing on Ms. B’s cerebellum, causing the dizziness, loss of 
co-ordination etc. Dr. R’s failure to make an accurate diagnosis of Ms. B ’s 
illness was due at least in part to his knowledge of the flu epidemic which he 
was certain was the source of Ms. B’s symptoms as he saw them. The fact is, 
his preconceptions set up certain expectations which led him to the wrong 
conclusion. But, the same might have been said for Dr. L who, trained as a 
neurologist, saw a set of familiar symptoms which led him to an accurate 
diagnosis. It could be said that it was almost mere coincidence that he was 
right. For had Ms. B really been suffering from the flu virus the CAT-scan 
would have revealed nothing and would have been a waste of time and 
resources, though with less serious consequences to Ms. B than Dr. R’s 
mistake.
Illnesses supply diagnosers with clues to their identity through the 
presence of symptoms. Symptoms suggest certain possibilities and collected
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together make some, or preferably one particular diagnosis the correct one. It 
is not so simple with silence. Larundic silence is slippery. It offers few 
‘symptoms’ if any to act as clues for the interpreter, at least not in any direct 
way. It is not surprising, then, that ordinary interpreters are more likely to 
disregard the information which surrounds the silence as this information takes 
greater effort to find. Instead the interpreter is more likely to rely on 
information which is closer to hand, namely the information from their own 
baggage or obvious external information. Larundic silence’s slipperiness 
requires the interpreter to make greater efforts to find relevant information for 
constructing non-radical and non-opportunistic readings.
Once again we are directed to the context of the situation to help 
interpret the meaning of the Larundic silence. And silence can be meaningful. 
It can tell us about the person responsible for the silence. It can show us 
things we do not already see. It is a tool for communication, for education and 
for realisation. When it is interpreted it can cause events; when it is 
misinterpreted it can cause tragedies -  see for example the events in A Man 
For All Seasons.
1.6.2: Grammatical and Communicative silences:
Larundic silence is divisible into two subcategories: grammatical 
silence and communicative silence. The grammar of silence is used in 
conversation or writing to put forth concepts which do not need to be 
expressed verbally, or which it would be uneconomical to make explicit. 
These are linguistic devices which allow the speaker time to prepare the next 
sentence, and allow the listener to reflect upon what was previously said. 
Grammatical silences always take place within linguistic communication, like 
the pause in a sentence. They are frequently interpreted, as the passage in 
“Silence in the Court” below demonstrates with regard to witness stammers 
during court-room cross-examination. Grammatical silences are frequently
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perceived as an attempt on the speaker's part to carefully formulate a thought. 
In this way silences punctuate speech like commas do written language in that 
they provide a pause without intending the thought to end, the speaker has 
more to say on the subject. Silences may also act as semi-colons do; in this 
case the idea expressed has come to an end, but the speaker wants to reserve 
the space to continue speaking, and be uninterrupted while she gathers her 
thoughts or allows the listener time to consider the idea. Silences may also act 
as question marks? Thus, leaving room for the listener either to respond with 
an answer, or to ponder the rhetorical nature of the question. Sometimes, 
silences are used as exclamation points! The impact of the preceding 
statement only sinking in during a pause in the conversation. Finally, silences 
can act as periods, completing the thought and letting the listener know that it 
is time to turn to another idea.
Economy of speech renders a great deal of significant information 
silent. This is another way in which Larundic silence performs a grammatical 
function. We cannot afford to say all there needs to be said on a given subject 
or it would take an eternity to communicate even the simplest idea. Thus, 
silence assists grammar by permitting to be left silent information which is 
implied by sentence structure. Consider, for example, the sentence “I want a 
glass of water”. It is taken to be understood who the referent T  is in the 
sentence, and what it is for this ‘I* to desire something; it is also understood 
what a 'glass' is in the sentence and how it differs from other things we call a 
'glass' such as mirrors; furthermore it goes without saying that water is the 
liquid with the chemical breakdown H20... and so on. Without this silent
communication of ideas no conversation would be able to take place. It would 
take too long to express every idea, and define every word before a sentence 
could be constructed. This may be said to be the most useful form of silence 
because of its practical nature. It is grammatical only in a very loose sense
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that it serves a function in linguistic activity unlike communicative silence 
which is separate from linguistic applications.
Without Larundic silence, we would miss the colour of language: 
humour, sarcasm, sadness... all would go unnoticed because the emotional 
content of a conversation is often expressed silently instead of directly. Take 
for example the long pause which follows an ironic joke, in that moment of 
silence the hearers sort out whether the utterance is meant to be taken 
seriously, then detect the irony of the statement and eventually find the 
humour in it. The teller of the joke need say no more to clarify (unless it was 
a really bad joke). The understanding happens silently, and neither has to be 
prefaced with “this is a joke”, nor followed with a rim-shot and a “get it?”. 
When the joke is written down we seldom find any indication that the sentence 
is meant to be humorous. We have no punctuation mark to indicate a joke has 
been told, nothing like what we have to indicate a question has been asked. 
The humour is implied; that it is funny is expressed silently and understood 
only from its context29.
The same is true with most of the emotional content of our 
conversations. Recently, open communication of feelings has become more 
acceptable. Statements which begin with “I am feeling...” are more common 
than they have been in the past. Instead we tend to convey our emotional 
responses silently, where this silence can indicate a spectrum of feelings and 
emotions. Often feelings cannot be expressed verbally anyway. In such cases 
Larundic silence is far more eloquent than words which only express the 
surface of what needs to be understood. Of course such words as ‘anger’, 
‘confusion’, ‘frustration’ are all good labels or indicators of what the person is 
trying to convey, and using these will help the interpreter of the emotional
9 0
In scripts we sometimes have indications that a line is meant to be delivered in a particular 
way indicated by a bracketed term such as (sarcastic), or (joking). Literary texts will also 
indicate when a character has said something ironically or with some other emotion. 
Interestingly, this is never the case in prose (academic writing) where jokes do sometimes 
occur (see Hankinson’s article on the humour in Aristotle), nor in poetry as far as I know.
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silence to take the right path when building an understanding. Without such 
labels the emotions listed above could be easily confused one for the other, 
and the interpretation would come out wrong. However, these are merely 
labels which are unable to fully express the feelings they point to30.
Communicative silence is the broad category of full silences which can 
take any number of forms. They are familiar to us because we experience 
them all the time. We are all familiar with moments of unexplicable insight 
into a situation, like the immediate feeling of warmth we sometimes feel for 
people we have only just met. Before the conversation goes far enough to 
make the judgement through ordinary means of finding like tendencies and 
preferences, we experience a profound knowledge that this is a person we will 
like. It is not the artificial feeling Oscar Wilde parodied in The Importance o f 
Being Earnest when Gwendolyn tells Cecily “I like you already more than I 
can say, and my first impressions of people are never wrong”31, which is 
proven false later in the play when she discovers she was wrong about who her 
own fiancee really is. It is instead some insight we gain in the empty spaces 
between the conversation which passes on some meaningful information about 
the other person. There is no need for verbal communication to accompany 
such Larundic silences, their wordlessness communicates enough on its own. 
Information manages to be transmitted despite the lack of verbal discourse.
It seems we are programmed from birth to acquire knowledge in this 
way. The paradigm example of this type of silent communication occurs 
between a mother and her new bom child. The baby trusts the mother and 
learns to love her not through an exchange of words, but through an unspoken 
bond between them. This bond is equally forceful for the mother who grows 
to love her baby even before she sees it, while the child is still in her womb.
See Pinter’s Betrayal’, Grove Press; New York, NY; 1978,.and Ishiguro’s The Remains of 
the Day; Faber; London; 1989; for good examples of emotions conveyed indirectly, and the 
tragedies which occur when they are misinterpreted.
O 1
Wilde, Oscar; The Importance of Being Earnest, Grey Halls Press; London; 1948.
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The bond of affection between mother and child need not be spoken. It need 
only be felt; it is experienced through silence. The same silent growth of 
affection later occurs between the child and its father, grandparents, aunts, 
uncles and siblings. Nothing need be said to the child about this affection, 
rather it is understood by the quiet knowledge that the other has feelings for 
one which are as strong as the feelings one has for them. This information can 
be silently demonstrated without being spoken.
From this early lesson in silent communication we learn to perceive 
information without it being verbally communicated to us. “Discovering that 
one has nothing to say, one seeks a way to say that.”32 This is information 
which exists between the lines, and is capable of transferring huge amounts of 
knowledge without which we would lack a great deal of understanding. The 
example above about wanting a glass of water illustrates this kind of silent 
transmission of information, but there is the other kind of transferral, like the 
mother-child bond, which actually communicates new information through the 
silence. The information passed on in the space of Larundic silence can be 
novel in the way we sometimes know we will like or dislike a person just by 
meeting them. This is true transferral, whereas the knowledge communicated 
in the water example is not new but merely recalled for the sake of 
convenience. True transferral of information does take place without the 
spoken words.
An observer may enter a room and find a person sitting and thinking. 
The person is not speaking so the observer may experience impure silence as 
they would hear only the sounds in and outside the room. Additionally, there 
is a full silence in the room, because the person is thinking about something 
which they may or may not wish to convey to the observer. Still, there is 
something active and meaningful taking place. The observer might respond to 
the silence by trying to figure out what it means because of an intuitive
32 Sontag 1984, 188.
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recognition that silence can be meaningful. Constructing an interpretation of 
the Larundic silence can convey a great deal of information to interpreters. It 
can tell them about the person responsible for the silence. It can show them 
things they do not already see. In this way, silence is a tool for 
communication, for education and for realisation. Furthermore, silences can 
communicate to the listener a thought which the speaker either is incapable of 
expressing or chooses not to express aloud.
1.6.3 Gestures:
A great deal of this silent Larundic communication is performed 
through gestures, facial expressions and what has overall been referred to as 
‘body language’. Nodding heads, searching glances and folded arms are all 
readable forms of Larundic silence and fit both subcategories of grammatical 
and communicative silence. Body language is part of grammatical silence 
because it is often used to enhance verbal conversation. Hand gestures are 
examples of grammatical silences when they accompany speech, such as 
pointing and saying “it’s over there”. However, gestures involve an overlap 
between grammatical and communicative silence. Besides providing clarity 
and emphasis when associated with words, as grammatical silence does, body 
language can also replace or confound linguistic conversation. For example, 
an ironic facial expression can change the meaning of a verbal statement, such 
as when rolling one’s eyes while saying “I’m so looking forward to this”. 
Gestures can also denote the opposite of a linguistic statement, for example 
when a child crosses her fingers while making a promise. This childhood 
superstition illustrates how words can say something different from what is 
silently meant. Moreover, body language can be an unconscious transmission 
of contrary or different information from what is being said. We can transmit 
the truth of our feelings about someone by the position we sit in; sitting
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sideways and looking over a shoulder at someone gives them a different 
message from facing that person directly. Thus, gestures can silently put 
across what words are not saying.
Gestures can also replace words altogether. Hand gestures, such as a 
wave, are still effective means of communication because, like words, they 
act as symbols for intentional meanings. The ultimate usage of 
communication by gesture is sign-language, but it is not clear that this is really 
silent communication in any more than a very superficial sense of silence. 
There is no doubt that speakers of sign-language are not making sounds when 
they speak. However the signs they use are symbols of concepts just as words 
are, so they cannot be described as silent in the Harpocratic sense because they 
are not empty. Sign-language does seem to fit the Larundic rubric as these are 
the sorts of gestures that Larunda might have used to relate her stories to 
Hermes. But, the main difference lies in Hermes’ need to interpret Larunda’s 
silent gestures because they were not formalised in a linguistic system -  sign- 
language is. The gestures of sign-languages are standardised and repeatable. 
They act, for all intents and purposes, in the same way words do; namely as 
symbols for concepts which can be strung together to transmit complex ideas. 
Signs differ from words primarily by virtue of the fact that they are soundless. 
Signs are words without sounds so they cannot be pronounced, but this does 
not mean that they cannot be easily transmitted to anyone who knows sign- 
language. And knowledge of sign-language is like knowledge of English or 
French, it has a system that can be learned and understood. So, by the same 
token, words are signs with sounds instead of actions. Furthermore, signers 
can be described as talking loudly or softly depending upon the size of their 
gestures and perhaps the degree of enthusiasm with which they are delivered. 
And even persons who are deaf sometimes need a respite from the ‘noisiness’ 
of conversation33.
33Dolnick, Edward. “Deafness as Culture” in The Atlantic Monthly, September 1993. Pp: 37- 
53.
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The Heart is a Lonely Hunter, by Carson McCullors34, is about a deaf 
and mute man living in an all hearing community. The character ironically but 
respectfully called Mr. Singer, is ascribed by the other characters to possess an 
almost mystical ability to ‘hear’ everything. They describe feeling that Singer 
knows things about them and about life which they cannot know. The author 
endows Singer with messianic qualities of holiness and eyes that seem to see 
into the soul. His silent world becomes even more silent when he looses his 
only deaf and mute friend to an institution. The poignancy of this loss is 
further elaborated by Singer’s habit of keeping his hands, which he uses for 
signing, in his pockets when he is not speaking. It is as if they needed to be 
shielded, as though his thoughts needed to be buried in the depths of his 
pockets, either from shame or more likely for protection. His decision to keep 
his hands in his pockets, thereby deepens his silence by concealing his primary 
means of communicating. Thus, illustrating how a user of sign-language can 
be silent beyond the soundlessness of their form of speech35.
Does this mean that there is a silence more profound than the silence of 
soundlessness? The project of this chapter has been to show that there is. 
Mere soundlessness does not adequately express the richness of silence which 
can be meaningful and communicative or purely empty. For the purposes of 
the project of understanding silence, we divide silence into two general 
categories with some sub-categories. Thus, we have:
Silence
Pure silence »ure silence
Harpocratic Larundic
Empty/Passive silence ^^Full/A ctjve silence 
Reflective iilence Grammatical Communicative
34McCullors, Carson: The Heart is a Lonely Hunter. Cresset Press; London; 1943.
35Dolnick, 1993. Pp: 37-53.
The second part of this thesis will be about interpreting Larundic 
silence and the problems surrounding the interpretation of such a slippery 
subject. In order to make a discussion of interpretations of silence make sense 
it is necessary to first address the question whether silence can be meaningful. 
The following chapter addresses the issue of meaning in silence.
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CHAPTER 2 
SILENCE AND MEANING
Is there meaning in silence? The intuitive answer to this question is 
probably the correct one: Yes, silence can be meaningful. We have first hand 
experience of meaning in silence; through our own silences we are familiar 
with times when we have intended a silence to stand for surprise, anger, 
sorrow..., and we have successfully conveyed that meaning to others without 
resorting to verbal explanations. But, what does it mean for silence to mean 
something? To answer this question it is worth examining what philosophers 
have said about what it means for words and sentences to have meaning, and 
then try to apply the results to silence.
2.1 Grice and Searle on Meaning:
H.P. Grice1 has attempted to define meaning in a linguistic manner. 
He says meaning is related to intention because it is tied to the outcome 
intended by the utterer of the meaningful speech act. That is, a speech act 
derives its meaning from the intention of the utterer to make someone 
understand her desire. Thus, meaning is part of speech acts composed of 
utterances which convey to the audience whatever the utterer wishes the 
audience to understand by the utterance. As an example, I say “Patrick, please 
take out the garbage”. By this I intend for Patrick to know, not only that he
1 Grice, H.P.: “Meaning” in Philosophy of Logic. P.F. Strawson ed. Oxford Readings in 
Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford; 1967. Pp: 39-48; and “Utterer’s Meaning, 
Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning”. Philosophy of Language. J.R. Searle ed. Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford; 1971. Pp: 54-70.
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ought to take out the garbage, nor only that I want him to take out the garbage. 
I also intend him to understand by my utterance, that intend him to understand 
that I want him to take out the garbage. The intention is not only specific to 
the action referred to in the utterance, but also indirectly and more subtly, my 
unspoken desire that Patrick understand what it is I wish to say to him and 
have him do. Thus, in issuing the utterance I  intend my audience to 
understand my intention, and that forms the meaning of my utterance. This is 
especially interesting in regard to more opaque utterances such as when I say 
“Whew, that garbage is starting to smell strong!”, by which I may have the 
same intention that I had in the previous, more direct statement “Patrick, 
please take out the garbage”. If my intention is the same, then given certain 
conditions it will be taken to mean the same, ie. my unspoken desire that 
Patrick understand that I wish him to take out the garbage. There are two 
things taking place here: 1) intending to utter ‘U \  and 2) intending the 
utterance ‘U’ to be taken to mean something ‘m’2. Grice’s definition of 
meaning is an intended intention successfully conveyed to an audience via a 
speech act.
J.R. Searle is critical of Grice’s definition because it relies too heavily 
on communication, but he does not reject the criteria for meaningfulness 
altogether. Generally, Grice’s position looks like a good description of a 
conversation where meanings are conveyed and communication takes place, 
but it is not a satisfactory definition of meaning. Searle is more concerned 
with the idea of meaning as isolated from language. It is possible to conceive 
of having a meaningful thought without it being uttered as a speech act and so, 
as Searle argues, meaning in fact preexists speech acts. He actually goes as far 
as to say that we are biologically predisposed to formulating meaningful 
intentions, thoughts, ideas, before we acquire language; thus, infants may have
9
Searle, J.R.: “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts”. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science. Vol.VII: Language. Mind, and Knowledge: Kieth Gunderson ed. University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minn.; 1975. Pp: 344-369.
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the intention to grasp or hold even though they do not have the language with 
which to express these meaningful intentions. It is possible to find examples 
of extra-linguistic meaning without relying on biological predispositioning 
(which has problems of its own). The best examples are feelings. Not only do 
feelings preexist the speech acts which describe them, but they seem to defy 
verbal description altogether. A statement can express joy “oh this is 
fabulous!”, but it cannot do so sincerely unless the feeling is present to be 
spoken about. Nor can it actually convey what it is to feel the joy expressed. 
Yet it does not follow from this that feelings of joy are not meaningful,; it is 
just that their meaning is not purely linguistic. This will be relevant for 
determining whether silence can possibly be meaningful.
Searle does not reject Grice’s criteria entirely,. Rather, he maintains 
that meaning and intention are interrelated. However, Searle’s explanation of 
meaning differs from Grice’s in that it is based partly on a weak form of 
verification and on psychological states. Searle’s position is as follows. One 
primary difference between just making noises and actually uttering a speech 
act is that the utterer is trying to make an audience understand something. 
This effect is produced when the audience recognizes the intention of the 
utterer. This is the twofold criteria for meaningfulness, the intention to utter 
and the intention that the utterance be understood to mean something. There is 
here, a close relationship between meaning and intention. But for Searle the 
intention to communicate an utterance entails that the intended utterance must 
have meaning; it is not enough to intend people to understand something, 
there must be something fo r  the utterer to intend to be understood. This is 
where Searle diverges from Grice by separating language from meaning: 
language is the tool with which utterers attempt to make an audience 
understand their intentions, meaning is what they intend them to understand. 
These are not the same things, intention to communicate is different from that 
which one intends to communicate, namely the meaning. Thus, it is possible
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to say something meaningful without fulfilling the second part of the 
meaningfulness-two-step, viz. without intending anyone to understand it3. For 
example, it is possible to produce a meaningful utterance in an empty room, or 
silently and secretly to oneself. But that still leaves unanswered the question, 
what is the meaning?
Searle says meaning is tied to validity because it is the representation 
of the conditions for a state of affairs. And to this end Searle introduces the 
notion of ‘fit’4.
“Statements are supposed to represent how things are, and thus 
they can be assessed as true or false. Orders and commands do 
not represent how things are, but roughly speaking, how the 
speaker is trying to get the hearer to make things be; and such 
speech acts cannot be assessed as true or false, but rather as 
obeyed or disobeyed.... To mark these distinctions, I say that 
statements have the word-to-world direction of fit; promises, 
orders, commands, etc. have the world-to-word direction of
fit.”5
Human actions, such as utterances, are expressions of intentionality, 
but meaning is only a special form of intentionality. Meaning involves the 
“intentional imposition of conditions of satisfaction onto conditions of 
satisfaction”6; thus, meaning is one of two layers of intentionality: the 
intention of fit and the intention of intending. The second layer, where 
meaning exists on its own, can be achieved without the utterance of a speech 
act, thus we can have wishes, beliefs etc. without speaking them. Meaning 
can therefore exist independently of language.
3Searle, J.R.: “What is a Speech Act?”. Philosophy of Language. J.R. Searle ed. Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford; 1971. Pp: 39-53.
4This is different from, but not unrelated to, Dworkin’s notion of fit discussed below.
5Searle, J.R.: “Response: Meaning, Intentionality, and Speech Acts”. John Searle and His 
Critics. Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick eds. Basil Blackwell Inc., Cambridge, Mass.; 
1991. Pg: 82.
6 Searle 1991, pg:83.
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“...The very bare bones of the intention to state are the intention 
that one’s utterance should be meaningful in the quite specific
sense that it should be a representation of a state of affairs.”7
Meaning is the intention to represent a state of affairs through an utterance; 
and representation is tied to intentional content, direction of fit, and conditions 
of satisfaction8.
Searle has been criticized for this one-sided description of meaning 
where meaningfulness is determined solely by the issuer of the utterance, the 
one who has the idea in the first place. Habermas, among other critics, 
declares meaning is a cooperative effort determined by mutual negotiation 
between the utterer and the audience. He is critical of Searle’s approach, 
which he describes as an attempt to derive “... the semantic notion of meaning 
from the cognitive intentions which are supposedly not only more basic than 
language but are also independent of the interaction situation.”9 Habermas 
says that persuasion and decision must be involved in meaning, which 
eventually culminate in the agreed upon understanding of a meaningful 
utterance. Habermas sees as contentious Searle’s assumption that 
meaningfulness can preexist a linguistic structure primarily because Habermas 
believes the conditions for recognizing facticity, the truth validity of ideas, are 
dependent upon linguistic structures. He says, with reference to the usefulness 
of drawings as representations for communication, that we need language in 
order to be able to describe and understand:
7 Searle 1991, pg: 83.
8 Searle 1991, pg: 84.
9 Habermas, Jurgen: “Comments on John Searle: ‘Meaning, Communication and 
Representation’”. John Searle and His Critics. Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick eds. Basil 
Blackwell Inc., Cambridge, Mass.; 1991. Pg:18.
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“The interpreter could not see at all that the drawing, by 
imitating a certain object, in fact represents a certain state of 
affairs if he did not already know a language and from this 
language use knew how states of affairs are linguistically 
represented.”10
So, for Habermas, meaning is closely tied to language because it is in 
understanding how ideas are represented through symbols, and in 
communicating ideas that meaning is understood. To know the meaning of a 
statement then, is to know its validity; it is to communicate the statement and 
find agreement about it with others.
Searle does not completly disagree with Habermas. Searle also claims 
that validity and meaning are closely tied; he says that to know the meaning of 
an utterance is to know the conditions under which it is accepted as valid. 
However, he also believes that meaning is independent of linguistic structure 
because the states of affairs utterances represent exist independently of their 
being uttered. Utterances are meaningful because they are valid or invalid 
(true or false, accurate or inaccurate) representations of states of affairs. It 
follows then that we can understand an utterance if we know the state of 
affairs required to make it true. But Habermas claims we cannot understand 
the validity of an utterance without some kind of linguistic structure.
“The hearer must be able to have the opportunity to anticipate 
the reasons for accepting a statement as true, an order as 
legitimate, a promise as binding, an avowal as authentic and 
sincere (or alternatively for questioning such a claim). The 
hearer cannot understand the speech act if he does not know the 
conditions for taking a yes/no position. The illocutionary 
meaning of a statement, an order, an avowal or a confession 
would remain hidden from the addressee if he could know only 
that the speaker has a certain intentional state...or that he wants 
to reveal the content of a belief, a feeling, a desire, an intention, 
etc.”11
10 Habermas, pg:20.
11 Habermas, pg:25.
48
In other words we cannot know the meaning of an utterance without knowing 
how to use that utterance to communicate with someone in literal terms, and 
ultimately reach an agreement about it in rationally motivated consensus. 
Habermas is wary of giving meaning priority over intention because he takes 
the position that meaning is not independent of a linguistic structure12.
“The priority of meaning over intention can be reversed in any 
case only under the premise that communication within a 
community of speakers is secondary to the capacity for 
representation possessed by the individual mind or brain....”13
Habermas’ position has a serious flaw according to Searle’s idea of 
meaning. The flaw is the same one Grice’s position suffers from, namely it 
makes the counterintuitive claim that there can be no meaning without shared 
meaning. In other words, there is no meaning without communication. 
Habermas relies too heavily upon mutual decision about what something may 
mean without taking into account that there must be something which is being 
decided upon, namely the initial utterance itself. And, what is this thing called 
the utterance, but a statement made by someone for the purpose of conveying 
some meaning to them (a la Grice); and what is the statement but some 
meaningful idea which came to the utterer in the first place, either as a 
representation of a certain state of affairs, or the representation of the way the 
utterer wishes the world to be: a psychological state. Thus, we return to the 
notion of a meaning which preexists its symbolic manifestation in language, 
and which belongs to the speaker before it is conveyed, shared and agreed 
upon in conversation. There are good reasons for accepting Habermas’ theory 
of mutual agreement, but not as a complete description of meaning, only as a
12 Have I made a mistake here? Or is it that Habermas uses the term ‘meaning’ as ‘general 
meaning’, like a dictionary meaning or a platonic ideal, or a previously agreed upon by the 
community meaning; and intention as what the individual intends by the specific utterance. In 
which case he is missing the important element Searle raises namely the the meaning that the 
individual has before intending to utter it.
13Habermas, pg:21.
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partial one which explains how meaning is used in a conversational context. 
Searle does not reject Habermas’ intersubjectivist view completely, he merely 
wants to point out that successful communication is not the definition of 
meaning.
Habermas and Searle debate about the place in which meaning exists. 
Habermas says meaning is in the agreement between speaker and listener as it 
is negotiated between them; Searle locates meaning before the act of 
speaking, because there must be something the two parties are agreeing upon 
and that is the meaning extrinsic to any speech act. Searle rightly points out 
that meaning must be separate from language, being present before humans 
acquire the ability to speak. It would follow then that meaning can exist 
without linguistic communication, and therefore does not exclude meaningful 
silences, or the possibility of communicating meaning through silence. Words 
are not the only way meaning is conveyed.
Searle’s arguments direct us to two important points about silence and 
meaning. The first is that, if Searle is right about meanings which preexist 
linguistic utterance, then it follows that silence can have meaning because 
silence is prelinguistic or extralinguistic. Secondly, it also follows from 
Searle’s argument that meaning is formed in silence before it emerges in 
linguistic form, and thus silence is the birthplace of meaning.
Considering the part of Grice’s theory which Searle does accept, it can 
be put that silence fulfills the two part criteria for meaningfulness in that a) 
one can intend to ‘utter’ a silence, and b) one can intend for that silent 
utterance to be understood as meaning something specific. The term 
‘utterance’ can be used in a very broad sense to include any act of 
communication whether by language, gesture, music or anything else; and it 
will be shown that it is possible to include silence among the category of 
utterances, however unorthodox, because it shares many characteristic traits
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with other utterances. Our working definition of an utterance is: a sound or 
sign which can symbolize or represent some meaning, and which is made by a 
person sometimes with the intention of communicating that meaning. Silence 
can fit this category description. Silence is a sign, though not a sound unless 
we count the lack of noise as a sort of sound. When it occurs in the midst of a 
sentence it is a place holder, otherwise it can be a symbol, which represents an 
idea (later in this work examples will be shown of the various ways silence is 
used in many different areas. It will be demonstrated that they are used in the 
same ways and to do the same things as utterances, eg in law and politics etc.). 
Larundic silences are often used in the effort to communicate. Silence can 
also be said to hold propositional content like the silence which says “I am 
angry with you”, or “I don’t know”. Furthermore, these propositions can have 
meaning in the way that Grice suggests, as the Larundic silence can be 
interpreted as its utterer intending the silence to be understood by its audience 
in a particular way.
Searle’s criteria of meaningfulness can also be fulfilled by Larundic 
silence. Larundic silence satisfies the criterion of intention as described in the 
above paragraph: one can intend a silence to represent some meaning in 
communication, and one can successfully transmit this intended meaning to an 
audience. So, a given act of silence can convey intentions of sympathy, 
anger...; we will see later how this is done through the interpretive act. 
Larundic silence also satisfies the second part of Searle’s criteria that meaning 
is independent of language. The ideas conveyed through Larundic silence 
grow independently of language and can be the paradigm of extralinguistic 
meaning in that the ideas of Larundic silence can sometimes be ideas which 
cannot be expressed verbally. Emotional and aesthetic ideas often evade 
language completely, and cannot be expressed except by a silence; and if it is 
true that their meaning exists without linguistic expression, then silence is 
where these meanings are expressed.
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Finally, it is not entirely obvious whether silence can satisfy the last of 
Searle’s criteria, namely the validity conditions of word/world fit. And the 
difficulty silence has in fulfilling this criterion is telling. Initially it looks as if 
silent utterances must be restricted to emotive and aesthetic statements of the 
sort that depend on judgement, and not empirical evidence, for their validity. 
But this is not the case. Silence is restricted to types of belief statements 
which can have internal logic, but which are also externally bound by 
empirical conditions. For example, the intention to utter the statement “this is 
beautiful (beyond words)” can only be true if the utterer sincerely believes it to 
be true; like any aesthetic utterance it relies on personal beliefs and not 
external proof for its validity. However, an interpretation of the meaning of 
that Larundic silence would have to fit with the feelings of the utterer. Thus, 
from the perspective of the interpreter there are certain facts which must be 
attended to when constructing an interpretation of the silence.
In order to demonstrate that Larundic silence can fulfill the conditions 
of validity in Searle’s theory of meaning, it would have to be shown that silent 
utterances can be made which have the shape of statements of fact, commands, 
promises, etc.. This can be done, but only given the right conditions. These 
conditions are supplied by context, which will be the focus of the second part 
of this work, where a link will be drawn between the interpretation of silence 
and the need to consider the context in which the silence occurs. From the 
example about putting out the garbage raised above, it is simple to see how 
context can affect the audience’s understanding of the utterer’s intentions. 
The second part of the example “Whew, that garbage is starting to smell 
strong!” can have several appropriate silent meanings; it may mean that the 
utterer believes she ought to put out the garbage, or alternatively that we ought 
to leave the area of the garbage, for example if we were planning to use it as a 
pic-nic spot. So, given certain empirical conditions, such as context, utterer 
and audience, the intended meaning will be different and the meaning
52
understood by the audience will be different as well. What this is supposed to 
show is that silence relies on surrounding conditions for its sense and reliable 
interpretation of its meaning even more than ordinary utterances do. In this 
respect they both resemble and differ from ordinary speech acts. So, in 
Larundic silence, as in any other utterance, conditions of validity depend upon 
the intentions of the one issuing the utterance and the context thereof. 
Commands such as “pass me the salt” or the silent scan of the table top which 
is understood to mean the same thing, have the world/word fit required by 
Searle for a meaningful fulfillment of truth conditions.
According to the criteria raised in the theories of Grice and Searle, 
silence can have meaning.
It is interesting to note from these theories how often the presence of 
silence arises. Grice’s two criteria describes a second order intention of the 
speech act, that is the intention of the utterer to have the audience understand 
an intention. It could be said that these second order intentions are part of the 
silent element of meaning. They are hidden intentions, intentions not even 
addressed by the utterer, who does not usually think about what she intends to 
achieve by the speech act, but merely performs it with the assumption that it 
will achieve the desired effect. If the speech act fails to do this, the utterer 
may then seek recourse in trying to say out loud what was previously 
communicated silently. Thus, she may say: “by uttering x I meant for you to 
do y.” But even that does not quite reveal the Gricean formulation “by 
uttering x I intended for you to understand that I meant you to do y.” Thus, 
according to Grice’s description of how speech acts contain meaning, this 
second order meaning is virtually always transmitted indirectly through a 
silent medium of communication. That thing which the utterer intends to have 
understood, exists in silence.
Searle’s declaration of a meaning which preexists language is the silent 
meaning, completely extra-linguistic, and independent in the way Habermas
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and Grice’s theories of meaning are not. Nevertheless, Habermas and Grice 
are not in total conflict with Searle’s position, but actually offer possibilities 
which may occur further down the road of meaningfulness. Searle is not 
talking about meaning in language and conversation, but meaning in itself, and 
this is meaning outside language: it is the meaning in silence. So silence can 
be meaningful, and meaning evolves in silence.
2.2: Silent Speech Acts?:
Having established that silence can be meaningful, it is a fairly direct 
step to proving that silence can be a kind of speech act. This will not be true 
of all silences. It must be remembered that we are referring to the active/full 
category of silences which are communicative, like the silent condolences 
offered at a funeral. Some silences will not fit the description of a speech act, 
while others will.
Once again, we turn to Searle for an account. He says that “speech 
acts are characteristically performed in the utterance of sounds or the making 
of marks.”14 However, speech acts must be associated with meaning in order 
to be something more than just a noise or a mark. Clearing one’s throat does 
not always count as a speech act, for example, unless it is performed for the 
sake of calling attention to oneself. So we can say about speech acts that “one 
is characteristically said to mean something by those sounds or marks.”15 The 
first point is problematic for silence because it is not a sound or a mark. This 
problem could be solved by expanding the description of a speech act slightly, 
and in a way that would not harmfully affect it. A characteristic could be 
added to the ones already outlined, changing the definition to:
14 Searle, 1971. Pg: 44.
15 Searle, 1971. Pg: 44.
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Any utterance of a sound, making of marks or the conspicuous 
lack thereof, is characteristic of a speech act.
The element of conspicuousness extends the description slightly to 
include full, active, communicative Larundic silences, without harming the 
natural usage of ‘speech act’ in any fundamental way. With this addition, 
speech acts can now accommodate any act of communication even if it is 
wordless. This is important because previous to this, speech acts could not 
account for meaningful looks, pregnant pauses and Larundic silences of other 
sorts because they had to include words or sounds either uttered or written 
down. Larundic silences can account for the times when words simply cannot 
express what the utterer intends to communicate, but is able to convey silently. 
We would not describe the condolences offered at a funeral as meaningless or 
even as not being an intentional act of communication. Including Larundic 
silences as speech act allows us to include silences which ‘speak volumes’ to 
the category of meaningful utterances.
The second part of Searle’s explanation of speech acts require that the 
act be meaningful, and that meaningfulness can be ascribed to the utterance or 
mark. This is not impossible for Larundic silence as we have seen above. 
Silences can contain intentional meaning, Larundic silences are meaningful, so 
silent ‘utterances’ can have meaningfulness ascribed to them.
Searle enforces the idea that there is an important link between 
meaning and intention in speech acts, and this is interesting in the case of 
Larundic silence. Larundic silences can have intentional meanings. One can 
intend a silence to mean “I am not speaking to you because I am angry with 
you”, and the silence will successfully communicate this to the percipient. But 
it is more interesting to look at Larundic silences which are unintentional, 
something which occurs far more frequently among silences than among any
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other sort of speech act. Most people are silent more often than not, and 
usually this is simply a resting place, not an act, but a refraining from action or 
an act of omission. But these everyday silences can be meaningful without 
being connected to any intentional meaning that the utterer (in this case non- 
utterer) intends to share with anyone. This follows from Searle’s account of 
meaningfulness, as discussed above, meaningfulness which preexists linguistic 
formulation. In other words, it is possible to have a meaningful silence which 
communicates nothing to observers. It would be wrong to call this something 
other than meaningful, because it is full of the coherent thoughts of the silent 
individuals who make them. It is also possible for a Larundic silence to be 
noticed as being meaningful, but where its content is not understood by 
observers; for example where a member of a meeting is asked why she is 
being so silent. So, we have two kinds of Larundic silences, those that intend 
to communicate and those that do not.
Sometimes the full Larundic silence which does not have 
communicative intentions can be interpreted, and communicate to the 
interpreter even though the silent person has not intended this to happen. 
Someone might describe a silence as ‘sulking’ or ‘concentrating’, and ascribe 
all sorts of accurate meanings to it. This can be very important as, for 
example, when an unintentional silence or pause is interpreted as preparation 
for a lie16. We must not overlook the possibility of a silence which 
communicates without any intention on the part of the silent to do so. Thus, it 
is possible to have communication without intention -  like a slip-of-the- 
tongue, and like unintentional slips-of-the-tongue, such silences are 
meaningful nonetheless.
Silence can be described as possessing all the criteria of a speech act; it 
fulfills the necessary conditions. Is it therefore a speech act? Or is it 
something more? Because it does things that speech acts cannot do, it is
16See section on “Silence in the Court”.
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somehow a larger concept than simply a type of speech act. This may be a 
very powerful aspect of silence -  its ability to be used in communication -  but 
is not all silence does. Take for example its role in music. Silence is the body 
from which music emerges, it is the space left open for the sound. This is why 
it is necessary to divide our understanding of silence between silences which 
are full and silences which are empty, then further subdivide full silence into 
grammatical and communicative. And finally we add a new subdivision 
below communicative. Communicative silence can be deliberate or 
accidental/incidental in order to account for unintended silent slips-of-the- 
tongue as different from the more intentional silence of direct speech acts; like 
the silent member of a meeting not wanting to say anything, but caught by the 
fact that her silence is conspicuous. Deliberate communicative silences are 
silences which are speech acts performed in a specific way; incidental 
communicative silences are more general.
Silence
Pure silence ^ ^ ^ I j n p u r e  silence 
Harpocratic silence Larundic silence
l I
Empty/Passive silence Full/Active silence
\
Reflective silence Grammatical Communicative
Deliberate . cidental
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CHAPTER 3 
METAPHOR AND SILENCE
3.1 Introductory Remarks:
It was established in chapter two that silences can be considered 
meaningful. It remains to be shown how silent meanings can be shared. In 
other words, is it possible to perform a communicative act through silence? In 
order to settle this question I contend three things:
1) that Larundic silence can communicate, but that
2) it does so indirectly and ambiguously, and that
3) it must therefore be interpreted to be understood.
Some linguistic theorists argue that all language is to some extent ambiguous, 
so that any linguistic utterance must be interpreted, not just silent ones. But 
silences are even more opaque than most literal statements and hence requires 
greater efforts at understanding than literal statements do. That is, silent 
utterances require greater effort than most literal statements require. 
Nevertheless, there are some linguistic utterances that require interpretation to 
be understood, most especially metaphor. In this sense, Larundic silences 
closely resemble metaphorical acts of communication as opposed to literal acts 
of communication. The resemblances do not stop with interpretation. In fact, 
there are further similarities which can be drawn between silence and 
metaphor, some of which will be described in this chapter. These are:
• both use ambiguity and vagueness.
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• both do more than their transliterations can do.
• both can do things literal language cannot do.
• both induce reflection due to the strain of their presence in literal 
language.
• this reflection is creative and educational.
• both refer to context for interpretation.
• both transcend the rules for literal language.
• both can substitute for literal language.
• both can produce infinite and finite numbers of accompanying ideas.
Because these similarities are so strong, I suggest that silence can be 
considered a class of metaphor, which is not just a metaphorical statement.
To begin with we shall examine an overview of some of the historical 
attitudes toward metaphor which are relevant to this argument. This will be 
followed by an exposition of the similarities which support my contention that 
silences can act as metaphors do.
3.2 Historical Overview of Metaphor:
Mark Johnson refers to the traditional attitude toward metaphor as:
“a metaphor is an elliptical simile useful for stylistic, rhetorical, 
and didactic purposes, but which can be translated into literal 
paraphrase without any loss of cognitive content.” 1
However, he points out that this claim reduces metaphor to nothing more than 
a form of stylistic embellishment. Unfortunately, the popularity of this
Johnson, Mark: “Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition” in Philosophical 
Perspectives on Metaphor, Mark Johnson, ed. University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis 
Minnesota; 1981, pg: 4.
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attitude has left metaphor with diminished status for centuries. The detractors 
of metaphor tend to hold the same central tenet, that truth content can (and 
ought) only be conveyed through direct literal language free of embellishment 
and imagery. Statements of truth are statements of fact, and ought to be made 
through the language of fact; thus, those who disfavour metaphor tend to 
favour the language of science which is believed to be embellishment-free and 
value-neutral.
Still, as Johnson points out, the expectation of a language which does 
not contain metaphor, even a less than ideal language, is unfulfilable. This is 
because all linguistic acts, even scientific ones, contain some usage of 
metaphor. Metaphor is often used to clarify statements of fact, but even the 
statements themselves are sometimes metaphors we take for granted. For 
example, the language of computer technology is full of metaphors of mice 
and windows, etc. Less conspicuously, doctors refer to heart murmurs, 
physicists refer to ‘Black Holes’ and chemists look for ‘bonding’ among cells. 
So why is it that metaphor has been debased for so long?
Johnson cites the irony that Plato, whom he calls the “master of 
metaphor”, was the source of the suspicion of metaphor which grew out of 
“the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry”2. Plato rejected poets as 
mere imitators and inflamers of passions, who were uneducated in true 
knowledge. However, this was not intended to be a complete rejection of 
figurative language. Johnson says it only shows that Plato knew how 
powerful and enticing figurative language could be. There was fear that the 
often emotive embellishments would be abused, for example where emotive 
metaphors are used to persuade and mislead the listener into agreement for 
false reasons. “Plato’s attack is directed against the poet or sophist whose 
misuse of language leads others away from the truth”3. In fact, Plato’s critique
Plato: Republic, X, 607b. See also Johnson p.4.
^Johnson, pg: 5.
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is directed at poetry and sophistry, not at metaphor in general, although it has 
been mistaken for such in spite of his own use of metaphor. This is especially 
ironic given that the Republic is considered to be one long metaphor for the 
soul, and the metaphor of the cave is one of the most famous in Western 
history.
Aristotle, on the other hand, did not criticise metaphor. He 
acknowledged its usefulness for constructing persuasive arguments and 
achieving insights. According to Johnson, Aristotle’s position on metaphor 
can be characterised as,
“(i) [the] focus on single words that are (ii) deviations from 
literal language, to produce a change of meaning that is (iii) 
based on similarities between things.”4
This is technically difficult to achieve, and requires insight and effort to ensure 
the metaphor is correct for the situation. It is not surprising then, that 
Aristotle, and later on Kant, believed that metaphor was an indication of 
genius in its users5. For Aristotle, this was because it revealed an incisiveness 
to detect hidden and obscure similarities between things.
“The greatest thing by far is to be the master of metaphor. It is 
the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a 
sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive 
perception of the similarity in dissimilars.”6
Following this, a great number of theories emerged which attempted to 
explain how metaphor works. Essentially there are two general approaches, 
each of which is elaborated upon by many theorists. No one of them has been
4Johnson, pg: 6. See also Aristotle 1457b7.
5 Kant, Critique of Judgement, section 49 p. 157.
^Aristotle: Poetics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle. Richard McKeon ed. Random House; 
New York, N.Y.; 1941. Line 1459a.
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designated as better than any other; they are equally accepted and rejected in 
their own camps. The first approach is the descendant of the traditional 
medieval logical-positivist tenets. This traditional view holds that if 
metaphors could transmit knowledge of truth claims, then these claims could 
necessarily be translated into literal language without in any way affecting the 
truth claim itself. Johnson refers to this attitude as “general downgrading of 
the epistemic importance of metaphor...”7, where metaphor is considered to be 
nothing more than mere embroidering. Others of this group said that 
metaphors
“...can make no truth claim at all. Instead, it was claimed, they 
function only emotively to express feelings, moods, or 
attitudes.”8
The first general approach has been challenged by a prevalent attitude 
toward metaphor. This attitude is the descendant of the Aristotelian and 
Kantian appreciation for metaphor. Thus, the second coterie believed that 
metaphor could contribute more to language and thought than mere 
embellishment. To this perspective metaphor provides a vehicle for 
expressing ideas with greater richness, and for transferring knowledge which 
cannot be transferred in any other way.
Nevertheless, in spite of these, and other positive attitudes, metaphor 
became mistrusted by thinkers who required plain clarity for expressing truth. 
This is the main charge metaphor has had to confront over time: whether it 
can really be a sound device for the discovery and transmission of truth. The 
three basic premises of this position are summarised as follows:
n
'Johnson, pg: 35.
O
Johnson, pg: 35-6.
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1) Language is literal, thus literal language is the only way to 
clearly express truth-claims, and thus the only way to reason 
properly.
2) Metaphor is improper use of words therefore it confuses and 
deceives.
3) “The meaning and truth claims of a metaphor (if indeed 
there are any) are just those of its literal paraphrase.”9
These pejorative connotations of metaphor were accepted by the 
majority of thinkers up to the present century. Those who rejected metaphor10 
claimed it was nothing more than flowery embellishments designed to lead 
listeners astray of the truth which literal language alone was believed to be 
able to express. This is a continuation of the medieval view that metaphor 
transforms truth into what it is not and thereby misleads us.
On the other hand, in the Critique o f Judgement, section 49 p. 157, 
Kant refers to metaphor within the context of his respect for genius and 
imagination. He held that creative activity is capable of novelty, and that what 
is created inspires creative responses and understanding in the observer. This 
set the tone for a more positive reception of metaphor, one which 
acknowledges the creative power of metaphor in understanding and 
explaining, and which shows us that metaphor can communicate ideas beyond 
what literal language can communicate.
“Kant’s fresh insight here is (i) that our metaphoric capacity is 
one expression of our general capacity for creativity and (ii) 
that such imaginative metaphoric representations generate more
9Johnson, pg: 12.
10 Philosophers such as Locke (13; Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. HI, chap. 
X, 34), Bishop Berkeley (13, “Of Motion”), and Hegel (The Philosophy of Fine Art, pp: 40- 
41).
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thought than can be reduced to or captured by any literal 
concept(s).”11
In “On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense”12, Nietzsche also 
rejected the separation between metaphoric and literal language, because he 
saw metaphoric understanding as essential to all knowledge13 (15).
“What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonymies, anthropomophisms: in short a sum of human 
relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage seem to a nation 
fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one 
has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors 
which have become powerless to affect the senses.”14
Thus, according to Nietzsche, there are no fixed truths, only personal 
experiences which by metaphorical understanding we have conventionalised 
into culturally accepted ‘truths’, grown used to, and forgotten the 
‘metaphoricity’ of15.
Nietzsche, Kant and others brought the pendulous attitude toward 
metaphor back to the appreciation Plato and Aristotle showed for it, and it has 
been swinging back and forth ever since. What follows is an exploration of 
how metaphor has been said to work in hope of demonstrating that metaphor 
relies on silence and that silence is very much like metaphor. It is with this in 
mind that a relationship between metaphor and silence can be said to exist in 
two senses: 1) much of what metaphor does occurs in silence
1 Johnson, pg: 14. Still, Kant did not accept metaphor fully because he said it was not a rule- 
governed activity so it could not produce definite knowledge through determinate-concepts.
12Nietzsche, pg: 180.
13Johnson, pg: 15.
14Nietzsche, pg: 180.
^Johnson, pg: 16.
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(communication, creative understanding...), and 2) sometimes silence acts as a 
metaphor for speech.
3.3 Three Assertions:
This section contains three assertions regarding the relationship 
between metaphor and silence. The first assertion is that silence is the vehicle 
for much of what metaphor does, especially if we accept the admittedly 
controversial claim that the cognitive content of a metaphorical statement 
exceeds any translation of the metaphor into literal language. If this is the 
case, then metaphor transmits some, if not most of its detail in silence. The 
second assertion follows from a demonstration that silence can be seen to 
possess many of the same qualities as metaphors, and therefore it functions in 
much the same way as metaphors do except that it lacks verbal statement. The 
third assertion demonstrates that silence and metaphor rely on contextual 
strain to be recognised. Given that these similarities can be satisfactorily 
demonstrated, it will be possible to claim that silence is an extension o f 
metaphorical speech.
3.3.1 First Assertion:
When Kant expounded on his assertion that metaphor is a creative act 
of genius16, he placed the activity of constructing metaphors among the 
internal intellectual acts of thought. This intemalism is the most obvious way 
in which metaphor relies on silence. Metaphor is part of thought, not just part 
of language. The information conveyed by the making of a metaphor is made 
clear in silent thought, and it is in even deeper silent imagination and 
subconsciousness that the images come together. Thus, understanding a
16 Kant, pg: 157.
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metaphor does not require literally stated thoughts about the information the 
metaphor is intended to convey,. Instead it is in feeling and image that the 
information comes to one, and one makes sense of the metaphor. This occurs 
in Larundic silence, it need not be verbalised. In fact to verbalise it would 
involve losing the point of using a metaphor in the first place.
Metaphor helps us construct and understand ideas by use of 
comparison. The act of comparison happens in silence. To lose the silence of 
the comparison would be to lose the point of using metaphor instead of literal 
language to convey information. It is the difference between the statements ‘p 
is q’ which stands for some metaphor, and ‘p is q in that r’ where ‘r’ is a list in 
literal language of the similarities to be drawn. It is fairly obvious that the 
second statement is not as efficient as the first. The long list of literal terms 
loses the economical character of the more simple metaphorical statement ‘p is 
q \  and all the connotations it implies (implication is important in discussing 
vagueness and ambiguity). Therefore, losing the silent aspects of the 
statement is equivalent to not using the metaphor at all. Furthermore, in the 
second statement, some will say that the metaphor is hardly even necessary 
because the literal statements that follow it say what was intended anyway. To 
illustrate these two points, one may say ‘Henry is heartless’, or ‘Henry is 
cruel, ruthless, nasty, etc.’ The first statement is succinct and manages to 
convey what the second statement conveys, only with less effort because the 
list of literal information remains economically silent. The second statement 
says more or less the same things the first says only less economically. As a 
result the actual metaphorical statement can be seen as unnecessary for 
conveying the information the comparison will draw; thus, it is redundant to 
state the metaphor and then explain it in literal terms. This, of course, follows 
from the logical-positivist attitude, which sees metaphor as mere embroidery 
of literal language. It ignores the possibility that metaphor can be more than 
its transliteration. Johnson and others, on the other hand, suggest that there is
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something crucial lost in making literal what was previously metaphorical. 
They claim we lose cognitive content which cannot be verbalised in the 
transliteration. Poetry is an excellent example of the kind of metaphors which 
lose a great deal of texture and freedom when transliterated.
Two significant consequences follow from this. The first is the degree 
to which metaphor depends upon silence, because without the silent work of 
comparison and reflection the metaphor would hardly be needed at all. It is 
what occurs in silence that gives the metaphor a different value from the literal 
statement. The second consequence follows as a response to the first, and 
suggests that metaphor is more than the sum list of literal statements into 
which it can be translated. By transliterating a metaphorical statement we lose 
some very important aspects of the intended communication. We lose the 
sense or the feeling inspired by the image of the combination of the two 
concepts being compared. So, i) metaphorical meaning happens in silence, 
and ii) metaphors do more than their transliterations can do.
3.3.2 Second Assertion:
Considering these two points, it requires little effort to draw our 
attention to the striking similarity between silence and metaphor as it has been 
explained by Johnson and others. Metaphor can do things literal language 
cannot do. This is not to say that it is better than literal language, only that 
what it achieves is different. Metaphor can help us communicate more 
effectively and therefore is valuable. Silence can be described in the same 
way.
Point (i) above has been covered in the section on meaning already 
discussed; silence is meaningful, and it bears its meaning without verbalisation 
in literal language. Metaphor does the same. Both metaphor and silence leave 
their literal meanings silent, so they require interpretation to be understood. If 
we grant that silences and metaphors can be meaningful, we must admit that
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they do not convey their meanings in the direct way literal statements do. 
Some people claim that metaphors and silences can be translated into a list of 
equivalent literal statements, and that they communicate these literal 
statements indirectly and in an ambiguous way. It can be said then that the 
literal statements metaphor and Larundic silence are said to represent remain 
silent, that they are thought but not said. The claim that metaphors are 
transliteratable is a contentious one, however; so I will say that the above 
claim can be true of any meaning ascribed to silence and metaphor, not just 
literal meaning (indeed, what is conveyed through the silence of a silent or 
metaphorical utterance is what cannot be literally put). Their silent meanings 
requires us to interpret what the intentions of the utterer are, even if we cannot 
verbalise the intentions in the end. Thus, a silent look of despair can be 
interpreted as meaning so much which cannot be literally translated, and the 
translation (if one is possible) or the meaning is left silent.
Also, like point (ii) above, silence can be used to express ideas which 
are not expressible in literal language; for example, the expression of 
emotions such as compassion. Transliterations of metaphors lose the creative 
element, the texture and richness which the imaginary comparison implies; nor 
can silences be readily transliterated without loss of content, depth and 
richness. It is as if literal substitution for a silence or a metaphor would 
trivialise the significance of the utterance. This notion is put best in the 
following highly evocative passage from Maeterlinck.
“As soon as we give utterance to something, we render it 
valueless in some strange way. We believe we have plunged to 
the uttermost depths, and yet when we come back to the upper 
surface the drops of water on our pale finger-tips no longer 
resemble the sea from which they came. We imagine we have 
discovered a hoard of wondrous treasure, but when we emerge 
again into the light of day we see we have brought only false 
stones and chips of glass, while the treasure shimmers 
unchanged in the darkness beneath.” (Maeterlinck)
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Silence and metaphor can be functional substitutes for literal language 
when literal language fails to express what it wants to. This follows from 
what was said in the first point, that silences and metaphors are more than the 
sum list of literal statements which they are said to represent. As a result, 
silence and metaphor are often more economical than literal language, and can 
express ideas through them that cannot be expressed literally.
3.3.3 The third assertion:
(iii) When we do come across a metaphor or a silence we may 
recognise them because they represent an absurdity within the context in 
which they arise. For example, when asked to describe another person you 
might say “she’s an angel”, by which you do not mean she is dead, resides in 
heaven, wears a halo, has great fluffy wings and plays a harp. So there is a 
contradiction between what is said and what is meant. This causes a strain in 
the context which requires the audience to reflect upon what was said and 
creatively construct a meaning to go with it. The same is true for silence 
where the strain of not receiving a literal answer to a question, for example, 
causes the percipient to turn in on the information she has in her possession 
and reflect upon it in order to creatively construct an interpretation of the 
silence. The strain of the absurdity appearing within the literal context causes 
recognition and this leads to creative understanding. Metaphor and silence 
both rely on a contextual strain for recognition and indication that something 
important is being said without literal language. A silent or metaphorical 
utterance may not be as efficiently noticed if the strain to the literal language 
is not present. So, for example, when a question is met with a silence instead 
of a literal statement, the audience leaves room for the answer and may give it 
longer consideration. There is a sense of greater importance around a silent 
answer than an immediate literal reply which may seem facile and 
unconsidered. Likewise, a metaphor causes the audience to consider and
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reflect upon the statement with an effort not necessarily afforded a simple 
literal statement. We lose the tension to literal language which cues the 
existence of a metaphor or silence, and like a false note in a concerto draws 
our attention to the focal idea.
This marks a third point of similarity between silence and metaphor: 
both silence and metaphor causally induce a state of reflection in utterers and 
their audiences due to the tension of their presence among literal language. 
First the strain of their presence within literal language causes the listener to 
notice that a (significant) point is being made. This logical absurdity gives 
pause to the utterer and the audience, who consider the statement with a care 
they might not have given it if the strain had not indicated the need to do so. 
The utterer and the audience reflect on the comparison being made in the case 
of the metaphor, or in the case of silence may consider previous or 
forthcoming statements or some other thing. What is important is that silences 
and metaphors, like vocal intonation, can indicate emphasis placed on an 
utterance or an idea. And the emphasis causes reflective deliberation in those 
affected.
It is based on these similarities that I suggest that silence is a type of 
metaphor which replaces literal speech. There are numerous other 
comparisons to be drawn between silence and metaphor which arise from 
various theoretical accounts of what metaphor is and how it works. The three 
points observed above are likely to be the most general of the similarities, 
crossing many of the accepted approaches. Others are more specific to 
particular theories but deserve some attention here because they help elucidate 
the relationship between metaphor and silence.
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3.4 Other Similarities:
Context and Relevance: In creating metaphors, relevance is of utmost 
importance, as it is when constructing interpretations of silences. “Metaphors 
must be drawn from things that are related to the original things.”17 In a 
similar sense, interpretations of Larundic silences must be relevant to the 
contexts which surround them. As we will see in Part II, the only restrictions 
for the proper construction of metaphor will be very much like the rules for the 
proper interpretation of silence: 1) the construct must be relevant, and 2) if 
kept within appropriate bounds the construct will bring new understanding and 
insight.
The above comparison is somewhat clumsy because with silence we 
are referring to relevance in interpretation, whereas the point above refers to 
constructing metaphors; there is a before and after distinction to be made, 
because we construct interpretations after a silent utterance whereas metaphor 
is constructed before its utterance. However, the similarity can be drawn to 
the understanding of metaphors, and by this we mean intellectual interpreting. 
This requires the same kind of care involved in interpreting Larundic silences 
where context and relevance help limit interpretations to (presumably) correct 
ones. Metaphor is like a riddle in the same way silence is, it must be figured 
out. In fact, sometimes it forces us to try to figure out what we might 
ordinarily have avoided trying to understand. Identifying a metaphor will 
require the observer to take into account some knowledge known by the 
speaker beyond the knowledge regarding the linguistic symbols themselves18. 
This is relevant for silence too. Larundic silence relies on its context for 
adequate interpretation, and it involves consideration on the observer’s part of
17 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1412a.
18Johnson, pg: 22.
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the knowledge possessed by the utterer regarding the silent non-linguistic 
utterance.
We can take a concept apart and study each of the parts separately, but 
it is only when seen as a whole that the meaning of the initial concept can be 
seen clearly. “In short, meaning emerges at the level of experiential gestalts, 
which give coherence and structure to our experience.”19 The meanings of 
two gestalt structures are placed in relation to each other during an act of 
metaphor, and the resulting combination constructs its own gestalt through a 
‘restructuring of experience’. This is like the context required for making 
sense of silences. If we fail to consider the entire gestalt it may affect the 
ultimate interpretation we construct of the silence. This will be examined 
more closely in Part n.
Furthermore, extrasentential context is important for the reason 
mentioned previously, that the identification of metaphor and silence rests 
strongly on knowledge of the context and a tension indicated. This includes 
not just linguistic falsity but any kind of tension, which draws our focus to the 
text and signals the presence of a metaphor or a silence. It is like noticing 
something has been omitted. We are drawn by the tension to recognise the 
nonliterality of the utterance20, and this leads to reflection and understanding. 
Thus, context is important to interpreting both silence and metaphor.
In Learning and New Insights: I.A. Richards claims ‘thought is 
metaphoric’21, because we understand concepts through a combining of two 
thoughts which are linked by a similarity, and the result of this is the meaning 
of the metaphor and a new idea. We learn through metaphor because the 
words are used to direct our focus elsewhere, then fiddle with the literal 
meanings to produce new ideas. The metaphor indicates to us the presence of
19Johnson, pg: 31.
20Johnson, pg: 23.
2177ie Philosophy of Rhetoric, pg: 94; Johnson p. 18.
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new ideas that we might have overlooked. Johnson called this “the focus on 
the Gestalt switch or flash of insight induced by a good metaphor.”22 The 
strained presence of a metaphor within a literal context causes reflection and 
the reflection entails learning and understanding.
“actions, events, and objects are understood by us in terms of 
‘experiential gestalts', i.e., structured meaningful wholes within 
experience. Each gestalt consists of various recurring sub 
patterns of the whole structure and can be analysed into these 
patterns, though to do so destroys the relationships that make 
the whole structure meaningful for us.”23
It could be that the ‘epistemological and ontological significance’ of 
metaphor is precisely “a device for reorganising our perceptual and/or 
conceptual structures.”24 Johnson claims:
“metaphor creates novel meaning by giving modified senses to 
various concepts. If [this] is correct, metaphor is a principle 
device for altering or restructuring our concepts or 
categories.”25
This may require some form of category-crossing among the terms 
used in the metaphor. “A metaphor is an assertion that...”26 something from 
one category has some claim to fit within another category. This requires 
imagination to study the surrounding context, the connotations inherent in the 
two terms, and finally to grasp the superimpositions of the gestalts entailed. 
Creative effort is necessary for dealing with silence as well. When confronted 
by Harpocratic silence we act upon its passivity and creatively manipulate
22Johnson, pg: 30.
2i
Johnson, pg: 30-1.
24Johnson, pg: 31.
2SJohnson, pg: 31.
26Johnson, pg: 33.
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knowledge of our own. Larundic silence requires creative efforts at 
interpretation in tandem with analysis of context. Creativity creates new 
information. Thus, the result of the effort to understand a metaphor or a 
silence is fruitful because it offers new information or insight into ideas 
previously not understood.
The act of understanding silences and metaphors is creative. We recall 
that metaphor incorporates genius and imagination. The creative activity of 
using metaphors is capable of constructing novelty, and what is created 
inspires creative responses and understanding in the observer. When we 
compare silence to this notion we find some very striking similarities to 
metaphor. ‘The created object’, normally the metaphor but in this case the 
Larundic silence, inspires its percipient to use imagination in order to form an 
understanding of the (un)intended meaning of the silence. The hearer of the 
metaphor is required to do the same thing. Both require an act of imagination 
or intellectualisation which can be novel, and in fact the novelty of a metaphor 
requires silent space for thought on the part of the one who constructs it. 
Silence is not identical to metaphor in this way because it does not offer the 
clues that the predicate term in a metaphor offers; the only clue we get for 
silence is its presence as recognised by the strain in the context. What silence 
can do is offer the space for reflection required for discovering new 
information through the metaphor. A conspicuous silence can indicate the 
need for creative reflection upon the ideas presented and in this sense operates 
more like a metaphor does. This is a kind of ostensive indication that thought 
is warranted in a particular case.
In any of the cases described above the acts of uttering and 
understanding a metaphor or a silence can and does produce learning in those 
affected. This may not be the same kind of straightforward information 
acquisition involved in literal communication, but it is nonetheless productive 
and active.
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Renegades from the Rules o f Language: Both silences and metaphors 
are utterances which go beyond the rules of literal language. Silence goes 
beyond the rules for ordinary language use and so it is difficult to make a 
definitive statement of what a silence means. As a result, there is no adequate 
conceptual way of demonstrating that the percipient’s understanding matches 
the (un)intended meaning of the Larundic silence. The same can be said for 
metaphor, which uses words in unusual combinations in order to construct 
meanings, an activity which is deliberately outwith the ordinary rules of 
language.
“In other words, the artist creates an original representation of 
something (in paint, tones, language, stone, etc.), but this 
activity is not a mere mechanical following of rules for 
producing a thing. Furthermore, the created object gives rise to 
a play of imagination and understanding in the perceiver that is 
fe lt as being adequate to the thing represented, although there is 
no conceptual way to demonstrate its adequacy.”27
Johnson follows on this with Kant’s idea of reflective judgement,
“...in which the imagination freely plays with (reflects on) a 
series of representations in search of a unifying principle. I 
suggest that the comparative (or what I call the ‘canonical’ or 
‘rule-governed’) level functions analogous to Kant’s aesthetical 
reflective judgement. In such ‘judgements of taste’ the 
imaginative act of reflection is fe l t  as adequate to the 
representations it organises, even though there are no concepts 
(or rules) governing that reflective activity.”28
The same occurs in silence, only in this case the metaphorical antecedent is 
silent or unspoken and creative reflection must find some adequate and 
appropriate match for it. In silence too there are no rules which govern the use 
or interpretation, at least no obvious ones (there will be some such as
on'Johnson, pg: 14.
28Johnson, pg: 39.
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observing context etc.). Thus, the adequacy and informativeness of a 
metaphor as for a silence must be felt rather than known because neither 
subscribes to the rules, least of all those of literal language.
Using metaphor or silence to express a meaning goes beyond rules for 
speaking and language use; in fact, silence is beyond those rules which are 
unable to fulfil a communicative need at the time, so the utterer resorts to 
silence to express what the rules of ordinary communication have failed to 
express. In this sense, silence leaves literal language silent the same way 
metaphor does. Johnson insists that metaphors are not rule governed, “and 
therefore not reducible to a set of rules, or a systematic procedure of 
understanding.”29 Making metaphors is therefore a free act of originality. 
Thus, the use of metaphor happens partly in silence and this part cannot be 
translated out of the silence. The silence of a metaphor and the silence of a 
silent utterance transcend the rules for literal language.
Sentence Meaning and Word Meaning: As with metaphor, there is a 
difference between what is said and what is meant by the utterance of a 
silence. We are drawn to the utterance meaning through the reflection upon 
the sentence meaning, where the sentence meaning triggers for us a creative 
act of imagination by the presence of a logical absurdity. Silence itself acts as 
this kind of logical absurdity, like the absurdity of a wordless reply, we are 
cued to reflect upon the absence of speech trying to replace speech (in the 
sense of trying to be a reply). This triggers reflective imagination and finally 
understanding of the silence or metaphor as a substitute for a literal speech act. 
This may actually create meaning where there was no meaning before (in the 
case of Harpocratic silence), or it helps resolve the tension caused by 
expectation of literal meaning in a case when none is offered, yet where the
9Q^Johnson, pg: 39.
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meaning is still present. The newly created meaning or understanding of 
meaning can help us acquire knowledge and novelty.
Substitute fo r  Literal Language: If we conceive of metaphor as an 
effective substitute for literal language, then it is possible to draw the final 
similarity between silence and metaphor. Silence is substituted for language at 
times when language cannot achieve its intended goals. Metaphor does the 
same for literal language when the latter fails. So metaphor and silence could 
be elevated to the position of effective substitutes for literal language and 
hence be seen as having equal status to it. This admittedly is a contentious 
position to hold, mostly because of criticisms made against metaphor and 
silence that they are ambiguous and do not fit the requirement of clarity and 
distinctness so prized by post-Cartesian logical-positivists (a point worth 
pursuing in greater detail, as I shall do below). There will be times when 
silence is clearly more appropriate than speech for communicating without 
confrontation or with greater satisfaction. Likewise, metaphors often make 
better explanations or descriptions than literal statements do. Furthermore, 
granting increased status to silence and metaphor will have the added benefit 
of explaining why we hold poetic language in such high esteem, and say that 
speech is silver while silence is golden.
3.5 Ambiguity:
So far we have addressed three major resemblances between silence 
and metaphor:
i) Metaphor and silence both leave their literal meanings silent, so that
they require interpretation to be understood.
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ii) Metaphor and silence are both functional substitutes for literal 
language when literal language fails to express what it wants to.
iii) Metaphor and silence both rely on a contextual strain for 
recognition and indication that something important is being said 
nonliterally.
To this shall be added a further major similarity which is founded on a 
common criticism that they are both ambiguous: iv) metaphor and silence are 
ambiguous and vague which has led to their diminished status in language. 
The question arises why these are considered to be negative qualities, and, 
moreover, why it is that we favour obviousness over ambiguity, certainty over 
vagueness, clarity over opacity, fathomability over inscrutability, facility over 
enigma.
Because neither metaphor nor silence make direct literal statements of 
truth, they may cloud their intended meanings and require great efforts of 
interpretation. As a result, they have been decried by seekers after truth who 
favour scientific models of understanding for their clarity and distinctness. To 
recount, the traditional belief is that metaphor and (by extension and for the 
sake of argument) silence are ambiguous and therefore cannot adequately 
express truth-claims in any direct way. They are accused of causing confusion 
and being deceptive. Furthermore, they are treated as having no more to say 
than their literal paraphrases do, limiting them to ornamental nebulous 
appendices of rhetoric. This attitude has led to their diminished status in 
language. But this attitude overlooks the benefits of being indirect. 
Sometimes ambiguity is exactly what is needed in a given situation, for 
example in conversations about religion, or at times when doctors have to 
break bad news to patients. Silence can be a metaphor for boundless 
receptiveness on the part of the utterer, and this leaves space for the other to 
think, speak and feel. Metaphors can be ways of gently putting something that
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would be too blunt and injurious if it were stated literally; so you might say 
someone’s child was a little monkey rather than comment on its funny looks. 
Johnson rightly draws our attention to the fact that metaphor often facilitates 
transferance of knowledge rather than obscuring it, and the same can be said 
for silence. Both have the power to communicate where literal language 
leaves off. If there are no words to express a thought or emotion, silence and 
metaphor can accomplish communication where literal attempts might fail and 
in fact obscure matters.
It would remain for us to ask why we favour literalness when we so 
clearly rely on non-literal ambiguities so much of the time. Johnson says that 
the reply to this is to challenge the belief that “literal assertions are better or 
more obvious bearers of truth”30 than metaphorical or silent ones. Why is a 
literal statement more right, clearer, or to the point than a metaphorical or 
silent statement? It may be unnecessary to answer this question directly. 
Rather,
“The point is not to put metaphor on par with literal statements 
but to explode the myth that they are radically different and that 
metaphor is cognitively inferior.”31
So why do we value metaphor and silence as a means for 
communication. Because, much of our regular communication relies on 
metaphorical elements, and it is a myth that these only embellish and confuse 
our thinking and speaking. Language is filled with metaphors. These 
facilitate, not obscure, communication. Sometimes silence and metaphor are 
even more appropriate for the situation than literal language is. Ambiguity 
can be tactful, discreet, non-confrontational and can trigger the kind of 
thoughtfulness that can create and understand new information. Metaphor and
30Johnson, pg: 37.
O  1
J Johnson, pg: 37.
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silence say things indirectly, but this can be seen as productive and functional. 
Therefore, rather than diminish their standing we ought to raise them to the 
level of literal language.
3.6 Fancy and Imagination:
A final similarity between metaphor and silence rests on a theory of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge's regarding the difference between fancy and 
imagination32. The distinction Coleridge draws constitutes an appreciation of 
the finitude and infinitude of ideas behind poetic or metaphorical language. 
He states that fancy implies a finite set of allusional claims, but that 
imagination is open to infinite possibilities only suggested by the metaphor or 
poem. Coleridge’s distinction is a useful one for understanding the levels of 
metaphor; and the distinction and its implications readily apply to silence as 
well.
According to Coleridge, the difference between fancy and imagination 
rests on the difference between finite and infinite creative capacity. Fancy is 
limited and imagination is infinite. Imagination is divisible into either primary 
or secondary types. Primary imagination is the infinite and all-powerful 
ability to create from nothing. It is the domain of God 33, the ultimate creator. 
Secondary imagination is a weaker version of primary imagination, an “echo 
of the former....and different only in degree”34. It involves human will, in that 
“it dissolves, diffuses and dissipates in order to re-create: or where this process 
is rendered impossible, yet still at all events if struggles to idealise and to
32Coleridge, Samuel Taylor: Biographia Literaria. Everyman’s Library, N o .ll. J.M. Dent 
& Sons Ltd.; London; 1906 (reprint 1952).
33 Coleridge, pg: 145.
34 Coleridge, 146.
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unify.”35 This is a form of thought that most resembles the infinite in that it is 
open ended in its capacity to create. It is best understood through the process 
of writing a poem. Poetry “dissolves” the factual subject in order to recreate 
it, unified with other ideas. The juxtaposing of two distinct ideas creates a 
novel unity. This is unlimited, so that the meaning of an imaginative creation 
is open to any understanding of it, and in fact encourages new imaginative 
creations on the part of its audience. Thus, imagination stimulates creativity.
Fancy is a far more limited concept. It is attached to “fixities and 
definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated 
from the order of time and space...”36. It involves choice, but not creation of 
the sort imagination is capable of. Instead, fancy is limited to association. In 
other words the one engaged in fancy can chose to change ideas which are part 
of her memories, but cannot create anything new or different from those 
memories. The metaphors of fancy are not infinite, but place limits upon the 
potential understandings of them. Thus, flights of fancy never travel very far 
as they are limited to the memories of factual knowledge the percipient 
possesses.
The limitless nature of imagination is advantageous to metaphor and 
poetry where the aim is to inspire creativity. It is also ideal in situations where 
a message is better left ambiguous. Thus, imagination is probably better 
suited to areas of expression that require ambiguity and freedom of creativity. 
For instance, imagination will be well suited to art and religion, two areas 
where specificity can be more confounding than vagueness. The limited 
nature of fancy, on the other hand, is more advantageous where a greater 
degree of specificity is preferred. Bearing in mind that this is in the context of 
metaphorical or poetic language, which is not usually considered specific, 
fancy is still more specific than imagination. So fancy can portray a
35 Coleridge, 146.
36 Coleridge, 146.
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metaphorical idea accurately and perhaps more succinctly than literal or 
imaginative language can. The limitations of fancy make it more direct than 
imagination and therefore more advantageous in situations where ambiguity is 
not desirable. Thus, fancy lends itself better to advertising or slogans which 
want to be direct, unambiguous and evocative.
Imagination and fancy are, in fact, interlined and do not exist 
independently37. They overlap so that images are both newly imagined, and 
reflective of reality and memories38. Imagination takes the “old and familiar” 
memories used by the fancy, and turns them into something novel39. In 
metaphor, imagination takes the limited ideas of fancy and interposes them 
with reality in order to create a growing imaginative concept which is 
limitless. For example, the imagination juxtaposes the realities of a horse and 
a goat, and the fanciful memories associated with them, in order to create a 
unicorn. In the fanciful image we merely have a horse with a horn on its head; 
in the imagination we have a mythological creature with limitless roles in 
stories, poems and parables. Thus, imagination moves from the limitations of 
fancy and reality into the realm of infinite possibility.
3.6.1 Finity, infinity and silence:
Coleridge’s distinction between the finitude of fancy and the infinity of 
imagination apply well to silence. The two main categories of silence fit the 
description of finite and infinite. Harpocratic silence is infinite in that it leaves 
the percipient with limitless space for creativity. Yet, like imagination, 
Harpocratic silence uses memories as the ingredients for the limitless 
creativity. Mortals cannot create without foundation. So, although they are
Brooks, Cleanth: The Well Wrought Urn. Cleanth Books. Dobson Press; London; 1949. 
Pg: 26.
38 Brooks, pg: 134-5.
39 Brooks, pg: 230 and ff.
82
limitless imagination and Harpocratic silence do employ finite content. 
Working from memories and knowledge the percipient of a Harpocratic 
silence can create infinite ideas and imaginings. Thus, both imagination and 
Harpocratic silence rely on fancy and reality to supply the material for 
creativity.
Larundic silence is more like fancy in that it is limited. A Larundic 
silence is one that contains a meaning, and this meaning restricts the possible 
interpretations a percipient may apply to it. Anything outside the limits of this 
meaning is considered radical and violates the Larundic silence. Thus, 
Larundic silences are finite, and must not be greeted with the same limitless 
creativity that is appropriate to Harpocratic silence.
There is also a sense in which overlap occurs between Harpocratic 
silence and Larundic silence. Fancy merges with imagination to the extent 
that fancy provides the basis for more creative imaginative ventures. In the 
same sense, Larundic silence can be the stepping-off point for Harpocratic 
silence. Where a Larundic silence occurs it brings with it a specific meaning, 
but it has difficulty restricting interpreters to that meaning. Rather, 
interpreters tend to elaborate on the meaning present in the Larundic silence, 
and in some cases ignore it altogether. Two possibilities may cause this 
reaction. Either the Larundic silence is being mistaken for a Harpocratic 
silence, in which case a misunderstanding has taken place and must be 
rectified to obviate a radical interpretation of the silence. Alternatively, it may 
be that the Larundic silence in fact says more than its limited meaning entails. 
In this case, the Larundic silence imparts its message, and causes the 
interpreter to move on in an imaginative way. Coleridge’s notion of 
imagination functions in the same way with fancy: it overlaps with the limited 
content of a fanciful idea and then goes beyond it with greater creativity. In 
the same way, the Harpocratic silence can begin by overlapping with a
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meaningful Larundic silence and then move from there to more creative 
realms of imagination.
The comparison of Coleridge’s understanding of the difference 
between fancy and imagination with our understanding of silence, is by no 
means a trivial one. The comparison highlights the distinction between 
Harpocratic and Larundic silences, and introduces the concept of finity and 
infinity to silences. Having a sense that some silences are finite and limited to 
specific meanings, as Larundic silences are, provides a clearer means of 
differentiating them from Harpocratic silences. And it is sensitivity to this 
difference that helps to obviate the possibility that Larundic silences will be 
violated with radical readings.
3.7 A Difference:
Having said all this, there are differences between silence and 
metaphor. Most importantly, silence does not require speech whereas 
metaphor is usually linguistic. This leads to a predicament. We must ask 
whether this difference is significant enough to dispel the claim that silence 
can be a metaphor. The dilemma is this, either silence is a metaphor for 
speech, or this statement is itself a metaphor.
To reply, there are certain kinds of silence which act as a type of 
metaphor. The claim of identity between the two may be false because it is 
too strong. But this ought not to preclude the existence of a silence which acts 
as a metaphor for speech: a metaphorical silence or silent metaphor. An 
obvious example of a silent metaphor occurs when the student asks the teacher 
a question and the teacher does not reply, but intends the silence itself to be a 
meaningful reply. In this case the silence stands for the answer, and its 
ambiguity and inscrutability are a deliberate part of the answer given. In the
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same situation the teacher may reply with an extended metaphor with the same 
intent. The result of both forms of reply are virtually identical. The silence 
and the metaphor are stand-ins for a literal reply; they do the same sort of 
thing the literal reply would do (namely answer the question), only they do it 
less directly. The reason for the ambiguity of the reply will likely be the same; 
either there is no adequate literal statement in which to frame the answer, or 
the teacher wants to provoke thought and inspire a more creative response 
from the student. The enigmatic answer of silence or metaphor causes the 
tension which indicates to the student that she must consider what is before 
her. It causes reflection and creative aesthetic judgement in the student who 
wades through the density of the enigma beyond the surface of the simple 
literal reply. The silence and the metaphor do the same things by being a 
meaningful substitute for speech, and this is why it is possible to say that 
silence is a metaphor in this situation.
Cases where a silence could not be adequately described as being 
metaphorical are most likely to occur when empty Harpocratic silence is 
present. Here, the silence is not intended as a substitute for a linguistic 
utterance. Harpocratic silence is not an utterance, not an absence-presence, 
but an absence. There is no intended meaning present in the empty silence so 
it is not a substitute for communicating some meaningful idea. Empty silence 
is not a metaphor for speech, except possibly in some metaphorical way.
The difference between metaphor and silence is primarily one of 
sound. The utterance of a traditional metaphor involves sound, but as we will 
see below, silence can involve sound, as in speech which says nothing or 
omits saying something. There is no reason to suppose that the reverse may 
be true, that metaphor can be present when there is no sound just as silence 
can be present when there is sound. We simply replace the speech with no 
speech and yet accomplish the same things as stated above. Sometimes a 
silence can be an outright act of metaphorical comparison, at least to the
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understanding which receives the silence and processes it in the same way as it 
would a spoken metaphor.
3.8 Conclusions:
Neither silence nor metaphor have been afforded the recognition they 
deserve, mostly because we tend not to appreciate or recognise the amount of 
use we make of each and the reliance we have on them -  we take them for 
granted. Johnson claims we have a prejudice against metaphors based on a 
lack of observed presence of metaphorical communication in our day to day 
activity; if we realised how much we do use metaphor we would likely lose 
the prejudice. The same goes for silence. These are not cases of linguistic 
deviance, but communicative tools that we rely upon and make frequent use 
of.
Moreover, there are many ways in which we make use of silence 
during the act of constructing and understanding metaphor. The gestalt 
comparison, the creative reflection occur in silence and for the great part 
remain there. But even more interesting are the comparisons which show how 
silence functions as a metaphor does. The four primary reasons are: i) 
meaningful content is present in metaphor and silence, ii) silence and 
metaphor can be used to express ideas which are not expressible in literal 
language, iii) strain within literal context draws our attention to the silent or 
metaphoric information, and iv) silence and metaphor are ambiguous. There 
is further support for the similarities which can be drawn from the reasons 
described above.
The following chapter is about the possibility of further similarities 
between silence and forms of speech. It will also cover notions regarding 
subdivisions of silence along the lines of the Coleridge distinctions of finite
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and infinite. However, in the section that follows we will be more concerned 
with the degrees to which silence occurs in acts of communication, leading to 
some surprising conclusions.
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTINUITY AND DEGREES
4.1 Jaworski and the Continuum Between Silence and Speech:
In the previous chapter, we showed how silence can be linked to 
metaphoric language. In this chapter the connection between silence and 
language will be developed further, based partly on the work of Adam 
Jaworski on silence and speech. By far the most noteworthy contribution 
Jaworski makes to our understanding of silence is his theory that there exists a 
continuum between silence and speech. Significantly, the continuum entails a 
fuzzy border between both of its ends. “Can I say something without 
speaking? Can I remain silent when talking?”1 Jaworski answers “yes” to 
both these questions and pursues the further question of whether it is possible 
to have absolute silence and absolute speech. He applies various theories to 
silence that are normally associated with parts of speech such as politeness and 
taboo; and ultimately recognises silence as part of or equal to speech. We 
shall examine Jaworski’s notion of the continuum between speech and silence, 
after which we will expand upon a concept which emerges from the 
continuum, namely that there are demonstrable degrees of silence.
1 Jaworski, pg: 28. I make a great deal of use of Jaworski's book in the following chapters. It 
should be noted however that his project differs from mine for the primary reason that his is a 
linguistic project whil my application is a philosophical one. Jawroski's examples and the 
conclusions he draws have been invaluable, but they are distinct from my project in the 
following ways. First he dwells more on applications of silence while I have tried to stress the 
details of the concept. He does not systematize the idea of interpreting silence in the way I do. 
And finally his project is linguistical analysis so he does not make the philosophical points 
that I make through comparison to the other theorists discussed in this thesis.
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We cannot make a clear separation between what speech does and 
what silence can do because there is overlap between them. The presence of 
this overlap defies our expectations, and indicates that silence may not be as 
distinct from speech as we might previously have thought. For instance, 
silence is part of communication, although it is not usually acknowledged to 
be so. One way in which silence helps us do this is by keeping the channel of 
communication open whereas speech often closes it, although we usually 
expect the opposite to be true. For example, silence is better suited to leave- 
taking, where speech might prolong the farewells and not actually permit the 
leaving. Silence is also a more apparent means of showing willingness to let 
another speak, and hence is useful in counselling situations where the object is 
to encourage the client to talk. These ideas enable us to understand why it is 
that Jaworski draws parallels between speech and silence.
Jaworski is anxious to stress that silence is not the pure absence of 
speech2. The idea of a continuum between silence and speech allows for the 
possibility that there are elements of each in the other, and that their existence 
is not mutually exclusive. This implies that at the heart of the continuum there 
is silence in speech and speech in silence, both extremes merging at the centre. 
It follows from this that there are communicative and non-communicative 
silences depending on where they occur on the continuum3.
The farthest end of the silent extreme is what we have labelled empty 
Harpocratic silence, the silence which does not communicate nor intend to 
communicate. To illustrate this non-communicative silence, the most extreme 
type of silence on the continuum, Jaworski gives as an example two strangers 
passing one another on the street. Nothing happens. They merely pass,
Jaworski, pg: 33.
3 Jaworski, pg: 34.
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ignoring one another, and no communication occurs4. This example is helpful, 
as it appears that a Harpocratic silence has passed. However, this is not pure 
Harpocratic silence because it contains at least the meaningful content that 
these people do not know one another, which can be important in some 
instances. We must keep in mind that the extreme of the continuum which is 
pure silence cannot be experienced, as we have already seen in section 1.5.
Somewhere in the middle of the continuum there is an overlap between 
speech and silence where speech becomes nothing more than sound. This is 
empty speech which overlaps with Harpocratic silence. To understand this 
idea we must consider that not all noise is speech. Some speech is silent in 
that it has no immediately graspable meaning. For instance, it can be filler 
with no more significance than the sound of pneumatic drills. This is speech 
merged with silence. Glossolalia, or speaking in tongues, is a good example 
of speech which overlaps with silence in this way. Glossolalia could be 
considered a form of silent worship on Jaworski’s continuum in that nobody 
understands what, if anything, is being said by it. Another example of speech 
that overlaps with Harpocratic silence is listening to or reciting a text in a 
foreign language. The words are said but they are empty of meaning for 
anyone who does not understand that language. Any meaning they do acquire 
is based on the context in which they are said and the way in which they are 
delivered; which explains why some actors are said to be so talented they 
could evoke emotional responses simply by reading the Glasgow telephone 
directory. This was one of the primary reasons for translating the Christian 
ceremonies into the vernacular; before that, their meaning (though not their 
significance) was silent to those who did not understand Latin.
Elsewhere in this middle range where silence merges with speech, is 
speech which is designed to obscure meaning. Such speech merges with
Alternatively, there could be implicit meaning in the silence between the two strangers, for 
instance there is an unspoken agreement not to communicate because this may be perceived as 
threatening or insincere -  as in ‘have a nice day!’
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silence through ambiguity, in the way that lies and distortions silence their true 
meanings. Bindeman referred to this type of silence within ironic writing, 
such as in the works of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s irony relies on silence to 
contain and communicate the author’s intended meaning. But, ironic 
statements are not silent. They are spoken. It is rather their literal meaning 
which is silent. Thus, silence and speech overlap in irony because the 
message is spoken but its meaning is silent. This makes irony a form of 
Larundic silence, because its silence is not empty but meaningful.
Elsewhere, the continuum further supports the idea that silence is much 
like metaphor. We have seen that metaphors rely on silence to transfer their 
symbolic meanings. This occurs at the point on the continuum where silence 
merges with speech, and the words of a statement telegraph their meaning 
indirectly in the silent background which accompanies them. The second 
assertion regarding the relationship between metaphor and silence can also be 
located on the continuum between silence and speech. In cases where silences 
can express symbolic meanings they fall on the part of the continuum where 
silence is meaningful and expressive without literal accompaniment. These 
are Larundic silences, both wordless and expressive at the same time.
The silence which communicates meaning in more obvious ways also 
exists in the heart of the continuum. These are the paradigm examples of 
Larundic silence which pass on information without words. It is especially 
important to see such silences as part of the continuum with speech because 
doing so places value on them as real acts of communication. Otherwise 
Larundic silence risks being considered a failure of language; or worse, not 
perceived as an act of communication at all. To place Larundic silence inside 
the continuum is to acknowledge its ability to make successful transferrals of 
information.
The extreme toward the speech end of the continuum is presumably 
highly effective communication. Cries for help are effective speech acts
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because they are succinct and unambiguous. However, even cries for help rely 
on silence to inform those to whom they are directed. A call of “Help I’m 
drowning” does not have to be followed by “Throw me a life preserver, dive 
in after me, swim to me, grab me and tug me back to shore...” In fact, it is not 
easy to find an unambiguous pure speech act that does not require some 
assistance from silence. This is because language relies on silence for the 
economy of speech already discussed in this thesis. So the extreme on the 
continuum toward speech is no more experiential than the purest form of 
silence. Nevertheless, the extremes inform our understanding of the mid­
ranges and account for the common understanding that silence and speech are 
opposites.
Jaworski’s continuum thus shows that speech and silence are 
complementary rather than contradictory even though they can have strong 
opposing extremes.
“...of the formal properties of silence the most prototypical 
meaning of the concept of silence involves a total lack of 
audible vocal signals. However,... silence in the sense of 
abstaining from speaking is relative and gradable.... Silence, 
then can be graded from the most prototypical, (near) total 
silence of not uttering words to the least prototypical cases of 
silence perceived as someone’s failure to produce specific 
utterances.”5
We have seen some examples of the positions on the continuum. 
These are: speech which is as empty as Harpocratic silence; speech which 
obscures its meaning and leaves it to Larundic silence; and Larundic silence 
which resembles speech because it communicates meaning, but does so 
without words. This demonstrates the variability of silence and speech and
5Jaworski, pg: 73.
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hopefully shows that silence is in some respects equal to speech on the 
continuum.
“...silence and speech compliment each other in the linguistic 
universe and they are capable of performing similar functions
and expressing similar meanings.”6
4.1.1 Language games and Silence games:
Speech and silence are part of a continuum from most to least verbal 
forms of communication, and from most to least meaningful kinds of 
utterance. Therefore, silence must not be overlooked as just a gap in 
communication; rather, its role is different in different types of discourse7. 
Wittgenstein pointed out that we use words in different ways depending upon 
the context of their use. He called the different contexts ‘language games’ and 
showed that we understand words differently when they are part of one 
language game than we do when they are part of another. So, for instance the 
word ‘drink’ is used one way by a person in a bar, and quite a different way by 
a parent offering a beverage to a child. The difference does not need to be 
explained, as it is part of the information understood in the given context8. 
Silences are understood in quite the same way, as meaning different things at 
different times relative to different contexts.
Silence is what is expected in certain types of speech or 
communication. Rhetorical questions by definition do not require answers. 
Religious worship often requires no sound nor expects any answer, and the 
worshipper would probably be shocked to hear a verbal reply from the deity to 
whom the prayer is directed9. Thus, the kind of understanding which is
^Jaworski, pg: 47.
n
Jaworski, pg: 46-7.
O
Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations. G.E.M. Anscombe trans. Basil Blackwell 
Ltd.; Oxford, Great Britain; 1958.
9Jaworski, pg: 36.
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expected in these contexts is silent rather than spoken. And since the contexts 
vary we can refer to them as the same sort of games Wittgenstein described 
language as participating in. Thus, we can refer to the ‘rhetoric game’ or the 
‘religion game’ to explain that silence is not being used inconsistently in the 
examples above, but that its use varies according to its context.
Silence can have positive and negative uses in communicative 
contexts, but so can speech. For instance, both can signal bonding or lack of 
bonding between people, indicated by conversations that go well or badly, and 
silences that are comfortable or uncomfortable. Where there is anger, 
speaking can negotiate; but silence can help preserve communication by 
avoiding saying something destructive, as this example illustrates from Peter 
Hoeg's novel Smilla's Sense o f Snow: “If I reply I will end up hurting Moritz. 
So I let it pass uncontested.”10 So silence can be the opting-out choice11. In 
some contexts, it plays the game by being “the extreme manifestation of 
indirectness”12. These are examples of the sorts of silence games we play in 
communication.
Silence does not just play a negative role in silence games. It can be 
used as a positive tool as well, and in some contexts can be more 
advantageous than speech. These are some examples that Jaworski suggests to 
illustrate this. Silence can mark a turn-taking in ordinary conversation. 
Pauses help organise speech, and give the speaker time to formulate what to 
say next. Moreover, sometimes it is more effective to rely on silent 
communication, for example in a noisy room. In the context of emotional 
silence games, silence can be face-saving in potentially embarrassing
10Hoeg, Peter: Smilla's Sense of Snow. Tiina Nunnally trans. Dell Publishing, New York, 
N.Y. 1993; pg: 214.
11 Jaworski, pg: 49.
12 Tannen, D. That's Not What I Meant: How conversational style makes or breaks your 
relations with others. J.M. Dent & Sons; London; 1986; pg: 52.
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moments, such as when an offer or invitation is turned down. Silence’s 
ambiguity helps disguise one’s feelings without lying, and helps avoid 
unpleasant topics. Even more substantially, silence can be the main vehicle 
for exchange, especially in highly visual events such as dance where visual 
stimuli make talking secondary13. “Silence keeps things open.”... “speech 
deteriorates”14. Any number of other examples can be found to show that 
silence varies with context, and thus fits Wittgenstein’s model of game 
playing. This accounts for the variations on Jaworski’s continuum, in that 
different positions on the continuum apply to different contexts and different 
games played.
4.1.2 Conclusions:
The benefit of viewing silence as part of a continuum with speech 
rather than as its antithesis, is that it underlines the usefulness of silence as a 
part of communicative exchange. The continuum shows that silence is another 
aspect of good communication. Thus, it need not be looked on as a failure on 
the part of the one communicating to rely on silence to put a point across. A 
failure of language does not mark a failure to communicate; rather, it is a 
different kind of communication which takes the place of language -  silent 
communication. The continuum reinforces the possibility of this positive 
attitude toward silence. It shows silence can be a useful and valuable part of 
exchanges between individuals, without cutting it off from other kinds of more 
verbal exchanges. Thus, the continuum helps maintain a positive 
understanding of silence.
Seeing silence as continuous with speech allows us to apply to it some 
theories about speech. Thus, we have seen silence as capable of multiple 
meanings, of being communicative and non-communicative within certain
1 ^ Jaworski, pg: 50-1.
14 Sontag 1984, pg: 194.
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fcontexts, and as having both positive and negative characteristics in different 
contexts. The variance is similar to the variance which language is shown to 
exhibit in Wittgenstein’s language game theory.
We can conclude from this exploration of the continuum that silence 
can exist in degrees. There are parts of the continuum where silence is pure 
and most closely fits the Harpocratic description of silence. Other parts where 
silence is communicative like language, as in the most distinct forms of 
Larundic silence. And places where silence supports language by containing 
the meaning that will not be directly spoken, such as in lies and ironies. The 
continuum also helps us understand how Larundic silence can slip into 
Harpocratic silence, and carry a meaning that is so vague it leaves room for 
reflection and creative interpretation. This ambiguous Larundic silence is 
exemplified by silent prayer, where the content of the prayer can be anything 
so long as it takes the form of a communion with a deity. Silence also exists 
in degrees where it interacts with speech. A speaker can alternate between 
speech and silence in order to put a point across in the most effective way. 
This occurs most frequently in arts such as poetry. In between these silences, 
there are many areas of overlap among the more and less communicative types 
of silence and speech. It is useful to perceive silence in degrees because it 
illustrates how it is possible to mistake Larundic silence for Harpocratic 
silence, the main source of misinterpretation of silences. We will return to this 
notion later.
The arts depict the degrees of silence most efficiently. In the section 
that follows we will explore the varying degrees of silence as they can be 
demonstrated in music, dance and works of fine art.
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4.2 Degrees of Silence:
We have already explored the primary difference between Harpocratic 
and Larundic silences. Harpocratic silence is empty and awaits the creative 
imposition of meaning to give it content. Larundic silences can be 
communicative silences and possess meanings of their own. However, these 
meanings will be understood and shared only if an interpretation of them can 
be constructed. Methods for interpreting actual Larundic silences will be 
described in part EL These are silences which are not necessarily accompanied 
by gestures or symbols other than their own presence, such as the silence of a 
person who is angry and will not speak to another person. Such silences are 
unequivocally silent, although they do contain meaning. However, with 
regard to silent acts of communication which do involve gestures and symbols, 
there arises the question whether these are silent at all. The question is 
particularly compelling with reference to sign-language which communicates 
in a demonstrably more direct and overt way than an ordinary silence does. 
Following from that, however, it must also be admitted that the silent 
communication of a work of art, though less direct than sign-language, is still 
more direct than an unaccompanied silence; and the same can be said for 
silences which are accompanied by gestures such as the touch of a hand. This 
description illustrates the likelihood that there exist degrees of communicative 
silence based on variations of ostensive accompaniment such as symbols and 
gestures.
Is a painting silent? Can we make a general claim of the statement that 
all paintings are silent? Surely, paintings are silent in the most obvious sense 
that they make no sound. So in at least this most obvious sense paintings are 
silent, and the same can be said of most works of fine art. There are some 
works of art which do make noise and can therefore be said not to be silent. 
Examples of these might be automated sculptures, sound sculptures,
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performance art, and of course music, poetry and drama. These works of art 
make sounds and are therefore not silent in any obvious way. But some of 
them might be silent in a more subtle way. They may make noise, but the 
meaning of the noise may not be clear or obvious. Or their meaning may not 
even be present, as in forms of highly abstract-minimalist art which is 
intentionally meaningless. For, as was pointed out above by Jaworski’s 
continuum, it is possible for a sound to be silent in the sense that it has no 
meaning or that its meaning is opaque. From this, we can already deduce two 
degrees of silence: first a technical soundless silence, like a soundless 
sculpture; and second a silence which is not soundless but meaningless, like an 
unintentional cough or a grunt. However, these two degrees are deceptively 
simple, because though works of art can be silent to the degree that they make 
no noise, we will see that they are not fully silent. Likewise, a sound can be 
silent to a great degree when it carries no intended obvious meaning, as will be 
seen below.
A third degree of silence can be detected in art. Jaworski’s continuum 
between silence and speech demonstrates that works of art such as paintings 
can be silent and communicative at the same time. Such works of art would 
exist on the part of the continuum where silence approaches speech. The best 
example of this is representational art. A representational painting is 
technically silent, but it offers symbols which help define and demonstrate the 
content of its meaning. The meaning does not have to be that which the author 
intended it to be. On the contrary, the meaning is what is contained in the 
symbols and construction of the painting. In this sense a work of art can be 
said to have a vocabulary and rules of grammar, which if not general are at 
least internally consistent. It is because of the demonstrative vocabulary of 
works of art that we are inclined to say that they are not purely or 
Harpocratically silent: works of art are not empty of meaning and they do try 
to communicate. The way they communicate is less direct than literal
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linguistic forms of communication, but more direct than unaccompanied 
silences. Therefore, we can suggest a further degree of silent communication 
which exists on the continuum somewhere between silence and speech; a 
silence accompanied by symbols which offer clues to its meaning and 
facilitate interpretation. Paintings are examples of this degree of silence. This 
would be a fairly low degree of silence compared to Harpocratic silence.
A fourth degree of silence relevant to art arises in abstract minimalism. 
Abstract minimalist artists assert that their work is meaningless15. 
Minimalism is a reaction against abstract expressionism and automatic 
painting where anything could be considered a work of art, including just 
random lines on a plain background. Minimalist painters were critical of this 
and tried to show that abstract expressionism was meaningless. They 
demonstrated this by creating intentionally meaningless works of art, such as 
blank canvasses, and plain white or black tableaux. But, the minimalists’ 
attempts to depict meaninglessness were bound to fail. Returning to the 
notion of meaningfulness described by Searle and Grice, meaning and 
intention are closely tied. Searle and Grice claim that intention to convey an 
intention, or intention to make an intention understood by an audience, is 
meaning. Therefore, the minimalist painters who intended to depict 
meaninglessness as a response to their colleagues could not escape being 
meaningful -  their meaning was meaninglessness, or a desire to show that 
something can be meaningless. By intending their work to be a reaction to, 
and critique of, the work of the abstract impressionists, they were making a 
statement and, therefore, their empty canvasses were not, could not be 
meaningless.
“[The modern artist carries silence] to the point of final
simplification, so that he becomes literally silent. More
15Steiner believed the frame around abstract art encased only meaninglessness, as for instance 
in Dadaist art. Steiner, Wendy: The Colours of Rhetoric: Problems in the reflection between 
modem literature and painting. University of Chicago Press; Chicago II.; 1982.
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typically, he continues speaking but in a manner that his 
audience can’t hear.”16
Nothing intentional can be meaningless. Even the empty paintings of 
minimalist artists like Marden and Rheinhardt17 contain the meaning that they 
are intended to represent nothingness, meaninglessness or Harpocratic silence. 
As a result, the silence of these works will not be meaningless, at least not 
when it is intended to mean nothing. So their silence cannot be pure silence 
which, as was said earlier, is only an abstract concept and cannot be achieved, 
least of all when one is intentionally trying to achieve it. So, in fact, the 
silence of an abstract minimalist work of art is really not a high degree of 
silence because it very clearly contributes to a dialogue about meaninglessness 
in art.
This is not to say that silences always bear significant meaning. The 
meanings may be insignificant like the accidental or incidental silence of an 
empty room. It is meaningful that the room is not in use, the empty silence 
containing the reason why the room is not in use. All sorts of interpretative 
turns can be applied to the silence of a room, but in the end the silence is not 
always terribly significant. And this will be the highest degree of impure 
silence we can reach, a silence which has no significant meaning. This is a 
silence which does not deliberately draw attention to itself, and contains no 
meaning of its own. It is Harpocratic silence and permits the percipient to 
create a meaning to fill it. This is the closest we can be to pure silence of the 
highest degree.
The above demonstrates that there is a level of silence which bears 
meaning that is communicated opaquely, or not very well. This is a fairly high 
degree of silence, one which closely approximates the purest of Harpocratic
16 Sontag 1982, pg: 184.
17Battcock, Gregory ed. Minimal art: A Critical Anthology. E.P.Dutton & Co.; New York, 
N.Y.; 1968.
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silence. The so-called meaninglessness of the abstract minimalist painters is 
not meaninglessness but opacity of meaning. The meanings of their works are 
not easily understood because they leave few clues toward constructing an 
interpretation of them. Thus, Jaworski’s continuum between silence and 
speech includes both a level of communication so abstract that it resides closer 
to pure silence than communicative silence or speech, and another degree of 
silence less abstract, but still slippery because it communicates with difficulty. 
But it also contains a degree of silence so low that the gestures and symbols 
that accompany the silence actually speak for themselves; this silence is 
hardly slippery at all.
4.2.1 Dance:
Dance presents another noteworthy aspect of the degrees of silence. 
Two particular pieces of choreography serve as examples of the idea of 
degrees of silence: “Silence is a Rhythm Too” (by Daksha Sheth & Ellen von 
Schuylenbruch, March 8th, 1995) and “Echo de Silencio” (Juan Carlos Garcia 
choreographer, March 11th, 1995) as seen performed at the “New Moves 
Festival Across Europe” in Glasgow at the Tramway.
It seems impossible in the context of silence to discuss dance without 
referring in some way to sound, most specifically to music and rhythm. It is 
no longer taboo to find bits or entire choreographic works performed without 
music. These pieces are to all intents and purposes silent dances, but more 
often than not the sounds which remain are part of the performance. By this I 
refer to the sounds of the dancers' feet striking the stage and the reverberations 
this causes; the breathing and odd grunts issued by the dancers; as well as the 
incidental sounds of their movement and finally the sounds emitted by the 
audience. There is another significant way in which the aural minimalism is 
not completely silent and this is through communication. The works of art we 
call dance performance are communicative to the same extent that other works
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of art communicate such as paintings, sculptures, music, poetry and drama. 
Through an examination of these two dance pieces, choreographed specifically 
with silence in mind, I shall try to show to what extent silence affects dance.
Dance has long been considered a form of communication. Whether 
this be the fairly direct pantomime of a fully choreographed and performed 
ballet based on a narrative story such as Swan Lake or the Nutcracker, the 
ritual dances performed at rites and festivals all over the world, or the “vertical 
expression of a horizontal activity” performed at dance clubs and raves, there 
is no doubt that people try, and succeed, to communicate through dance. But 
in dance as in the other arts, communicative silence occurs in different degrees 
of effectiveness, from more direct and less slippery silent acts of 
communication to more indirect and more slippery acts of communication.
In “Silence is a Rhythm Too”, it is not readily clear what the 
choreographer Daksha Sheth and choreographer/dancer Ellen von 
Schuylenbruch have in mind with their use of silence. Hence, this piece 
would be an example of dance minimalism where communication is cool, 
vague and very indirect, and where the silence is almost maximally slippery. 
The nineteen minute piece consists of a series of carefully controlled, difficult 
acrobatic movements performed to abstract contemporary music composed by 
Shrikanth Sriram. The music consists of atonal, non(anti)-melodic sounds, 
distortions and reverberations in and around which the dancer moves, 
responding to the tones as they reverberate into silence. The brief silences 
between intonations become part of the dance as the dancer either stops or is 
compelled to move within the silences. The atonal nature of the music itself 
sounds like an imitation of what silence would sound like if it were given 
noise. The tones are rich, yet hollow; they move, yet have no direction. In 
short, they embody many of the paradoxical elements of a silence. The 
dancer’s movements or steps keep time to this non-music. The piece is
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abstract and defies explanation, yet it effectively directs our attention to the 
way silence can inspire and expire movement.
On the surface, there is a high degree of silence, or empty silence, in 
“Silence is a Rhythm Too”. Its abstraction makes it as silent as the work of 
abstract minimalist painting appears to be. But, like abstract minimalism, 
“Silence is a Rhythm Too” is actually a highly effective part of a conversation. 
Its meaning is a response to other dance and music. The title implies that it is 
a response to more melodic and rhythmic traditional music and dance. So, 
like abstract minimalism it is part of a conversation about what constitutes 
meaning and emptiness. And in so being, this choreographic piece is a highly 
efficient attempt at communicating because it successfully shows how rhythm 
can be found in silence.
Less abstract is the interpretative piece choreographed by Juan Carlos 
Garcia called “Echo de Silencio”. The piece is inspired by and danced to 
Henryk G o rk i’s Third Symphony, a highly emotive melody which the 
choreographer purports
“expresses the desperate lament before tragedy. It echoes the 
silence of thousands of speechless, astonished spectators.
Neither the pain nor the anxiety can be repressed.” (Program 
notes)
The piece is deeply moving in part because of the music, but equally 
because the choreography and the set design contribute to the emotional 
charge. The music begins in darkness as the dancers enter from various parts 
of the performance space. Each of the four dancers enters the space and 
switches on covered lamps which hang low to the stage. The lamps are turned 
on and off at strategic parts of the piece by the dancers themselves, pulling 
cords which hang, nearly invisible, within their reach. The light falls in 
distinct circles upon the black dance mat and illuminates either the whole 
stage, or individual distinct spots when only one is switched on at a time.
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This provides effective lighting for the space and clearly delineates the 
spectator-dancer from the performer-dancer at any given time. At the 
beginning of the piece individual dancers perform in individual light spots, 
while the other dancers walk around the spot either far enough away to be in 
virtual darkness or just on the perimeter of the light. This provides a very 
powerful display of isolation, separation and observation between the dancers. 
It also aptly illustrates the relative silence of those in the shadows whose 
dance-voices are not heard, at least not distinctly heard, because they can 
hardly be seen even though they may continue to dance. The choreographer 
states that
“The choreography includes multiple parallel actions and 
pieces of information. Details often escape the spectator, just 
as in real life.”
So the silencing occurs outside the lights, but also when the dancers are 
illuminated by their own performance-lights, because too much happens at one 
time to be acknowledged all at once by the audience.
The choreographer is clear that there is communication occurring in 
the piece whether all of it is acknowledged or not. He even goes so far as to 
describe his work using linguistic terms,
“My intention hasn’t been to compose a piece to go with the 
music but to create a dialogue. Dance and music co-exist.
They underline man’s contrasts, contradictions, opposing 
situations. They reflect emotions severely. Tenderness and 
energy. Indolence. Strength.” (Program notes)
“For some years I have been exploring the potential of Indian 
martial arts like Chhau and Kalari for developing a new dance 
vocabulary.” (Italics added, program notes)
It is the use of the term ‘vocabulary’ which is curious here, but relevant to all 
dance. Even though “Silence is a Rhythm Too” is abstract it is implied from 
the use of the term ‘vocabulary’ that the choreographers relied on a sort of
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language to express and communicate a meaning. A dance vocabulary 
implies that dance is in some sense a language, possibly an abstract and 
indirect language but one which has the ability to communicate nonetheless. 
This implies that the degree of silence actually present in a choreography is 
not much greater than the degree of silence present in a painting or a poem. 
The symbols create a vocabulary for the work of art which keep it from being 
completely silent.
Like silence, dance is an abstract and indirect method of 
communication; a cool medium, as Jaworski referred to it. But there does 
seem to be a difference between a paradigm Larundic silence and dance, or 
any work of art for that matter. The difference is based on the amount of 
facility with which one can construct interpretations of a work of art and the 
amount of difficulty in interpreting silence. The symbolic vocabulary of art 
offers clues for capturing the meanings in works of art; but silence has no such 
vocabulary and is therefore much more slippery. The repertoire of steps of 
ballet are adequately referred to as a vocabulary partly because they contain 
pantomimic symbols of meaning. Thus, the degree of silence present in works 
of art such as dance and painting is less than would be expected. The 
difference extends outside works of art as well. Included in the puzzle will be 
other silent forms of communication which hardly seem like silence because 
they use symbols, signs and other ostensive means of communication. Most 
especially we would have to include sign-language and pantomime as 
silent/non-silent acts of communication. In other words these examples 
involve a low degree of silence because they use gestures and symbols to put 
their point across. Thus, these are acts of communication which include less 
silence and would find themselves in the middle of Jaworski’s continuum 
closer to speech than to Harpocratic silence.
4.2.2 Dubious silences:
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Now we turn to more communicative degrees of silence which beg the 
question whether they are silent at all. Books and sign-language fall into this 
category to different degrees. This is because they are far less abstract than 
works of fine art. The primary reason for this is that books and sign-language 
use complicated systems designed to be more precise and clear than the more 
limited systems of the arts.
When the choreographers discusseded above described their dance as 
having a vocabulary they were referring to a vocabulary which is limited 
compared to verbal vocabularies. The vocabulary, grammatical rules and 
syntax of language in the traditional sense is complex. It is due to this that 
language is capable of expressing ideas with a degree of directness and detail 
of which dance is not capable. The language of dance is inherently indirect 
because its level of complexity is low. As a result we will have to concede 
that dance possesses a greater degree of silence than ordinary language does, 
not just because dance is soundless, but also because it is indirect. The sounds 
dance does use, the music, rhythm etc. do not communicate any more directly 
than the dance steps do. As a result the sounds in dance cannot increase the 
level of communication that dance is capable of, except by increments. 
Highly emotive music can move the audience more successfully perhaps, but 
the meaning of the performance may not become any more overt. Gestures 
help give dance a lower degree of silence, because they give the audience 
something to work with in constructing interpretations; but again this does not 
help it escape silence altogether. Thus, compared to language, dance is quite 
silent.
Books are able to move closer to the level of speech because they 
communicate with a far greater degree of directness. Interpretations of the 
meanings of books are likely to be much easier because their vocabulary is 
more complex. But not all literature is that direct. The meaning of a literary 
work can be increasingly silent depending on its opacity, until the meaning is
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nothing more than a whisper among the words. Poetry, for example, can be 
deliberately opaque and make interpretations of it more difficult. This puts 
poetry near silence on the continuum because interpreting it can be so 
difficult. The prose used in instruction manuals and text books, however, is 
placed closer to speech because it is meant to be more direct and clarifying 
than opaque. An abstract instruction manual would hardly be of much use to 
the person attempting to program and use a video tape player. Thus, books 
such as text-books can be said to exist in a lesser degree of silence; but 
because it is a continuum we are describing, it is also possible to see books, 
especially poetry and novels, as possessing a higher degree of silence due to 
the difficulty of interpreting them.
It is sign-language which is the most interesting of these degrees of 
silence because although it is technically silent it is also distinctly not silent. It 
exists both in silence and in speech on the continuum. Speakers of sign- 
language are silent but not because they are not speaking. It is only that they 
do not require sounds to make their direct communications understood. They 
can be described as being silent at times, when they are not signing. They are 
also describable as being loud and louder when the speaker increases the size 
of the sign-gestures, so that everyone in a large room can see/hear them, or in 
moments of enthusiasm. As a mode of communication, sign-language is 
barely silent at all. It manifests a language and a culture more clearly than 
dance or representational art do. Its meanings are just as direct as any natural 
language, and it can also be indirect and opaque enough to write abstract 
poetry. The degree of difficulty of interpreting the meaning of a sign-language 
utterance is no greater than attempting the same for an equivalent language 
one is familiar with. It is for these reasons that it is tempting to say that sign- 
language is not silent except to the weakest degree18.
18Dolnick, 1993. Pp: 37-53.
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Thus, there are degrees of silence and these degrees may interweave. 
An utterance can be technically silent but imbued with meaning easy to 
interpret because it is accompanied by gestures, symbols or signs. 
Representational art, standing ovations and sign language are among 
examples of several of these degrees of silence. Other things may be very 
noisy but still be silent because their meanings are either very opaque or non­
existent, for example the sound of the wind. Still other things may be silent in 
both ways in that they make no discernible noise, and contain no discernible 
significant meaning, or no meaning at all.
In exploring the notion of degrees of communicative silence we see 
that the amount of silence present in an “utterance” depends on the level of 
difficulty or facility of constructing interpretations of the utterance. 
Utterances appear to be multi-layered, so that communication can occur at 
different degrees on different levels. The presence of interpretable symbols 
decreases the amount of silence in the utterance. Media that use many 
established symbols, such as religious art, classical ballet and prose texts are 
not very silent because they make their meanings known in a non-slippery 
way; their symbols act like clues for interpretation the same way words do in 
speech. Silence uses less overt means of communication, and there is virtually 
no fixed vocabulary supplied to make interpretation easier. Silence is what is 
not given in any obvious way. Thus, the more abstract and opaque the 
medium of communication, the higher the degree of silence present in it.
4.3 Conclusions:
We have seen that there exists a continuum between silence and 
speech. This continuum is useful because it explains how we can have 
silences that communicate and speech that does not. The continuum allows us
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to see that there is overlap between speech and silence in areas such as irony, 
equivocation and meaningful silences. It also indicates that there are degrees 
of silence. Silence can be said to be present to a greater degree in abstract 
utterances which have little fixed symbolism accompanying them; and silence 
is present to a lesser degree in cases where symbols such as words make 
interpretation more direct. The point was made through examples of more and 
less silent works of art. These helped to demonstrate the degrees of silence 
and showed that Harpocratic or meaningless silence cannot be created 
intentionally as any intention indicates a meaning. We will now explore the 
various uses of silence in the hope of understanding more about the 
complexity of its presence.
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CHAPTER 5
VALUING SILENCE
5.1 Varying Value:
“I sit there in total silence. It’s always interesting to leave 
Europeans in silence. For them it’s a vacuum in which the 
tension grows and converges toward the intolerable.”1
“We drink it in silence. It’s Christmas Eve. For me, silence is 
usually an ally. Today it’s pressing lightly on my ears.”2
“It’s not until the engine room shuts behind me that I realize 
how enervating the noise was. The silence is refreshing.”3
These are three quotes from Peter Hoeg's novel Smilla's Sense o f Snow 
in which the main character holds a particular affinity for silence. The quotes 
demonstrate something significant about silence. They show that we apply 
both negative and positive value to silence. Our attitude toward it is 
ambivalent because it is both useful, and difficult to deal with. We can benefit 
from being silent, for example, when we wish to be evasive. On the other 
hand, it is frustrating to try to interpret the meaning of an evasive silence 
because it is so slippery. Our ambivalent attitude toward silence shows in the 
way we respond to silences in certain contexts: liked where it is useful; hated 
where it makes communication opaque; and dreaded where it confronts us 
with death. Thus, an understanding of how we value silence will necessarily
^ o e g , 1993. Pg: 21.
2Hoeg, pg: 124.
3Hoeg, pg: 296.
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proceed from a relativist theoretical perspective so that we can account for our 
variable attitudes toward it.
In the section that follows, two claims about silence will be proposed. 
1) That the general ambivalent attitude we have toward silence is evidence for 
the claim that silence itself is value neutral; from which it follows that 2) we 
impose value upon silence depending upon its situational and contextual 
status. No normative claim regarding whether silence is inherently good or 
bad, useful or detrimental, and so on, can be made about silence in general nor 
of any of its broad sub-categories delineated above. Instead we apply value- 
statements to silence externally and relative to our attitude toward it in a 
specific situation. Claims regarding truth and falsity are particularly difficult 
to deal with in regard to silence because very often silence makes no assertion 
at all, or some assertion indirectly. Thus, it is hard to avow the truth or falsity 
of silent speech acts until after they have been interpreted; and then it is the 
interpretation about which claims to truth and falsity will be asserted, at which 
point the interpretation will have to be assessed for its own accuracy and a 
value applied to it. Evaluation of interpretations will be dealt with in Part II. 
This section will deal with an assessment of attitudes toward silence, showing 
how they are situation dependent.
5.2 Value and Context Dependence:
Jaworski claims that silence has two values: negative and positive. 
Silence can, for example, mark “a failure of language” or “an opportunity for 
personal exploration”4. However, this assertion requires a qualification: 
silence itself is value neutral,. It is individuals who assign a value to silence 
according to the instance in which it arises. Value-neutral silence can be
4Jaworski, pg: 66-67.
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assigned positive or negative weight depending on the situation and the 
judgement of the interpreter. Thus, we consider the peace of a silent room to 
be a positive silence, whereas the silence of a dark street can seem menacing. 
Silence itself, as a general concept, cannot be assigned the value labels of 
‘good’ or ‘evil’, because it does not have independent inherent value in the 
way torture or generosity may be said to have. If silence has no inherent value 
but its value changes according to the situation in which it arises, then silence 
derives its value from its context: sometimes it is considered negative and 
sometimes it is considered positive. These values are not inherent but applied 
by external observers or issuers of a given silence. Provided that Jaworski 
accepts this context-relative qualification, his theory that silence is open to 
valuation is correct.
This change notwithstanding, Jaworski’s analysis of silence is an 
excellent reference for understanding ordinary valuations of silence. His 
linguistic perspective clearly shows the many ways in which we manifest 
positive and negative attitudes toward silence, and ultimately shows how our 
reactions to silence vary according to the contexts in which they arise, and 
according to our cultural predispositioning toward silence. The following is a 
summary of Jaworski’s position with some additions.
Jaworski favours the cultural-relativist analysis of silence because of 
the ambivalent attitude we have toward it, and there is a great deal of evidence 
to support this choice.
“...the attribution of invariant meanings and interactional 
properties to either speech or silence does not find plausibility 
in the communicative realities of different speech 
communities/cultures. Therefore a relativistic approach to the 
study of the meaning of silence has been advocated.”5
5Jaworski, pg: 48.
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That silence can be meaningful is no longer in question. What silence 
means is a question which cannot have a single answer. Silence is open to 
many meanings, it is a pluralistic concept, and cannot be circumscribed by a 
simple definitional explanation. The meaning we attribute to silence is likely 
to be context dependent, and because we do not ascribe value where there is 
no meaning, it follows that the value assigned to a silence will be context 
dependent as well. But it seems wrong to infer from this that silence is a 
generic concept upon which we impose whatever we choose. Instead it may 
be said that Larundic silences can carry a variety of meanings and values 
because silence is flexible in the same way certain words can be flexible. This 
is much like the word T .  ‘I* is not definable in any specific way because its 
referent varies depending upon who utters it. Silence is similar. Although two 
utterers can use a silence in the same sort of way, its meaning or referent being 
different in different situations6. Silence can carry its own meaning like a 
word does,7 but what this meaning is will vary according to its context. Also, 
the value we attribute to silence will vary according to the meaning the silence 
carries, and this will depend on context as well. How a silence is used, then, 
will affect our valuation of it.
5.3 The Uses of Silence:
The variability of the meanings of silences explains why we are 
ambivalent toward it; sometimes we seek its comfort and safety, other times 
we rage against its entrapment of freedom of speech. Sometimes it is 
luxurious, other times it is dangerous or frustrating. Our attitude depends
6Admittedly, T is not an average word. The significance of the example was to draw attention 
to the fact that some words are capable of the flexibility of silence.
7Reference to language games in Wittgenstein. See above.
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upon the meaning the silence is given, and therefore the context in which it 
arises. In this section we will explore a summary of some of the uses Jaworski 
ascribes to silence and some of the drawbacks inherent in using silence as a 
means for communication.
One thing is certain; as Jaworski points out, we must dispel the belief 
that silence is merely a background for speech8. As Sontag says “Something 
is neutral only in respect to something else.”9 Jaworski criticises Bruneau for 
saying that “silence is to speech as the white of this paper is to this print.”10 In 
other words, Jaworski asserts that it is wrong to believe that all silence does is 
provide the contrast for the presence of words. Silence does more for speech 
than that. Accordingly, Jaworski concludes that silence belongs to the para- 
linguistic systems of language. It is part of speech in the same way volume 
and intonation are part of speech, so it is not mere background11. Volume and 
intonation make a great deal of difference in speech. Saying something loudly 
has a different effect than saying it softly. Placing emphasis on some words 
changes the meaning of a sentence. For example, "I won't have it' is different 
from 'I won't have it'. Likewise, silence defines the boundaries between 
utterances, aids in the cognitive processing of speech, it helps us note changes 
and allows the speaker to formulate thoughts12. So it follows that “silence and 
speech are two intersecting and equally relevant communicative categories.”13
8 Jaworski, pg: 12.
9 Sontag 1984, pg: 186.
10Bruneau, T.J.: “Communicative Silences: Forms and Functions”. The Journal of
Communication, 23,17-46. Pg: 18.
11 Jaworski, pg: 14.
1 \2 Jaworski, pg: 13.
1 o
Jaworski, pg: 17.
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5.3.1 Pauses:
As a linguist, Jaworski helps us see how silence is an integral part of 
communication14. He says there are three types of silences during 
conversation, these are: gaps, lapses, and significant silences. He illustrates 
the usefulness of silence with reference to these pauses in speech. For 
example, pauses politely leave room for others to participate in the speaking, 
which makes the situation more comfortable. Pauses may also help the 
speaker formulate ideas more fully, or analyse them more thoroughly. Pauses 
help the speaker not to impose or dominate, and help restore balance if this 
should occur. Pauses also provide a reasonable time for replies to be 
formulated, and a response to be made. Jaworski even recommends that we 
wait longer than we have planned for a reply, and we will be pleasantly 
surprised at how well it improves communication. This is especially relevant 
in teaching situations, because students are often intimidated and will not 
speak unless they feel that they are truly invited to do so15. Pausing also 
leaves the student time to digest new information.
However, pauses can have troubling consequences as well. The two 
most obvious problems are being cut-off and having the pauses interpreted 
negatively. Everyone is familiar with the frustration of being cut-off in a 
conversation during a pause to gather thought or take a breath. This can be so 
frustrating that some people panic at the thought of having to take a pause and 
rush right through them. But not taking pauses can have equally adverse 
effects, such as not having time to reflect and gather one’s thoughts. This can 
lead to incoherence, and suspicion on the part of listeners that one is trying to 
dominate the conversation. Having pauses misinterpreted is really a topic for
14 Jaworski, pg: 35.
15 Jaworski, pp: 9-10.
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discussion in the second part of this dissertation. However, it is useful to note 
now how misinterpretations can occur and the effects they can have.
Pauses are usually ignored by listeners, but sometimes they can be 
perceived negatively. For example, they can be thought of as a lack of clarity 
of thought, or as preparation for a lie. They can also signal an avoidance on 
the part of the speaker, who is seen as stopping themselves from saying what 
is really on their minds. Moreover, we tend to be afraid of silences in 
conversations, especially when we do not know the person with whom we are 
conversing. We tend to be afraid that a pause in conversation might indicate 
lack of rapport16. Pauses can be telling signs of misdirection, or they can be 
useful tools for clarity. It is how they are interpreted and responded to in a 
given context which gives them positive or negative value.
5.3.2 Expressing the Inexpressible:
We saw earlier how silences can be economical in conversation 
because they contain what is implied so that not everything has to be made 
overt; silence can be “economical, efficient and to the point.”17 Silence is 
also able to express ideas which go beyond language or which are 
unspeakable. For example, victims of torture often find it impossible to 
express the horror of their experiences, and some psychologists believe it to be 
unfair to their clients to try to force them to do so. But the horror of the 
situation is nonetheless communicated by the fact that no words can 
adequately express the victims' feelings. Thus, silence is useful for 
communicating what language cannot express.
16 Jaworski, pg: 6.
17 Jaworski, pg: 4.
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“There is relatively little that words can do for grief. Words 
can do relatively little about anything. But what else do we 
have?”18
What we have is silence. Larundic silence is an excellent substitute for
speech, especially “when speech breaks down”, and fails to describe or
explain. This is when words become irrelevant, when they cannot express
what can be conveyed silently, and instead flounder in failed attempts to
express in language ideas and feelings for which there can be no words.
There is a tendency in such situations to rely on small-talk to help ease
the discomfort of being at a loss for words. Because of this, Jaworski draws
parallels between silence and small-talk. Small-talk is often criticised as not
containing any communication. The actual meaning of the conversation
remains silent and small-talk eases the awkwardness of it. Often there is a
difference between what is said and what is meant in small talk. For example,
in the West the phrase ‘let’s get together sometime’ can be a way of politely
putting off a date, but in some cultures an expectation of some sort of follow
up emerges. There are cultural variances in attitudes toward what mark
sufficient and insufficient amounts of talk, what is regarded as polite or
impolite19. The routine behaviour of small-talk helps avoid the discomfort and
awkwardness of silence in some cultures. In other cultures, silence replaces
small-talk in some social settings. This is especially true where the society
makes extensive use of silence. Apache greetings do not have to contain
words. They are often silent, especially upon first meetings20, and speech is
considered suspect between strangers.
Native American teachings propound this reliance on and appreciation
for silence.
18Hoeg, pg: 166.
19 Jaworski, pg: 56.
90 Jaworski, pp: 54-55.
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“Training began with children, who were taught to sit still and 
enjoy it. They were taught to use their organs of smell, to look 
where there was apparently nothing to see, and to listen intently 
when all seemingly was quiet. A child who cannot sit still is a 
half developed child.”21
5.3.3 Culture and Context:
As the previous example illustrates, silence is a form of 
communication which is used in different ways by many different cultures, 
and of which Jaworski says:
“Therefore I believe children acquire the ability to use and 
understand silence very much in the same manner that they 
acquire all other linguistic skills in the acquisition process.”22
Some cultures rely on silence more than others, but it is clear that 
silence is a universal means of communication. Silence can be useful 
in many aspects of life, including teaching, learning, psychology, 
marriage, management... But it must be said that attitudes toward 
silence vary according to culture as well as context. For example, even 
in the West where silence is relatively little valued, politicians who talk 
too much are perceived as not trustworthy, and excessive verbiage is 
seen as covering up lies or ignorance. Silence is also preferred when 
speech inhibits activity, such as long good-byes at leave-taking. 
Additionally, by not expressing contentious ideas, silence can help 
alleviate tension and avoid confrontation. So in some sense it is the 
language of diplomacy.
21 Chief Standing Bear in A Fabulous Gift: Inspirations on Silence and Solitude', Eileen 
Cambell ed. Aquarian, an imprint of HarperCollins; Hammersmith London; 1994.
99Jaworski, pg:4, and note 3 pg: 26.
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The Japanese take a more favourable attitude toward silence because 
for them speech is considered a deterrent to action. As a result, Japanese 
simultaneous translators are less valued for their very strenuous and vital 
contributions to international relations, because they make their living by 
speaking in a society which prizes silence above speech23. Speech is seen as a 
deviation from a preference for silence.
In the West we tend to treat the presence of speech as normal and 
silence as deviational24. According to Jaworski, in the U.S.A. humans are 
perceived as machines where the natural humming (talking) is considered 
normal, healthy working behaviour. Its absence is a sign of break-down and 
malfunctioning25. Among North American psychologists silence during a 
therapy session is often wrongly perceived as failure to progress; nobody is 
speaking so it seems as if nothing is happening. Likewise, Jaworski points out 
that a silent student is often misperceived as being disengaged from the 
learning context, but, he adds, a silent student is not necessarily one who is not 
learning26. In both these examples, silence can also be seen as a positive 
element that leaves room for productive thoughtful activity which may be 
inhibited if it had to be verbalised. Yet Westerners do not necessarily perceive 
it in this positive way. Instead we link silence in these contexts with 
discomfort and failure. It is safe to say that there are some cultural contexts 
that might value these examples of silence differently. For instance, a 
Buddhist monk might be inclined to praise the silence of a student.
23 Kondo, Masaomi. "Japanese Interpreters in Their Socio-Cultural Context." UM Meta, 
1988, 33,1 Mar., pp: 70-8.
24 Jaworski, pg: 44. Here Jaworski makes reference to the feminist critique of psychology 
which designates qualities common in men as normal, their absence in women is hence 
considered deviational and abnormal. See for example Carol Gilligan.
9r
Jaworski, pg: 46.
26 Jaworski, pg: 53.
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5.3.4 Using silence correctly:
Using silence to communicate will affect what is communicated27. As 
a result, silence will be favoured as a medium of communication in some 
situations and disfavoured in others. This is because silence produces certain 
qualitative differences in what is conveyed. Silence leaves a great deal of 
intended content ambiguous, which could be dangerous in some fields, such as 
medicine or engineering. Thus, silence lends itself better to some contexts 
than it does to others. Religious language prefers ambiguity and hints, so 
silence lends itself well to religion. Science, on the other hand, tries to stay 
away from ambiguity, so silence is usually out of favour with scientists whose 
work requires distinct statements in order to preserve clarity. Legal language 
requires the same kind of exactitude. As a result, lawyers favour speech and 
are suspicious of witness silences during cross-examination28.
Ambiguity can be useful in some contexts but not all. Thus, it is clear 
that silence will be assigned positive value in some situations and negative 
valuation in others. The inclination to call silence purely negative or mere 
absence is simply a cultural prejudice of the West29. Silence can actually be 
seen to confer all sorts of benefits. Potentially uncomfortable situations can be 
rescued with routine, ritualistic behaviours which involve silence. For 
example, when nothing is said because we do not want to call attention to a 
cultural faux-pas, or when someone makes a rude remark. Different contexts 
call for different formulaic responses and silence can be one of those
9 7
Marshall McCluhan said “the medium is the message”, and Jaworski applies this notion to 
the way silence communicates its messages. See Understanding Media: The extensions of 
man; Mentor; New York, N.Y.; 1964.
28See chapter 16 on "Silence in the Court".
9Q Jaworski, pg: 48.
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responses. In fact, even in the West silence is preferred in important 
situations, such as when marking the boundaries of life through rituals such as 
weddings, or at births and deaths. Unfortunately many people tend to forget 
that silence is clearly favoured over speech in certain contexts.
“Both speech and silence can be used in creating bondage, 
communication, rapport, and so on, or just the opposite: Both 
can be used to cut oneself off from others and to convey no 
(genuine) message. While silence is usually associated with the 
perception of lack of communication, speech is associated with 
its presence.”30
But some speech only creates the illusion of communication, while some 
silences only create the illusion of non-communication. We can say that the 
presence of irrelevant words in speech can cause it to be regarded as silent31, 
just as the failure to mention something significant is the same as being silent 
about it. On the other hand silent looks can be just as clear as an outright 
statement, and sometimes more eloquent. In fact, given the right context, 
silence can do many of the things speech can do, and sometimes vice verse. 
The ambiguity of silence is appreciated more in some cultures than in others, 
but all cultures have instances where silence is openly preferred as a medium 
of communication.
5.4: Pseudo-Communication:
Words become irrelevant when they are part of pseudo­
communication. Jaworski calls an act of communication ‘pseudo­
communication’ when it is not negotiated but controlled purely by the sender,
30 Jaworski, pg: 98.
O 1
Jaworski, pg: 99.
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as in advertising32. It contains a contrast between what is the stated (which 
remains unclear and hidden) and what is the observed purpose of the 
communication. It exploits uncritical and collective thinking, relying on the 
passivity of its audience for its success (probably because it is not meant to 
withstand criticism). It is ambiguous due to its confused use of symbolism, 
and appeals to emotions rather than intellect or reason. Pseudo­
communication depends on external authority and secret knowledge. Its 
means are subordinated to its ends, and it is usually simple, reduced to an 
easy-to-understand universe which is ultimately sloganizable. All this 
apparently leads those subjected to pseudo-communication to pay it little or no 
attention. As a result, things like advertisements are usually disregarded, 
because it is assumed that they contain little meaningful content, and that the 
content will require a great effort on the part of the audience in order to be 
understood33. Ordinarily, silence communicates what is not overtly said in 
pseudo-communicative contexts. The bits of information not present are left 
to be deduced by the audience. However, this is only possible if the presence 
of the pseudo-communication is noticed, otherwise it will be ignored. And 
because it requires an effort to deduce the meaning of the pseudo­
communication it often is ignored in favour of things more easily understood.
According to Jaworski, silence tends to suffer from the same problem 
pseudo-communication does because it shares some of the same qualities. If 
we assume that some text, for example an advertisement, will not have 
satisfactory results for our efforts we tend to ignore it, relegating it to a 
subattentive level. We do the same to silences which we expect will have no 
meaning, and so are not inclined to make any effort to understand34. This is
Jaworski, pg: 100. Habermas would argue that this is impossible as all communication 
must be negotiated to occur.
Jaworski, pg: 100.
34 Jaworski, pg: 101.
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very important because it results in a communicative vacuum, where no 
passage of information can occur because it is not recognised as occurring. 
We will see that it is highly significant that a silence must be noticed as 
relevant in this way before it is understood.
Jaworski asserts that the first effort required for communication via 
silence must be the acknowledgement, from both the utterer of the silence and 
the audience, that an effort at communication is being made. Without this 
acknowledgement no transferral of information can happen. But his claim 
overlooks two important points. First of all, it ignores the possibility of 
subliminal communication. This may conjure up images of wicked advertisers 
covertly coercing us to over-consume products for their own gain; but it is 
possible to imagine an act of silent communication which may be 
acknowledged by the utterer, but not by the percipient who receives the 
knowledge at a sub-conscious level. It is possible to understand that a 
meaning is conveyed without acknowledging that the act of communication is 
taking place. Secondly, Jaworski’s account does not accommodate acts of 
unintentional communication. It is possible to communicate something 
silently which one does not intend to communicate nor believe to have 
communicated. Jaworski himself raises examples of lies which people try to 
disguise by speaking over. A liar may believe she has gotten away with her 
lie, but can have unknowingly signalled it by talking too much. Actors are 
cautious not to telegraph what they are about to do. The person playing 
Hamlet35, for example, can unknowingly communicate to the audience that he 
knows someone is hiding behind the drape in Gertrude’s chamber before he is 
supposed to have noticed the movement, which ruins the shock of Hamlet’s 
murder of Pelonious. So mutual acknowledgement may not be necessary for 
communication to take place, as communicative silence can function on a
35Shakespeare, William. Hamlet. New American Library; New York, N.Y.; 1987.
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subconscious level without conscious acknowledgement on the part of the 
utterer, the audience or both.
The communication vacuum created by pseudo-communication can 
also be produced by repetitive speech, which eventually is ignored. As a 
result advertisements must be changed every so often in order to avoid too 
much repetition. As Jaworski points out, repetition can produce meditative, 
reflective states, and aid in understanding, and, he says, silence can do the 
same36. We can see this as Jaworski’s equivalent to Harpocratic silence which 
stimulates its percipient to reflect and meditate. The repetitive nature of ads is 
more likely to be oriented toward creating a non-reflective state, where 
consumers buy not because they have been convinced of the reasons to believe 
that this is the best product, but because the advertisement has been successful 
in capturing their attention on a less cognitive level. Passive Harpocratic 
silence causes creative and productive behaviour on the part of the percipient, 
whereas this description of repetitive advertisements shows that they are more 
likely to inspire passivity in the percipient. So passive silence requires greater 
effort than the passive behaviour required for repetitive advertising. Thus, 
advertising is pseudo-communication, but silence does not resemble it to this 
extent.
5.4.1: Oppressive silence in the political context:
Political propaganda borrows strategies from advertising, using 
repetitive speech and irrelevant words to create pseudo-communications37. 
Both of these strategies camouflage silences which the speakers are afraid may 
be distrusted. Thus, politicians hide behind verbiage when they are afraid that 
they will be seen as either secretive or ignorant. This helps them preserve
36 Jaworski, pg: 105.
37 Jaworski, pg: 104.
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their silences behind a pretence of sharing knowledge, although they remain 
silent on more salient subjects.
As a result, silence can be a useful tool for political discourse, and not 
just an effect38 (as in being silenced, see below). Jaworski says that silence is 
politically strategic when
“...the refusal of a public figure to communicate verbally... (1) 
violates expectations, (2) draws public attribution of fairly 
predictable meanings, and (3) seems intentional and directed at 
an audience.”39
The result of these silences is to clearly communicate an intended intention 
(perhaps of the sort “I am not a crook”) without actually stating it. Such an 
intentional message must either be general enough to accommodate the 
ambiguity of its medium, or be directed toward an audience that is specific 
enough to make misunderstanding less likely. This follows from a further 
statement:
“The difference between politically strategic silence and other forms of 
communicative silences is that the former does not have to rely on its 
context to make its meaning predictable, whereas the meanings of the 
other kinds of communicative silence can only be interpreted in 
relation to the verbal and other non-verbal context in which they 
appear.”40
So Jaworski is assuming that the political context is somehow not a necessary 
element for use of, and interpretation of a politically strategic silence. But I 
assert that context is necessary for all predictability. If the political context in 
which the silence takes place did not exist it would be just another difficult-to- 
interpret silence, and could be intended to mean just about anything. The
io
Jaworski, pg: 105; as in being silenced, see below. 
39From Brummett, 1980, pg. 289; Jaworski pg. 106.
40 Jaworski, pg: 106.
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context, as will be explained in Part II, provides the necessary parameters for 
making sense of a Larundic silence.
Strategic silences can have good and bad consequences. In the 
political context a silence always implies mystery and passivity41. This can 
have positive effects on the image of the politician, but it can also be 
perceived as elusive and untrustworthy because expectations of 
communication are not fulfilled. One can evaluate the outcome of a politically 
strategic silence by analysing “political contexts preceding and following the 
silence, its ethical aspects, and other non-verbal behaviour accompanying 
it...”42. The outcome will indicate what value is placed on the silence by 
revealing how well it succeeded in masking the secret. Thus, the context 
reveals at least part of the meaning of the silence.
In Polish there is a specific term for ‘failing to mention something’ 
(przemilczenie). It is considered a useful political tool for manipulation43, but 
it can backfire when the audience expects to hear what was ostensibly ignored 
by the speaker. The consequences of failure to mention something are 
positive when the silence is effective, but can have serious negative effects 
when they are discovered. In this sense, silence can be “concealed in a 
multitude of words”44, so it is possible to remain silent even when we speak.
Ordinarily, strategic silences are meant to have positive effects. 
Allusional references can, like in-jokes, communicate directly with a few and 
indirectly with others45, thus giving a single statement a double-entendre 
which owes its subtlety to silence. Strategic silence permits discretion and 
indirectness. A silence is often more polite than a direct refusal. Euphemisms
41 Jaworski, p: 106.
42 Jaworski, pg: 107.
43 Jaworski, pg: 109.
44 Jaworski, pg: 8.
37 Jaworski, pg: 110.
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are helpful in this way by appearing to be relevant and exhaustive46, while 
actually leaving a great deal to silence.
Silence can be relevant to politics in ways other than equivocation. 
When a law is silent about a particular topic, and the judge decides it is not a 
problem for the courts, the issue is passed on to legislators. Thus, the case 
enters the political realm. Now legislators and politicians must decide how to 
formulate a new and appropriate law, and to do so they must discern the public 
attitude toward the issue. More often than not legislators do not consult every 
citizen in order to learn how each perceives the solution to the problem. To do 
so would be far too cumbersome and time consuming. Instead, politicians rely 
on openly expressed opinions, and their own interpretation of silence in the 
community. This can have problematic effects on the community because 
politicians’ and legislators’ interpretations of public attitudes can be mistaken 
or distorted, and this is particularly true in the case of silence.
In the political realm silence is most often considered acquiescence. If 
citizens do not openly express their attitudes toward an issue politicians will 
continue to do what they were doing, assuming that the silence means they 
have full agreement from citizens. But, agreement does not always mean 
acceptance in politics. Sometimes it merely means the government has 
succeeded in coercing its citizens enough to make them afraid to speak, as was 
often the case under the Third Reich. Alternatively, during the U.S.A. 
McCarthy hearings, silences were deliberate displays of dissent on the part of 
witnesses who refused to “name names”. So, interpreting public silence as 
support can be a mistake.
Jaworski believes that silence can help maintain the status quo in 
politics and elsewhere. This is often done through censorship, either self- 
imposed (as in a public figure’s use of ‘no comment’) or other-imposed.
46 Jaworski, pg: 114.
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Dictators often maintain control by use of silence and silencing measures47. 
This is a form of what Jaworski refers to as ‘macro-silence’, which hides 
injustices and controls reactions to them. Mass media can be used to issue 
political gibberish in order to disguise these silences48, and then the 
irrelevancies of the propaganda become silent pseudo-communication. For 
example, martial-law in Poland silenced opposing parties by not allowing 
media access to certain groups. More overtly the desaparecidos (missing 
people) of Latin America were victims of outright terrorism in an attempt to 
silence them. Fortunately, their mothers, wives and sisters prevented them 
form being completely silenced by carrying photos of the missing persons on 
banners protesting the government. The victims’ stories are given voice 
through these women, and the victims’ identities are preserved from silence 
because of them.
“The silencing of a group may take very subtle but equally 
effective forms: brainwashing, indoctrination, and negative 
stereotyping, which all lead to the creation of a group’s self 
image as a powerless, submissive, inferior body with nothing 
relevant to say.”49
Silence is oppressive when it is characteristic of a dominated group. 
Oppressive silence is silence which is not an absence of speech on the part of 
its victims, but an absence of listening on the part of the oppressors. This 
silence usually causes tension, anxiety and depression to members of the 
oppressed group. It can be subverted in many ways including graffiti, and 
underground publications, and other methods which defeat the oppressive 
silence.
47 Jaworski, pg: 115.
AQ
Jaworski, pg: 116.
49 Jaworski, pg: 118.
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5.4.2: Oppressive silence in the social context:
Jaworski includes women among those who suffer from being silenced 
by a dominated group. Even St. Paul said:
“Let women keep silent in the churches, for they are not 
allowed to speak. Instead, they must, as the Law says, be in 
subordination. If they wish to learn something, let them inquire 
of their own husbands at home; for it is improper for a woman 
to speak in church.”50
There are many examples of women’s oppression through silencing. 
Women have traditionally lacked access to male dominated media. Only 
recently have female voices become more prevalent in public places, and then 
these women are often subject to irrelevant restrictions not applied to men, 
such as age and appearance. Also, women’s achievements have been silenced 
historically. Women’s activities, art and craft have been ignored or given the 
generic rubric of community activities and crafts. Their work appears in 
museums without names to indicate who made them.
The oppressive silencing has not been exclusive to the public realm. 
Women are frequently interrupted in face-to-face conversation, and have 
suffered from the double-bind of being expected to talk in social contexts but 
be subordinate to men the rest of the time. Strangely, women are generally 
considered to have better verbal skills than men, but are still kept from having 
control over conversations. Furthermore, men’s tendency toward 
inexpressiveness can be seen as a type of male dominance over women.
Those oppressed by silence are prohibited from indulging in the 
relaxing, private silence “men have access to at home”51. Silence perceived as 
a luxury, in the sense of being private, relaxed or meditative, takes on a 
different feeling when it is enforced. Instead, the silence of the oppressed is a
50 II Cor. 14.34-35; Jaworski 119. See also, Kramer, H. & Sprenger, J. Malleus  
Maleficarum. Montegue Summers trans. Arrow Books; London; New York, N.Y.; 1987.
51 Jaworski, pg: 119.
129
frustrating struggle against not being heard, where one is limited in expression 
and belittled.
Women, and silence, have been perceived as abnormal form the biased 
point of view of those who see men, and speech, as normal. Speech is 
preferred because it appears to be logical, simple, and intelligible52. It is 
interesting to note that men have applied the same labels to male thinking; 
whereas, female thinking is often called illogical, fuzzy and emotive and 
criticised as abnormal for being so53. But,
“The perception of a feature as normal or abnormal is never a question
of objective fact but of the circumstances in which it is observed...”54
Those things which are perceived as abnormal cause anxiety because 
of their complexity and the challenge they pose to the dominant order. As a 
result, the desire to silence the abnormal is strong. The self is regarded as 
right because it is familiar or normal, thus the other is wrong because it is 
unfamiliar or abnormal. Perception of the other can be altered and 
manipulated, so that we can decide whether to perceive something as 
familiar/same or alien/different. Thus, speech may be perceived as preferable 
and then the unfavoured group is prevented from engaging in it, or their mode 
of speech is classified as inappropriate for some reason. Women’s speech has 
been called fuzzy and emotive, laden with irrelevancies and, therefore, 
different from men’s. The male model is considered clear and truthful, better 
able to communicate important things. It is the male model which is 
dominant, therefore it is perceived as normal, while the female model is 
perceived as abnormal. The assignation of status is ambiguous and people’s 
status can change according to context. People are defined not according to
52 Jaworski, pg: 122.
3^Gilligan, Carol. In A Different Voice. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.; 1982.
54 Jaworski, pg: 122-3.
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facts, but according to “what we believe to be the case...”55. Thus, when a 
group is perceived as being ‘other’ and are oppressed as well, they become 
taboo and are then silenced56.
5.5 The Restrictions of Language:
Language is often perceived as a means of control. We have control 
when we speak, in that we have voice. But it is also another kind of control, 
namely the control language has over the speaker. Language is limited and it 
limits us when we try to use it. Even the most eloquent speaker, the best user 
of a language, will need to resort to neologisms, words borrowed from other 
languages, metaphors and silences. A language can be silent on a subject in 
cases where it has no words to address it, label it or describe it. In such cases 
the speaker is controlled by the language which limits speech and ultimately 
can limit thought if we ignore what is beyond language. Linguistic control 
abbreviates what can be communicated, and can prevent others from 
understanding what one intends to say. Additionally, in some cases language 
may require us to say something other than what we want to say.57
By contrast, silence is freedom from the restrictions of language. In 
silence we can address thoughts which cannot be addressed by language 
because language lacks the frame of reference for doing so. We escape the 
control language has over us when we do not use it, at least to some extent, as 
we often fail to notice things for which there are no words in our language. 
The Inuit think about snow differently from the way English speakers do
55 Jaworski, pg: 124.
56 The above is from Jaworski, pg: 125. See also the work of Dana Jack.
57 Robin Downie mentioned an interesting example of this. Apparently a certain language 
has no other term for 'far away' than “there where one cries ‘mother I am lost’”.
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because their vocabulary is great enough to account for subtle, but probably 
significant, differences English speakers do not notice. However, this does not 
mean that we have no experience of things for which we have no name, it is 
just that the experience is silent and therefore easily ignored.
Silence liberates us from the restrictions of language, provided that it is 
not ignored. The subtleties and vagueness of silence can be useful for 
breaking through the limitations language imposes upon us. We must be open 
to what silence offers, pay attention to what cannot be said, what is left out of 
language, in order to escape the tyranny of language. To do this is to learn to 
appreciate silence, and thereby allow it a positive value. This notion will be 
expanded upon in Part n.
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5.6 Conclusions:
The many uses of silence illustrate how it is unsatisfactory to assign a 
single value to silence as a general concept. The positive uses of silence 
indicate its positive value. Hence we judge as ‘good’ the silence which passes 
on information without it needing to be spoken; and we judge as ‘bad’ the 
silence which deceives or oppresses.
Silence is not a definable concept; by evading definition it remains 
flexible. So we have not defined it, but instead have tried to create a 
generalised analysis of its many functions, from the difference between pure 
and impure silence, to the subdivision of impure silence into Harpocratic and 
Larundic silences, and finally focusing on Larundic silence in its 
communicative role. This examination allows us to see silence in different 
ways and permits a richer understanding of the role of silence in 
communication. However, the realisation that silence is meaningful and 
common in our lives and language uses could not help us to determine 
whether normative statements and value statements about silence can be made 
sense of. This had to be done via an exploration of some of the many 
functions silence serves.
It is not clear whether silence is valued in itself or not. On the whole 
the general attitude toward silence is one of ambivalence; sometimes ‘silence 
is golden’, other times it is evil like the ‘silence of a conspiracy’, or the 
‘silence of the grave’ (which term is usually thought of as evil though it is 
probably quite neutral except for the feelings we impose upon it). The value 
we attribute to silence seems to be context dependent, much like its meaning. 
So the value we attribute to silence will vary according to the meaning the 
silence carries, and this will depend on context. The context itself will be 
situation dependent or culturally dependent as different cultural groups have
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different attitudes toward silence in general. Among these groups the value a 
silence is given depends upon the situation in which it arises. Silent greetings 
are less favoured among European Westerners than they are among Navajo 
Native Americans58, except in certain situations where a silent greeting is 
more appropriate to European Westerners such as when you wish to greet 
someone in a lecture hall while a lecture is being given. Hence the appeal to 
context.
It should no longer be in question whether silence can bear meanings, 
as they have shown to be able to do so. Moreover, those meanings can be 
transmitted to an audience through Larundic silence, and without the use of 
more overt forms of communication. In this sense silence is communicative 
like speech is. However, ultimately we cannot say of silence that it is valued 
or not, because its status depends on its context, and even then its value may 
be ambiguous. The same may be said of most things. However, it is possible 
to make value assertions about individual silences, which means that in order 
to make sense of value statements about silence we must follow Jaworski’s 
recommendation and assume a relativist perspective. This marks a similarity 
that silence has to language; neither is inherently valuable in every case -  
silence and speech are good or bad only when we apply our judgement upon 
them. We can assert normative claims about silence and speech only 
according to the context in which they arise.
58 Jaworski, pp: 54-55.
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CONCLUSION TO PART I
In part I of this thesis it was shown that silence is a far more complex 
notion than is immediately obvious. We have tried to circumnavigate this 
complexity by mapping out a vocabulary that demonstrates the different types 
of silence. To this end silence was divided into the two categories of pure and 
impure silence. Impure silence was the subdivided into Harpocratic and 
Larundic silences, with further subdivisions. It was subsequently 
demonstrated that Harpocratic silence can be empty and ready to have 
meaning applied to it. Larundic silence, meanwhile, was shown to bear its 
own meaning in the way that linguistic utterances bear meanings. In order to 
understand how silences carry and then communicate their meanings, silence 
was compared with metaphor. It was concluded that silence shares enough 
similarities with metaphor that it is possible to refer to it as a form of 
metaphor. The reasons for this were outlined in chapter 3. From the point 
where silence is viewed as a form of communication, we proceeded to look at 
its relation to speech. Jaworski’s notion of a continuum between speech and 
silence helped determine the connection between the two, and to strengthen 
the arguments in chapters 2 and 3 which apply linguistic theories to silence. 
In chapter 4, the continuum then clarified how it is that silence can 
communicate even though it is wordless. And chapter 5 offered a summary of 
different ways in which silence is used.
Part II of this thesis will explore other aspects of the communicative 
nature of silence. In the sections that follow, we will see that silence relies on 
interpretation to make its meanings known. It will also be seen that this 
requirement makes communication through silence precarious and hence
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reliant on restrictions to guard against radical readings. Thus, a model for the 
interpretation of silence will be offered in Part II based on suggestions from a 
variety of theorists.
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PART II: 
INTERPRETING SILENCE
CHAPTER 6 
PROBLEMS WITH INTERPRETING SILENCE
6.1 Introduction:
Part I extends the argument that silences can have meanings, and do 
act as meaningful utterances which can communicate and inform. The 
argument demonstrates that silences can communicate but that they do so with 
great ambiguity, much the way metaphors do. Their ambiguity is not, 
however, necessarily a drawback. On the contrary, ambiguity can be useful 
for communicating concepts which are either obscure or elude language 
altogether. Moreover, silent communication can accommodate richness, depth 
and texture which ordinary language cannot; this is because absence of speech 
stimulates the imagination and leaves space for new ideas. Finally, it was 
shown that silence can be expedient when language fails to be.
On the other hand, there are inherent problems related to the ambiguity 
and vagueness of Larundic silence. Its evasion requires the audience to 
construct interpretations of it in order for its meaning to be understood and 
communicated. Unfortunately, this can lead to misunderstandings, which 
prompt the twin aims in Part II of this thesis. The first aim is to examine some 
of the features of interpretation and misunderstanding. Second, is to explore 
some of the possibilities for making interpretation of silence less uncertain. In 
order to accomplish the second aim several elements are proposed which, 
when combined, will make interpretation accessible and misunderstanding less 
likely. These elements are derived from the works of a number of 
philosophers, most notably Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hans-Georg Gadamer,
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Sperber and Wilson, Richard Bernstein and Ronald Dworkin; and include such 
notions as: context, relevance, prejudice, tradition, openness, agreement, 
practical reasoning, best light and fit.
In order to facilitate the process of building interpretations which 
adequately reflect the meaning of the utterance, the above elements will be 
considered. It will be argued that the best interpretation of a meaning must 
attend to the context in which it arises. Such attention is not limited to the 
immediate surroundings and to the utterer, but also to the context in a more 
mediate sense including the details not available on the surface. Attention to 
mediate information ensures the interpretation has proper/// to the coherent 
whole of the utterance. This in turn ensures that the utterance is seen in its 
best light; in other words, as internally consistent and not set up as a straw 
man easily knocked down by the interpreter. This is one way in which the 
interpretation relies on relevance to prevent misunderstanding. Jaworski 
suggests a second salience of relevance in interpretation of silence. As he puts 
it, ideally the audience “chooses the most relevant interpretation of my 
silence”1 in an effort to prevent misunderstandings. This requires openness on 
the part of the interpreters so that all the relevant information is acknowledged 
and used. Openness is necessary because information can be obscured by the 
preconceptions interpreters bring to the act of interpretation. These 
preconceptions, or prejudices, can obscure the meaning of the silence. 
However, Gadamer suggests that prejud ices  may also facilitate our 
understanding by providing the basis upon which to build the understanding. 
Gadamer’s prejudicial basis will thence be useful for constructing 
interpretations of silences which offer few clues of their own as foundations 
for interpretations. Finally it is necessary to reach an agreement of the 
meaning between the interpreter and the utterer or the utterance, to provide a 
means of differentiating between understanding and misunderstandings. This
1 Jaworski, pg: 3.
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is pulled together by the act of practical reasoning which weaves the 
constituent parts into a general model and applies it to individual silences with 
flexibility and coherence.
For reasons which may be obvious, this part of the thesis focuses 
primarily upon Larundic silence rather than Harpocratic silence. Larundic 
silences bear meanings of their own and are therefore the only silences that 
require interpreting. By extension then, they are also the only silences that can 
fall victim to misinterpretations. This is what I shall refer to as a radical 
reading of the meaning of a silence. Going outside the finite meaning of a 
Larundic silence is problematic for the simple reason that it involves 
misunderstanding and hinders communication. Moreover, Larundic silences 
are likely to precipitate serious consequences when they are ignored or when 
they are mistaken for Harpocratic silence. The following chapters are 
designed to help restrict interpretations to the limits inherent in the Larundic 
silence, and thereby limit the possibility of radical readings. This does not 
mean that there is no freedom in a Larundic silence. Its perimeter is wide, but 
it is still restrictive to a degree, as we shall see.
The theories examined below offer elements which contribute to a 
possible model of interpretation that not only accommodates language and 
text, but also silence2. We begin with an exploration of the slippery nature of 
silence, and an attempt to explain why it is both difficult and necessary to 
construct interpretations of silent communications.
2 These theories are also applied to art, science, law and social-understanding in general by 
the various authors. Gadamer especially leaves his theory deliberately open to be applied in 
various contexts. In fact, the term “text” for him can substitute for many different objects of 
interpretation including utterances and works of art. The term” author” is also applied in 
various ways accordingly; thus an utterance can have an author, as can a work of art. These 
terms will be used in a similar manner throughout this text.
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6.2 The Slippery Nature of Silence:
The problem with silences is that they are opaque. This opacity 
implies that the meanings of silences are difficult to apprehend. 
Consequently, silences must be interpreted to be understood. However, 
interpreting meanings is rarely an infallible practice, even under the best of 
circumstances when clues are provided and a meaning is obvious. There is 
always a risk of misunderstanding or distortion due to the presence of personal 
beliefs brought to the act by the interpreter. Because of the high potential for 
misunderstanding and opportunism in interpretation it is useful to construct, if 
not rules, then some kind of general methodology for making interpretations. 
This will be especially useful for silences because silences rarely, if ever, 
provide the optimum conditions for interpretation that other more overt acts of 
communication provide. Thus, we say that silence is too slippery to get a hold 
of. The following exchange between Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson 
illustrates how easy it is to overlook the importance of a silence.
“Is there anything to which you wish to draw my attention?”
“The singular incident of the dog in the night time.”
“But the dog did nothing in the night time.”
“That was the singular incident.”
(Holmes to Watson, on the subject of the dog who did not 
bark because he knew the burglar3.)
As familiar as we are with the experience of meaning behind our own 
silences, we are equally familiar with times when we have recognised the 
presence of meaning behind the silences of others. For example, one can be 
aware that the silence of children in the next room means trouble before going 
to see this for oneself. However, the knowledge that another’s silence is
I would like to thank Prof. Graham Watt for drawing this example to my attention.
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meaningful is not necessarily accompanied by a distinct understanding of what 
that meaning is. Some theorists doubt whether it is ever possible to know the 
intended meaning behind another’s utterance, whether that be a silent or a 
spoken utterance, a text or even a work of art. Theorists such as Gadamer 
deny the hegemony of authorial intention altogether. However, if we grant 
that silences do have meanings, and that they can communicate these 
meanings, then we will want to know how this is accomplished: how can we 
know what the meaning of a silence is? Grasping the meaning of a silence 
involves constructing an interpretation of it, but this will be difficult because 
silences are slippery and do not offer the kinds of conditions needed for 
making accurate interpretations.
How do we account for the slippery nature of silence? Jaworski 
applies to silence the theory put forth by Marshall McLuhan in Understanding 
Media: the Extensions o f Man4. According to this theory, media of 
communication come in two forms: “hot and cool”. Hot media offer the 
audience a large amount of information for understanding the messages they 
bear; cool media offer little information so they must be filled in by the 
listener in order for communication to take place5. Television is given as an 
example of a hot medium because it fills the senses with visual and auditory 
information and leaves very little to the imagination. Speech is a cool medium 
of communication because it requires at least some effort on the part of 
listeners for clear understanding to take place. Silence is even cooler because 
it requires a great deal of effort. And this is at least one way in which silence 
can be described as slippery, because grasping its meaning requires effort.
“Silence is a medium of communication whose processing
requires more cognitive effort than speech.”6
4 Routledge, Kegan & Paul; London; 1964.
5 Jaworski, pg: 141.
6 Jaworski, pg: 141.
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Even though speech is a cool medium, when we hear someone speak 
comparatively little cognitive effort is required to determine whether their 
speech is meaningful or not. Some additional effort may be required to 
determine what the meaning of their utterance is, but the utterance is easily 
recognised as meaningful. Silence is different. A greater effort is required for 
the percipient to even notice that a silence is meaningful, and even more effort 
is required to determine what that meaning is. According to Jaworski, silence 
does not manifest its meaning in a strong way. In this sense, he continues, 
Larundic silence is like a code and necessitates the effort of decoding through 
interpretation. This leaves silence vulnerable to misinterpretation7. Silence 
resembles a code because its message is not obvious but ambiguous, and like a 
code it must be recognised as being a communicative attempt before it can 
pass its meaning on. It must be assumed that an attempt at communication is 
occurring or a silence risks being ignored as meaningless. This is because 
silence lacks manifest conventions of communication. In the same way, a 
written code may be perceived as mere gibberish until it is acknowledged to 
be a message and then decoded. As a non-verbal mode of communication, 
silence relies on coding and decoding because it is weaker than verbal 
communication and is therefore slippery and ambiguous.
We can summarise this depiction of the slippery nature of silence as 
follows. The description of silence as a cool medium of communication and 
Jaworski’s analogy of silence as a code, distinctly illustrate how the 
communicative act of silence is slippery in the following ways: 1) silence is 
an ambiguous and therefore weak form of communication which manifests its 
meaning only very coolly; 2) as a result it is not always recognised as being a 
meaningful act of communication and is therefore easily overlooked as empty 
or ignored; 3) even when it is recognised as being meaningful silence requires
n
Jaworski, pg: 85.
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efforts of interpretation in order to be understood, and this leaves it vulnerable 
to misinterpretation. To this will also be added 4) silence as a non-verbal form 
of communication offers few clues for making the act of communication more 
likely to succeed. Because of these four characteristics, silence is accurately 
described as being slippery.
6.3 Conditions for Building Interpretations:
It is the problem of mistaking full communicative silences for empty 
ones that in part fuels the need to address the ways in which we construct 
interpretations of silences. Another reason for doing so is that even when 
silences are recognised as bearing a meaning this meaning is difficult to 
discern because the silence is slippery. Under optimum conditions the 
construction of an interpretation of a meaning is relatively straightforward. 
But silences rarely, if ever, present such optimum conditions and as a result 
they are more difficult to understand. So what are the conditions that make 
construction of an interpretation of a meaning, any meaning, possible?
To determine this it will be helpful to look at an example of a relatively 
simple interpretative act. Take an illocutionary act such as the command 
“silence, please”. In a particular situation, such as when visiting a library, the 
meaning of the command is sufficiently clear and is made clearer by the 
context in which it arises. Hence, the audience is intended to interpret the 
command as directed toward anyone who is making noise, and as requiring 
this person to stop doing so. But how is this interpretation to be arrived at? 
How do we know what the utterance “silence, please” means? In this case 
there are two factors which will assist our understanding, these are: 1) the 
utterance itself, i.e. the words and language used to construct the utterance, 
and 2) the context of the situation. As described earlier, the words provide the
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clues to what is being said; they are the signs of a predetermined linguistic 
system, and their meanings or the ideas they represent are also predetermined. 
Thus, the words with which the utterance is constructed help the audience to 
understand what the meaning of the utterance is by narrowing the field of 
possible choices from infinite to manageable. The audience must then select 
from the restricted possibilities the interpretation they think is best. Secondly, 
the context helps reduce the possible interpretations further and directs the 
interpreter toward a plausible meaning for the command. That the command 
is issued in a library, for instance, that other people in the library are trying to 
read, possibly even that the librarian as person in authority has issued the 
command; these are all clues to the possible meaning of the utterance. By 
these indices and a process of elimination the correct interpretation can be 
reached and the sense of the utterance understood.
We want to be able to describe certain acts of interpretation as 
misunderstandings for at least two reasons. First, because we know 
misunderstandings occur, and it would be counterintuitive to deny this. And 
second, because to deny the possibility of misunderstanding is to presume the 
infallibility of all interpretations, and this is dangerously relativistic. It is 
important to accommodate at least the form of misunderstanding which will be 
called “miscommunication” and is described by Jaworski as a “pragmatic 
failure”.
“When the pragmatic force of the utterance, in this case silence, 
attributed by the hearer is different from that intended by the 
speaker, ‘pragmatic failure’ takes place.”8
By this we assume Jaworski is referring to the propositional force (P/) 
described by Grice9 as the intended informative content of the utterance.
o
Jaworski, pg: 68.
9 Grice, 1967. Pp: 39-48.
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When the Pf  of a statement as perceived by the audience is different from the 
Pf  intended by the utterer then miscommunication takes place, and the 
audience fails to understand the meaning which the utterer intended them to 
grasp.
This implies that there is a certain importance attributed to the 
intention of the utterer in issuing the utterance. An idea which is not 
especially radical, but which does meet with criticism. There are many who 
disagree that authorial intent plays a role in interpretation. Their argument is 
briefly something like this: we can never know what goes on in the mind of 
an author when making a statement; furthermore, the utterance once issued 
takes on a life of its own and will be interpreted in ways which the author 
could never have intended (partly because interpreters have different 
perspectives than the author has). Therefore authorial intent is not a helpful 
concept for formulating interpretations. This argument contains some truth, 
but it is not necessarily valid. It is true that we cannot read minds, and even if 
we could, our personal views of the world and our past histories would affect 
the way in which we understood the information we receive. It is also true 
that authors rarely succeed in directly transmitting their exact thoughts to an 
audience, and any attempts to do so are bound to be frustrated. However, the 
anti-intention position does not withstand the critiques offered by Searle as 
outlined above, and Gadamer, as will be demonstrated below. Their positions 
assert that there is something distinct to which the audience is ascribing a 
meaning. This something is independent of the interpretation ascribed to it by 
the audience. Gadamer will go so far as to say, that there is an object 
independent even of the intended meaning of its author; and that it is the thing- 
in-itself \ as Gadamer calls it, upon which our interpretations are imposed. 
Even without taking the extreme perspective Gadamer takes, it is possible to 
support the claim that there is a meaning independent of the interpretation 
imposed upon it. This will explain why we have to be careful how we make
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interpretations, and will also explain why we can be said to make wrong 
interpretations. It lays the groundwork for misunderstanding.
The tenability of this notion holds for silences as much as it does for 
any utterance or work of art. Even though it is not entirely clear what a silence 
means, it is the case that Larundic silences can have specific meaning, and that 
interpretations of a Larundic silence ought to try to remain faithful to whatever 
that meaning is. The question remains how this is to be done.
6.3.1 Words as Clues:
Under ordinary circumstances, when an utterance is made its audience 
understands the message it conveys. In other words, we tend to understand 
what people say to us. At least one of the many reasons why this is so is that 
the words in the utterance help convey the meaning to the audience. As 
Wittgenstein put it, we understand the sense of the sentence at least partly 
because we understand the words with which it is composed10. In some way 
the words act as clues to the meaning.
Interpretation of words is different from interpretation of silence. 
Words are symbols which act as perimeters or limits to their interpretation. 
Every word has at least one meaning, and this meaning directs the interpreter 
toward specific ideas. These are the ideas for which the word is a symbol. If 
the interpreter goes outside the limits of these ideas then it is possible to 
describe the interpretation as wrong or radical. The limits guide the interpreter 
toward right interpretation, and to exceed the limits is to miss the point. Take 
for example the word ‘house’. If the interpreter construes this symbol to be 
something with four legs, a long tale, and a big mane the attempt would be 
judged as a wrong interpretation of the symbol. If the interpreter took the 
word to mean a building with four external walls, a roof, a garden, and used as 
a dwelling, the interpretation would be judged as right. This is because the
10 See Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §3.3 &4.022; and Investigations, §20, 33, 117 & 197.
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interpretation has remained within the accepted limits of the definition of the 
word. Nevertheless, it is possible to make mistakes by staying within the 
boundaries of correct interpretation. If the speaker had in mind the House of 
Parliament then the interpreter’s conception of a dwelling would be incorrect. 
Yet somehow we hesitate in calling this wrong in the same way mistaking a 
house for a lion is wrong. We might be more inclined to call it an honest 
mistake but not actually wrong. This is because the interpreter did not exceed 
the limits the symbol set out; she merely took what was most readily evident 
to her as the correct interpretation without fully exploring the boundaries of 
meaning the symbol offered. Thus, words restrict interpretations of 
utterances, at least to some extent, by being associated with accepted 
meanings. But can the same be said of utterances that contain no words?
6.3.2 Clues fo r  Silence:
It is possible to interpret silences even though they lack the overt clues 
words offer. This is because there are other clues we use to make 
interpretations, and these can be applied to interpretations of silences as well. 
One such clue is in the way that silence draws attention to itself, an idea earlier 
referred to with reference to metaphor. Silent communication appeals to its 
ostensive-referential surroundings in order to make it distinguishable from 
meaningless silences, marks or sounds. That is to say, that silences which 
occur when they are expected, or when their presence is conspicuous, are 
perceived as meaningful because of the way they fit into their surroundings. 
For example, a minute of symbolic silence at a memorial is meaningful 
because of its context, and is easily differentiated from the meaning of a 
minute of silence which might precede a concert. Furthermore, the tension of 
the inappropriate presence of a silence can also cause one to recognise its 
meaningfulness, as we have seen above. This is one way Larundic silence has 
to protect itself from the vulnerability of being ignored as Harpocratic.
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Grice, as we saw earlier, and Jaworski have pointed out that an act of 
communication occurs on two levels.
“The manifestness of assumption in communication takes place 
at two levels of intentionality. Informative intention is 
recognised when a certain stimulus (verbal or nonverbal) is 
produced by the communicator to manifest or make more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions. Communicative 
intention is recognised when it is made mutually manifest to 
audience and communicator that the communicator has this 
informative intention. The two basic layers of information 
provided by ostention are the following: (1)... the informative 
intention -  and (2)... the communicative intention”11
Silence is capable of informative intention on its own in that it can bear 
a specific meaning; or of inform ative intention  accompanied by 
communicative intention such as when a silence cannot be ignored.
“It appears that when silence is used ostensively to manifest 
explicitly (or make more manifest) a set of assumptions, both 
informative and communicative intentions are fulfilled.”12
However, a silent informative intention is easily ignored if its communicative 
intention is not recognised. So a person confronted by a silence will first of all 
need to perceive the communicative intention behind the silence; after which 
it is possible to recognise that the utterer wants to convey a meaning by 
issuing it. This is the one of the necessary clues for non-radical interpreting of 
Larundic silences. It will be referred to as noticing the relevance of the 
silence, in keeping with the idea of relevance introduced by Sperber and 
Wilson and discussed below. To note that a silence is relevant is the first clue 
toward interpreting its meaning because we do not make efforts to interpret 
things which we do not recognise as bearing any meaning.
Nevertheless, this does not account for the kinds of unintentional 
silences discussed earlier which can and do communicate without either the
11 Jaworski, pg: 84-5. See also the section of this thesis on Meaning and Silence.
12 Jaworski, pg: 87.
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intention to inform or the intention to communicate. These silences were 
referred to earlier as ‘silent slips of the tongue’. For example the silence of 
two strangers passing in the street does convey the information that they do 
not know one another, but such silences are not intended to convey 
information they are simply incidentally communicative. Another example is 
found in the Straussian school of Platonic exegesis which bases itself on 
finding meaning in what is not present in the texts13, so the readers find 
meaning in what has been (un)intentionally left silent. Thus, we can transmit 
information without fulfilling either the informative intention or the 
communicative intention; in fact without any intention at all. This is because 
some information is cognitive and not inferential, such as accents which 
express information about the speaker without intending to14. In this sense, a 
silence can tell us something about the identity of its utterer or the person who 
avoids making an utterance. Formal silences and pauses can intentionally 
convey meaning, especially if they are formulaic in nature. But they can also 
convey information unintentionally and therefore require no intention on the 
part of the utterer that a communicative act is taking place. Furthermore, the 
information conveyed does not necessarily have to be recognised by the 
audience, who can receive the information by osmosis, as it were, without 
knowing they have received it. Hypnosis works on exactly this premise, 
where people are hypnotised in order to help them remember the elements of 
events they have witnessed but could not recall the fine details of. It follows 
from all of this that it makes sense to say that we can interpret a silence whose 
bearer claims has no intended meaning.
In order to interpret the meaning of a silence we look for the clues 
within the context in which the silence occurs. As the examples in the
11 Strauss, Leo: The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws. University of Chicago Press;
Chicago, II.; 1975. Thank you to Richard Stalley for calling this example to my attention.
14 Jaworski, pg: 88.
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previous paragraph suggest, sometimes this means reading between the lines, 
an idea illustrated in more detail in the section on “Medical Silence”.
Clues for the interpretation of silence are possible, even though silence 
is slippery. The clues for interpreting silence emerge when careful attention is 
paid to the possibility of meaning within silence and when the context of the 
silence is examined, like reading between the lines. But this must be done 
with an awareness of the multifacity of silence. Silence is not merely 
communicative or uncommunicative; silence can also be either 
communicatively relevant or communicatively irrelevant, just like speech, and 
we can acknowledge it or ignore it the same way we do speech. This accounts 
for empty silences, full silences and the problem of full silences which are 
mistaken for empty silences. Below we will show how other elements, 
including context and relevance are of utmost importance as clues for 
interpreting silences.
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CHAPTER 7
CONTEXT
7.1 Context and Frame Analysis:
The primary element for constructing non-radical interpretations is 
context. Context provides silences, and other objects of interpretation, with a 
frame of reference. This kind of frame analysis1 is especially helpful in 
simplifying the activity of interpreting silence. The frame analysis model can 
provide the interpreter with valuable clues for constructing her interpretation 
and
“...explain how individuals exchange signals that allow them to 
agree upon the level of abstraction at which any message is 
intended.”2
Framework is a useful analogy applied to silence by Jaworski. 
Context, he says, is like the frame of a painting which draws the boundaries 
between the painting and reality. The meaning the painting extends exists 
only within the frame; outside the frame the painting is something else: an 
object, a decoration, an investment3. Staying within the perimeter of the 
frame ensures that the interpretation is consistent with the story the painting 
tells. Thus, we are required to remain within the frame in order to generate 
non-radical interpretations of the object. This will be a significant source of
1 Jaworski, pg: 145.
Jaworski, pg: 147.
Jaworski, pg: 148.
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clues for interpreting Larundic silences. The painting outside its frame is 
something else, just as a silence outwith its context is not the same silence it is 
within its context. The limiting characteristics of a frame of reference thus 
help prevent us from mistaking finite Larundic silences for the infinite 
qualities of Harpocratic silence. Uncovering and remaining within the frame 
of reference is necessary for making non-radical interpretations of Larundic 
silence.
Larundic silences are the only silences that require interpreting, 
because they are the silences which bear meaning to be interpreted. The 
meaning a Larundic silence offers is a limited meaning in that its meaning is 
specific. Any interpretation that moves outside the limits of the silence’s 
frame of reference is a radical reading of the silence. For a reading to be non­
radical it must respect the boundaries set by the frame of reference. This 
means respecting the context of the silence in its mediate and immediate 
forms. In this way the interpreter of a silence will be able to uncover clues to 
the meaning of the silence, and the boundaries of the frame of reference will 
become clearer until the meaning is revealed. The point of remaining within 
the limits set by the silence and revealed in its contextual elements is to remain 
faithful to the meaning which the silence extends.
However, there are Larundic silences that point the way outside their 
own frames of reference; for example, poetry can suggest a silent meaning of 
its own, but may also serve as a take-off point for the imagination. In such 
cases it is necessary to remain within the perimeter of the silent meaning of the 
poem only to the extent that the percipient wishes to know the meaning of the 
poem. Beyond that, the percipient is free to move into a less finite, more 
Harpocratic silence of creativity. Two different but overlapping silences are at 
play here. The finite Larundic silence that contains the meaning of the poem, 
and the resulting infinite Harpocratic silence to which the poem directs the 
reader. Not recognising the distinction between the two raises problems for
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Larundic silences, because it leads to unrestricted interpretation of a specific 
meaning; in other words, a radical reading of a Larundic silence.
7.1.1 Reading the Clues:
“The interpretation of the message may equally depend on the
understanding of both the said and the unsaid elements of the
utterance (implicature).”4
Reading the clues in the context can help us resolve the ambiguity of 
Larundic silences. Studying physical characteristics such as duration, 
intensity, and contextual strain, can assist in the clarification of the meaning of 
a silence. Physical characteristics serve as clues for interpreting the silence 
with greater accuracy. The setting of the silence has been shown to be 
important in several examples in the thesis already. The silence of church­
goers at prayer ought to be considered within the context of the church, just as 
the silence of an audience attending a concert is meaningful within the context 
of the concert. Familiarity with the physical characteristics surrounding a 
silence will reveal further information, as it will disclose mediate information 
about the silence not available on the surface. To illustrate, consider how one 
interprets the meanings of Larundic silences uttered by people we are familiar 
with. It is no coincidence that we are better able to interpret the meanings of 
people we know. And, in fact, our agility at interpreting a silence can grow 
with the degree of closeness we have to the person whose silences we 
interpret. This is due to familiarity. A familiarity with the silent utterer’s non­
verbal signals increase our ability to understand the meanings behind their 
silences. Hence I can recognise that when my husband tugs on his beard he is 
tense, and I do not need him to express this to me verbally. However, there is 
more to my interpretation than simple association of action with emotion,
4 Jaworski, pg: 79.
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because I am also able to tell when this same tugging is an indication of 
concentration. This is where I go deeper into the context of the situation. 
Patrick’s silent beard-tugging can be understood in different ways depending 
on when he is performing the action. I can know that his silence means 
tension or concentration according to the temporal context in which he is 
pulling on his beard. Someone who didn’t know him as well as I do, might 
mistake beard-tugging while concentrating for beard-tugging due to boredom. 
My familiarity provides me with better interpretative skills because I have 
assembled a lexicon of Patrick’s behaviour.
But this is not sufficient explanation of interpretation through context. 
It must also be said that I can be wrong about my interpretation because I am 
too involved with the person whose silence I am interpreting. In this case our 
shared context might interfere, and a stranger might be better able to interpret 
Patrick’s silence. I may believe that Patrick is tugging on his beard because he 
is engrossed in what I am saying and is concentrating. I could miss the fact 
that he is actually tugging on his beard because the subject of our conversation 
is making him tense. An impartial observer might be better equipped to 
interpret Patrick’s silence correctly. How do we explain the observer’s 
success? Once again it is the context on which the observer relies to make 
sense of the situation. The context shows that this is a conversation between 
spouses in which the husband tugs on his beard. My familiarity may blind me 
to certain elements in the context. A stranger on the other hand may be highly 
aware of the elements I miss. Through contextual observation the observer 
may remark other aspects of the setting in order to make a less radical reading 
of Patrick’s silence.
This example indicates the importance of mediate contextual 
information. The advantage I have over the stranger is that I am capable of 
assessing not just information from the immediate setting, but also from the 
mediate setting. I am familiar with Patrick’s personality to a greater degree
154
than the stranger is. Mediate information is a valuable clue to interpretation 
because it reveals what is below the surface. When we reach only for 
immediate contextual information we may not access important clues that 
reveal information with greater depth and complexity. The immediate 
understanding can be facile and incomplete. Thus, it is worth the effort of 
excavating for further information, even if this is not easily available. This is 
important to bear in mind later on when the thesis discussion will return to the 
notion of effort required for interpreting silences. The effort may be greater 
than that required for interpretation of words with overt clues, but the revealed 
richness will make the effort worthwhile.
Careful examination of the context of the silence will reveal a great 
deal of information, but not all the information will be appropriate to the 
interpretation of a particular Larundic silence. Some information will 
confound rather than assist the interpretation. There are at least two sorts of 
confounding information in this regard. First of all, some information will be 
brought to the act of interpretation by the interpreter and mistaken for 
information revealed by the silence. For instance, mistaken hunches and 
prejudgements may be so common-place that the interpreter does not 
recognise them as her own. Second, the silence will be surrounded by a large 
amount of information some of which may be unnecessary or misdirective. 
Too much information will overwhelm the interpreter, who may choose to 
ignore the meaning because the effort at understanding it is too great. Still 
other information may not be useful at all.
Thus, as Jaworski says,
“...the principle of relevance based on minimisation of the 
information processing effort and maximisation of the 
contextual effects of the utterance, can be useful in explaining 
how silence is interpreted and disambiguated.”5
5 Jaworski, pg: 68.
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Below, the discussion of fit, openness and relevance will reveal more 
about this idea. Fit plays a role in assuring that a silent meaning is framed 
within its own context. Jaworski suggests that in order to avoid 
miscommunication the interpreter of a silence ought to attend to the pertinent 
issues of the interpretation. This means considering whether the interpretation 
they offer is coherent with the significant characteristics of the utterer, which 
can include the context, the relationship between utterer and audience, internal 
rationality, etc. The importance of openness will also be revealed in greater 
detail below. Making use of context requires a degree of openness to the 
information present within the frame of the utterance; information which is not 
made clear in any direct way. The interpreter is asked, then, to read between 
the lines and be open and receptive to the information supplied there6. 
Prejudgements may interfere with this to a degree, but it will be revealed that 
they also assist the interpretation by providing a basis upon which to grow.
7.1.2 Context and Value:
The argument was offered earlier that context helps determine the 
value of a given silence. We saw that the value a silence has is the one applied 
to it externally, based on context and individual perception. The variance was 
seen to occur over cultural contexts as well as different social contexts, such as 
in politics and small-talk. It appears that silences are assigned positive value 
when they are part of a context that shows their ambiguous qualities in a good 
light. However, the value determination is not complete until the percipient 
(either the utterer or the audience) evaluates the silence. The percipient then 
judges whether the silence has served their purposes or produced the desired 
consequences for the context. If the percipient is satisfied that the silence is 
suitable to the context, she will then apply a positive valuation to the silence. 
In cases where the silence is not suited to the context, it will be assigned a
6 Examples and further discussion of this can be found in chapter 15 “Medical Silence”.
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negative valuation. For instance, a stunned silence can be useful where the 
silence was the desired effect on the part of the mugger who tried to stun her 
victim. On the other hand the same silence may be evaluated as negative by 
the audience who, stunned into silence, become victims of the assault. In this 
case the mugger assigns a positive value to the silence, but the victim proffers 
the opposite evaluation, the negative valuation, because the silence caused 
them harm. It follows that not only the meaning given the silence, but also the 
value applied to that meaning, are part of the act of interpretation, and rely on 
context for their determination.
The mugger example also demonstrates that a silence is not only 
evaluated according to context, but according to individual perspective as 
well. We will see later on, that perspectival valuation depends on a mutual 
cognitive negotiation and agreement between the utterer of the silence and the 
percipient of the silence. Agreement on this ground will provide the 
foundations for determining the soundness of an interpretation of a silence.
Perhaps the most convincing argument in favour of using context for 
understanding utterances is that offered by Wittgenstein in Philosophical 
Investigations. Wittgenstein argues that context demonstrates the sense of an 
utterance which makes communication and understanding possible. The 
following is a summary of Wittgenstein’s argument regarding context, and 
some ways in which the argument can be applied to silence.
7.2 Wittgenstein on Context:
In his Philosophical Investigations1, Ludwig Wittgenstein shows how 
important context is for language interpretation and in doing so he illustrates
1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1958.
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how silence is instrumental in the interpretation of spoken utterances. He also 
provides the basis for an argument showing how context is relevant to 
interpreting silences.
“One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to 
objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to 
moods, to numbers, etc. To repeat - naming is something like 
attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory 
to the use of a word. But what is the preparation for?”8
The above is Wittgenstein’s characterisation of the Reference Theory 
of Language, which was the most convincing theory of language before 
Philosophical Investigations was produced. Wittgenstein is critical of this 
theory of meaning because he claims it is an inadequate description of the way 
language actually functions. The reference theory purports to explain the 
functioning of language as follows: all words simply name objects in the 
physical world, or extralinguistic objects. According to the reference theory of 
language, then, language is simply a tool for expressing the world. 
Wittgenstein takes issue with this perception of language because he finds it 
inadequate for explaining the subtleties of language usage. For instance, it 
does not explain the expression of abstract thoughts and emotions. He also 
says that the reference theory of language underestimates the complexity of 
language and the significance of contextual elements in communication. 
Wittgenstein’s suggestion that context is part of understanding is instructive 
where silence is concerned because it provides the basis for clues for the 
interpretation of silence.
Wittgenstein begins his critique of the reference theory of language by 
examining a quote from St. Augustine regarding the process involved in the 
acquisition of language. In § 1 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
points to the important issue that Augustine's passage brings to light: all words 
have meaning and the point is to discover how they get their meanings and
o
° Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §26.
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how these meanings function in communication. Augustine claims that words 
refer to the objects they name, and therefore all words are just the names or 
labels9 for objects. However, Wittgenstein justly remarks that this can only be 
true of nouns, and thus the theory seriously limits the possible uses of words. 
We can ascribe such names to “certain actions and properties” but this, 
Wittgenstein says, is only a secondary element of the reference theory of 
language. He says this merely shows how a particular word is used in a given 
sentence, not how the word is defined. Names and labels, he argues, are only 
meaningful within contexts.
Although names name things and facilitate some kind of 
communication they only do so in the most rudimentary way. Wittgenstein 
describes several fictional languages based on the reference theory of language 
which he says cannot be complete because they do no fully incorporate the 
subtleties of language. The language described in §2 of Philosophical 
Investigations is a language formed on this theory, and Wittgenstein describes 
it as primitive. Here A can communicate requests to B by simply speaking the 
name of the various objects named in their world. A calls for “slab” and B 
responds to a preunderstanding of the word by bringing A the slab. This is a 
convincing description of one way language works, but only one particular 
way, and is not an exhaustive list of language usages. For example, what if by 
saying the word “slab” A was actually trying to express to B that she would 
like to have B remove the slab from her foot, rather than bring her a new one. 
Just saying the word would not sufficiently describe the idea intended by A’s 
use of it at that particular time. The primitive language does not make a 
sufficient distinction between words and sentences10; it packs too much 
meaning into one word, thus complicating communication. Words in such a 
primitive language are too reliant upon the economy principle of silence,
9 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §15.
10 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §19
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where inherent meaning is silent at the expense of direct, hot, clear 
communication. The silent information can be easily overlooked, and the 
situation thereby confused by what is unsaid. This notwithstanding, not all 
economically silent communication will be this problematic, as will be shown 
in the rest of this discussion of context.
Another issue which the reference theory of language does not address 
is the silent subtlety of language based on the many possible uses of words11. 
The reality of this is made clear by the work an actor must do when preparing 
to work with a script. There is a standard demand for the actor to incorporate 
silent subtext into a performance, speaking one idea out loud, while conveying 
an unspoken and possibly even unrelated thought The plays of Harold Pinter 
are notorious for this, as this scene from Pinter’s play Betrayal helps to 
illustrate. Two old friends are having lunch together in a restaurant. Robert is 
describing a trip he took to Torcello while on vacation in Venice with his wife 
Emma.
Jerry: It’s so long ago, I’m obviously wrong. I thought one went to 
Torcello by gondola.
Robert: It would take hours. No, no, -  whoomp -  across the lagoon in 
the dawn.
Jerry: Sounds good.
Robert: I was quite alone.
Jerry: Where was Emma?
Robert: I think asleep.
Jerry: Ah.
Robert: I was alone for hours, as a matter of fact, on the island.
Highpoint, actually, of the whole trip.
Jerry: Was it? Well it sounds marvellous.12
11 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §23.
12 Harold Pinter, Betrayal, Grove Press, New York, N.Y., 1978; scene 7, pg: 112-113.
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On initial reading this sounds like a relatively benign conversation, but 
it is made clear by the rest of the script that the actors would in fact have to be 
silently transmitting thoughts and emotions quite different from what the lines 
suggest. In this situation Robert has just discovered that his old friend Jerry is 
having an affair with Robert’s wife, Emma. During their encounter in the 
restaurant Robert is unsuccessfully masking the hostility he feels toward Jerry; 
and Jerry, sensing that something is wrong, is trying to placate his friend 
without asking outright what is the matter, because he fears a confrontation. 
Each word in the scene is rich with ideas that the actor must communicate to 
the audience without actually speaking the words. It could be said that all this 
would be transmitted to the audience through vocal inflection and body 
language, but that is only partially true13. A critically good performance is 
usually a very subtle one, thus eliminating the possibility of Robert displaying 
his true emotions by dumping his lunch in Jerry’s lap. The information must 
be communicated as silently as possible, using very little ostensive-referential 
information to make the meaning clear; and yet the meaning is communicated 
even so.
What is interesting about the play, and all of Pinter’s work, is that he 
does not make anything too obvious, but relies on the language of the script, 
and the context of the story, to convey his point in silence. Robert’s line about 
the highlight of his trip is one of the more obvious examples of this point. He 
seems to be testing Jerry, giving the ambiguous message that either the island 
itself was the highlight of his trip, or being away from Emma was. It is 
possible that the actor playing Robert would set this statement up with an eye 
to seeing how Jerry would react to his having been happy to be away from 
Emma. Yet the language is ambiguous enough to mask his true intent thus 
enabling him to avoid a confrontation in the restaurant.
1 ^ Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §21.
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The ambiguities of language simply cannot be properly accounted for 
in the reference theory of language. If every word was just the name of some 
extralinguistic object how could we explain the fact that whole sentences and 
individual words express ideas well outside the perimeter of the relationship 
between the name and the thing named.
“Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a 
saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. -  
The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these 
objects. (And in both cases there are similarities).
Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of 
words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and 
print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. 
Especially when we are doing philosophy!”14
This is closely related to the second point of criticism Wittgenstein 
makes of the reference theory of language. He says that words and language 
are context dependent. Hence, they do not derive their meaning solely from 
their relationship to the relatively stable outside world of the objects which 
they name. They also derive meaning through their usage in a particular 
situation by particular individuals at a particular time.
“When we say: ‘ Every word in a language signifies something’ we 
have so far said nothing whatever,; unless we have explained exactly 
what distinction we wish to make.”15
Our understanding of the meanings of words is context dependent, so 
any given word can have different possible meanings according to the context 
in which it is used. In other words the context will ‘explain exactly what 
distinction we wish to make’. Silences are equally flexible, if not more so; 
and silences rely just as much upon their contexts, if not more so. The 
reference theory of language does not account for this. In the primitive 
language of §2 the word “slab” would have to be able to incorporate many
14 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §11.
15 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §13.
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possible usages because it is so stark and thus would be used in many different 
ways depending on the context. Even our much more complex language 
offers many examples of words which can be used in many ways depending 
on their context. One might be making an order, or being sarcastic, or trying 
to be polite. The scene between Jerry and Robert described above takes on 
new meaning when couched in the contextual information surrounding it, and 
has no particular or deep meaning without that information. Furthermore, its 
meaning could have been very different had it taken place in a different 
context with a different historical background. The context may be silent, but 
it must not be overlooked as it is important for constructing interpretations.
Language’s dependence on silent context is clear from the difficulty 
we have in understanding the acquisition of language. We do not learn to 
speak a language simply by having someone point at and call the names of 
various different objects, in the hope that we will know what it is the teacher is 
referring to through the ostensive-referential definition. This would be 
impossible because there are some things that cannot be made clear by simple 
ostension reference without the proper context. Take colours, for example. 
One cannot teach someone the meaning of the colour blue by simply pointing 
out a blue object. The student might mistake the word blue for the name of 
that particular object, and not for the colour. So one attempts to reexpress the 
thought by pointing to several objects, all of which are blue. This presents a 
further problem, namely expressing the concept that the similarity of all the 
different shades of blue is in fact what you are trying to indicate as the 
meaning of the word. The same is as much true for learning to understand 
silent communication, which is not taught through ostensive references so 
much as through experience. Learning to understand silences is not really 
something which can be taught with words either. Silent communication 
defies all standard methods of teaching, and yet it succeeds in being 
expressive and being understood. To accomplish successful communication
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through words or silence requires what Wittgenstein refers to as “mastery” on 
the part of the interpreter.
Teaching and learning languages involves mastery16. Mastery is the 
key to understanding the innuendoes inherent in language. When one has 
truly mastered a language one is capable of grasping the generalities of speech 
and applying them to specific contexts and situational usages. Mastery is like 
being proficient enough at a game to think it through and make optimal use of 
one’s position17; it is to truly know a language. Ostensive-referential 
definitions require some mastery in order to be comprehensible because the 
student must be able to make out what it is the teacher is referring to when she 
indicates a particular object. The teacher may point at a ball saying the word 
“round”, and the student must be capable of grasping the fact that it is the 
shape of the object which is being referred to and not the colour or the object 
itself. Mastery helps the student to realise the unspoken communicative 
silence of the teacher. The reference theory of language assumes that 
everyone has some kind of mastery of some language before the actual 
learning takes place, but this is impossible for children learning a language for 
the first time. Pointing at objects and merely giving them names is not enough 
of an explanation of how children acquire language or understand silent 
communications. Wittgenstein includes the relevance of social context and 
the participation in a community to the possibility of learning the language of 
words and the language of silence. T ra in in g  he says facilitates 
understanding18. One is trained to react in a particular way when a particular 
name is called, indicating that socialisation is an important part of 
understanding language or silence - even in theories of ostention. This
16 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §20.
17Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §31.
1 Q
Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §6.
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accounts for the differences in attitudes toward speech and silence between 
cultures and groups.
It is not just because things have names that we have language:
“We name things and then we can talk about them: can refer to
them in talk.”19
Some words do not name objects at all. Still others only name objects when 
they are intended to do so. Language is much more complex than just the use 
of names; it involves ambiguities, context and meaning. All of this indicates 
that the reference theory of language previous to Philosophical Investigations 
was not a satisfactory explanation of the way language works, including silent 
‘language’. Much more is involved than the reference theory of language 
allows, as the critiques Wittgenstein put forth indicate.
To summarise, according to Wittgenstein the reference theory of 
language overlooks two major aspects of language: 1) language contains 
many ambiguities due to its lack of uniformity; and 2) language is context 
dependent and relies on a comprehension of the context to facilitate 
understanding. The same points can be said to apply to silence, whose 
inherent ambiguity and lack of uniformity give it the freedom to stand for 
many different meanings which cannot be differentiated nor understood except 
from within their given contexts. The above also shows how meaning is 
closely tied to intent for Wittgenstein. In §19 he suggests that all words are 
subject to the intent of their users, so the sense of a word depends on how the 
user wants it to be used in that situation. This may recall the theories of 
meaning offered by Grice and Searle, where we showed silence can have 
specific meanings. It also foreshadows an argument concerning the need to 
respect the limits of that meaning when constructing interpretations. We do
^  Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, §27.
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not have to limit this to authorial intention, however, since doing so is 
problematic, as was seen above with reference to silent slips of the tongue.
7.3 Conclusions:
Context has been demonstrated to be a valuable feature of 
interpretation. Building a non-radical interpretation of a Larundic silence can 
be assisted by context in the following ways. Firstly, context provides the 
frame which delimits a specific meaning for the silence; beyond the limits, it 
was shown, is where interpretations become radical. Context also provides 
clues which can direct the interpreter to the meaning extended by the Larundic 
silence. Additionally, the value we ascribe to a silence can be ascertained by 
reference to the context in which the silence occurs. Silences are assigned 
positive value where the context is suited to their ambiguity, and negative 
value where the context is not suited to ambiguity. Finally, Wittgenstein’s 
theory suggests that context reveals the sense a silent utterance is to take, and 
in so doing assists the interpretation of ambiguous silences. The multiple 
possibilities of the meaning of a silence make its meaning vague. 
Wittgenstein demonstrated that context reveals the vagueness by placing the 
silence in a setting that directs us to the sense of the meaning of the Larundic 
silence.
It was suggested earlier that other ingredients will be necessary for 
constructing non-radical interpretations of silences. We now turn to the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer in order to reveal further 
elements.
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CHAPTER 8 
GADAMER’S CONTRIBUTION:
8.1 Gadamer’s Hermeneutics:
Larunda’s myth demonstrates the necessity of interpretation for 
understanding silence. The interpretative possibility of Larunda’s silences is 
provided through the love of Hermes, the messenger of the gods. Thus, we 
turn to hermeneutics, which derives its name from Hermes, to assist in the 
understanding of Larundic silence. Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers some 
important proposals for grasping how we interpret silence. He makes four 
claims which are in general useful for the purposes of constructing 
interpretations of Larundic silence. The first is that we are prisoners of our 
prejudices, histories and traditions, so we ought not to try to escape them in a 
misguided attempt to find unencumbered rational understanding. Second, is 
his theory about fusion of horizons in which communication occurs in the 
overlap between separate conciousnesses. Third, is his rejection of relativism 
based on his belief in a ‘thing-in-itself’ which delimits our attempts at 
interpretation. And finally there is his interest in dialectic agreement as a basis 
for truth. Each of these ideas will be examined in what follows, and it will be 
shown how they are relevant to understanding silence.
8.1.1 Authorship:
It is natural to turn to the intentions of the utterer in trying to establish 
the meaning of an utterance1. Intentionalism of this sort attempts to remain
1 Because there are similarities between authorship and original utterances the two terms will 
be used interchangeably.
faithful to the meaning the utterer is trying to communicate by making the 
utterance. In the passages on meaning discussed above, it was shown that 
Searle claims an utterer has something in mind when issuing the utterance. 
This particular meaning, it would seem to follow, is what the audience ought 
to receive, otherwise the utterance is a failed attempt at communication. And 
it follows from this that meaning is what the author intends it to be. Or is it?
Gadamer rejects the hegemony of authorial intention as the source of 
meaning. In fact he is wary of accepting any form of pure authoritativeness 
because he believes that this would create a tyranny of the privileged 
perspective. The alternative he offers is a meaning which exceeds the 
meaning intended by the author, and incorporates the meaning as it is 
interpreted by the percipient. However, this does not permit the percipient to 
construct subjectively opportunistic interpretations of the author’s work. 
Gadamer, in fact, rejects this kind of subjectivism:
“The consequence of modem subjectivism, it seems to me , is 
that in all such realms self-interpretation receives a primacy 
that is not justified by the facts.”2
Rather, Gadamer prefers a greater meaning which is created through a 
combination of the meanings offered not only by the intentions of the author, 
nor only by those combined with the interpretation by the audience, but also 
including the meaning extended by the text itself as an independent object. 
Gadamer’s position is that there is a meaning constructed in the act of 
interpretation, a meaning which is different from the meanings offered by any 
of the individual components. Hence it will not do to claim that the meaning 
of a text or text analogue is what the author says it is. Self-description is not 
an adequate postulate of a meaning, because meaning exceeds what one
Gadamer, H.G.: “The Nature of Things and the Language of Things” (1960); in Gadamer, 
Hans-Georg: Philosophical Hermeneutics. David E. Linge trans./ed. University of California 
Press; Berkeley, Calif.; 1976; pg: 80.
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person’s understanding of it is. No individual’s interpretation is truer than any 
other’s.
The primary advantage of this position is that it eliminates the 
possibility of tyranny by a single perspective. Gadamer argues instead, that 
meaning is perspectival, and that the truth of a meaning can vary and change. 
But, to avoid becoming relativistic, he does claim that there is a thing-in-itself 
which has a continuous existence in spite of the change; just as we can say 
that a person is the same individual throughout youth, adolescence and 
adulthood. There is always one object being described, but it is described 
differently from varying perspectives. As a result, the meaning of an object, a 
text or text analogue, can be somewhat different for every interpreter who 
encounters it. The same can be said for utterances one encounters. 
Nevertheless, there will be overlaps because each interpretation must have 
some input from the continuous thing-in-itself.
“Now when we encounter the expression ‘the nature of things’ 
the point is clearly that what is available for our use and given 
to our disposal has in reality a being of its own, which allows it
to resist our efforts to use it in unsuitable ways. Or to put it
positively: it prescribes a specific comportment that is 
appropriate to it.”3
It must be noted before we continue, that this is the same kind of
independence of meaning already ascribed to Larundic silences. The
prescriptive component is the meaning inherent in the silence that restricts our 
interpretations of it. The prescription acts as the perimeter beyond which we 
must not go in order to remain faithful to the silence.
The reason for this perspectival perception is based on Gadamer’s 
explanation of human ontology. He insists that we are the culmination of our 
personal experiences combined with general history. As a result, each 
individual has a different and unique perspective of the world, both as we
* 3 Gadamer 1960, pg: 70.
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interpret the past and how we understand the present and future. This is 
because all individuals bring their own set of experiences, preferences, 
expectations, beliefs and other such things, to the act of understanding. 
Gadamer calls these one’s personal prejudices, and he accepts them as a 
functional aspect of our interpretative capacities. It is clear that Gadamer is 
using a different sense of the word ‘prejudice’ than in its usual pejorative 
sense. This difference requires further explanation.
8.2 Prejudice:
When Rene Descartes began his Meditations4 he did all he could to 
divest himself of his previous beliefs in order to discover what he could know 
which was not contingent upon other knowledge. In other words, he did not 
want his prejudices to interfere with his reasoning. Enlightenment thinkers 
were equally distrustful of prejudice; they claimed it obscured our knowledge 
of the truth. Gadamer, however, sees these attempts to abandon prejudice as 
fruitless. He claims that the distrust, far from being divorced from prejudice, 
is in fact a manifestation of it. Gadamer says that we cannot escape our 
prejudices because they are part of our ontological make up. The belief that 
we can eliminate them in order to find unencumbered rational truths is, 
according to Gadamer, misguided. He has been praised for pointing out the 
inherent connection between our understanding and our prejudices; and for 
finding a useful place for prejudice in cognitive activity. In fact, Gadamer 
warns that we ought to be aware of how prejudice affects us and then use it to 
build upon.
 ^Descartes, Rene: Meditations on First Philosophy: with selections from the Objections and 
replies; John Cottingham trans. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1986.
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I will make use of Gadamer’s positive ontological sense of prejudice 
throughout the rest of this thesis. It must be understood that this is restricted 
to Gadamer’s sense of the term and not the ordinary pejorative understanding 
with which it is normally used. To distinguish it from ordinary prejudice I 
will use italics where Gadamer’s notion is being applied and plain text where 
it is not.
Past experiences and beliefs are the foundations of further learning. 
Without some previous understanding of the world we are unable to identify 
and make sense of new information. Nevertheless, this does not limit us, as 
Gadamer states “...individual explorations necessarily start from the very 
limited experiences and fields of experience.”5 Then we use our experiences 
to identify new ideas and to construct coherent interpretations of the new 
information we receive.
“It is not so much our judgements as it is our prejudices that 
constitute our being. This is a provocative formulation, for I 
am using it to restore to its rightful place a positive concept of 
prejudice that was driven out of our linguistic usage by the 
French and the English Enlightenment. It can be shown that 
the concept of prejudice did not originally have the meaning we 
have attached to it. Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified 
and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, 
the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the 
literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of 
our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our 
openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we 
experience something -  whereby what we encounter says 
something to us. This formulation certainly does not mean that 
we are enclosed within a wall of prejudices  and only let 
through the narrow portals those things that can produce a pass 
saying, ‘Nothing new will be said here.’ Instead we welcome 
just that guest who promises something new to our curiosity.”6 
(Italics added)
5 Gadamer, H.G.: “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection” (1967, G.B. 
Hess & R.E. Palmer trans.); in Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Philosophical Hermeneutics. David 
E. Linge trans./ed. University of California Press; Berkeley, Calif.; 1976; pg: 18.
6 Gadamer, H.G.: “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” (1966); in Gadamer, 
Hans-Georg: Philosophical Hermeneutics. David E. Linge trans./ed. University of California 
Press; Berkeley, Calif.; 1976; pg: 9.
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Prejudice is something integral to an individual’s identity, part of the 
ontological structure of human beings, part of the human condition, if you 
will7. We do not appear to be able to avoid or escape it; we simply have 
preferences, beliefs and prejudices which are constitutive of who we are. That 
a given individual has a preference for isolation over community, a dislike for 
market economy, and a belief in a pantheistic religion are all qualities which 
form part of her identity, her ontological structure. Even inevitable changes in 
these qualities are part of her identity and do not change it completely. We 
can at least say about her that she is the person who once believed in 
pantheism. Beliefs and preferences, etc., are acquired over time, through the 
process of experience. “It is the untiring power of experience, that in the 
process of being instructed, man is ceaselessly forming a new 
preunderstanding.”8
The experiences which inform our prejudices may be either direct or 
indirect: direct, in that they derive from events which have occurred to the 
person first hand, such as the phrase ‘once burned twice shy’ illustrates; 
indirect, in that they may be the influence of community or culture, history or 
tradition instead of events which the individual has experienced personally. 
As Gadamer puts it, “It is not really we ourselves who understand: it is always 
a past that allows us to say, ‘I have understood’.”9 Thus, our personal 
experiences and the cultural experiences we acquire from history create the 
foundation upon which we build our understanding of the world.
7 Gadamer 1967, pg: 28.
8 Gadamer 1967, pg: 38.
9Gadamer, H.G.: “On the Problem of Self-understanding” (1962); in Gadamer, Hans-Georg: 
Philosophical Hermeneutics. David E. Linge trans./ed. University of California Press; 
Berkeley, Calif.; 1976; pg: 58.
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8.2.1 Historical references to prejudice:
Historically these preconceived ideas have been much criticised for 
causing interference with true knowledge of the world. They have had this 
notoriety since at least as far back as Plato, whose cave example10 is a good 
description of how the baggage of prejudice might interfere with one’s 
understanding of the world. The people in the cave are victims of false beliefs 
because their only knowledge of the world is of the imperfect shadows cast on 
the wall before them. If they do not realise they are being misled they will 
never have true knowledge and therefore will not be free. But, released from 
their chains they may venture into the light of the real world which, if they are 
brave enough to stay outside until their eyes adjust to the light, will liberate 
them. The chains are much like the biases and preferences which make up our 
ontological baggage of prejudice. Plato calls them “opinion”, or “doxa”, and 
eschews them in favour of true or right knowledge of the forms. He says only 
those who are able to see the forms without the encumbrance of doxa are truly 
free, and have the knowledge to become philosopher kings.
Plato may have been one of the earliest to condemn the ontological 
baggage of prejudice, but he certainly was not the last. Many decriers of 
prejudice followed, especially during the Enlightenment. Some have accepted 
the possibility that prejudices and pre-judgements can play a functional role in 
understanding, while others say they are mostly a hindrance to right and clear 
understanding and ought to be purged. In a paradigm example of those who 
would reject baggage, Hutcheson suggests it is the interference of associative 
ideas11 which prevent the clarity required for making accurate interpretations. 
His solution for the fogging associative ideas cause is to abandon them 
completely or as much as possible. The purity of interpretative vision required
10 Plato, The Republic, book x; Allan Bloom trans. Basic Books; New York, N.Y.; 1968.
^Hutcheson, Francis: Philosophical Writings; R.S. Downie ed. Everyman’s Library; Dent; 
London; 1994.
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to prevent error can only be achieved by eliminating the prejudices and 
preferences we acquire through certain types of experience, and through the 
association with others whose opinions one might acquire and accept though 
they are not true. His cure for the obscuring property of associative ideas is to 
purge them, and thereby eliminate their obscuring effects. These 
notwithstanding, some have said that this baggage is inescapable, and have 
described how it can even be useful.
Aristotle may have been one of the earliest to express an implicit 
acceptance of prejudice and show how it could provide a functional purpose in 
understanding. His discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics of virtue gained 
through the habitual performance of virtuous acts shows the value of acquired 
knowledge12; "...virtue comes about as a result of habit..."13 He says that to 
become virtuous, students must locate a virtuous person and then imitate her 
actions until they become habitual. But this implies first that we have the 
knowledge to identify a virtuous person from a vicious or non-virtuous person. 
Thus, we must have a preconception of virtue so that we know what to look 
for, even though this preconception may change after observation. This is the 
first way that prejudice is implicitly encouraged by Aristotle. Next he says 
that we are to repeat the virtuous behaviour until it becomes habitual for us. 
Hence it becomes behaviour based on habit, which is no more than 
preconception or prejudicial behaviour. So we can say that Aristotle accepted 
prejudice as a means for achieving the ultimate aim of human existence, 
namely virtue.
Phronesis plays an especially important role here because it is one of 
the foundations of understanding through practical reasoning. Phronesis is the 
kind of moral reasoning which extrapolates theoretical knowledge from
12Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1179b21, 1127b7.
13Aristotle, 1103al6.
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practical knowledge, such as the facts of an event14. Having examined the 
event, a judgement regarding its moral content is produced by theoretical 
reasoning about it. The solution has more universal characteristics than the 
case does. It takes the form of an abstract description of the case, resting more 
on the universal concepts within it than the particular facts. So, for example, 
the case may be one in civil law where the judge must decide whether to 
award damages to a patient whose doctor behaved negligently. The principle 
extrapolated from the case might be that people deserve protection from, and 
in some cases compensation for, harm caused them. Thus, the patient 
deserves some kind of reward for her suffering. In this sense, phronetic 
reasoning moves between the universal and the particular. The phronomos 
individual examines facts to extrapolate universal, or more general 
judgements, and then moves back again to the case at hand to see how these 
judgements may be applied to the facts. Phronesis requires flexibility and 
imagination because it goes beyond mere rule following; it is not simple 
submission to principles previously or extraneously imposed. Instead, the 
exercise of phronetic reasoning requires the individual to assess the case on its 
own merits, and creatively construct a solution to the moral problem at hand. 
It is in this sense that phronesis can be described as resting on previously 
acquired knowledge: The act of imaginative theoretical knowledge
construction, or the invention of a solution to the moral problem, requires 
individuals to use all sorts of information and understanding available. The 
new ideas cannot spring fully formed from nothing; they need a communion of 
concepts of which they are the result. Preconceptions mixed with new 
information are the basis for creating novel ideas. Thus, prejudices are part of 
phronesis or practical wisdom. But this is only implicit in Aristotle’s 
description of reasoning. He does not actually state the need for the old ideas
14 Aristotle, 1142a27.
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to form the basis of new ones. However, it does seem to follow from what he 
says about learning to be virtuous through habitual behaviour.
8.2.2 The hooks which draw us to the meaning:
Historically, then, philosophers have chosen to reject prejudice on the 
grounds that it obscures and confounds understanding and communication. 
Gadamer makes a different move in his post-Heidegerrian hermeneutics. His 
argument is that we understand novel meanings only from the basis of 
knowledge we already posses; namely from our prejudices. He claims that 
this occurs through the fusing o f horizons when the prejudices which form our 
personal horizons join or intersect with the horizons of others.
“Just as when we progress in understanding the mirabilia lose 
their strangeness, so every successful appropriation of tradition 
is dissolved into a new and distinct familiarity in which it 
belongs to us and we to it. They both flow together into one 
owned and shared world, which encompasses past and present 
and which receives its linguistic articulation in the speaking of 
man with man.”15
It is precisely the baggage of prejudices said to interfere and lead to 
error in interpretation that are the vehicle for the fusing. Gadamer makes us 
aware that we own this baggage; it is our histories, our preferences and our 
prejudices. These are never far away no matter what activity we are engaged 
in. He acknowledges this and gives it a functional role in his theory saying 
prejudice makes communication possible. Without it, understanding would 
have to happen in a vacuum. Each piece of baggage stores the elements of 
understanding, making the link from familiar to foreign.
“Only the support of familiar and common understanding 
makes possible the venture into the alien, the lifting up of 
something out of the alien, and thus the broadening and 
enrichment of our own experience of the world.”16
15 Gadamer 1967, pg: 25.
16 Gadamer 1967, pg: 15.
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This way, the interpreter uses ideas already familiar to her to gain access to 
ideas she has never experienced before. The fusing brings familiarity and 
familiarity brings correct understanding and interpretation. And this will be of 
vital importance to interpretations of Larundic silence because they permit so 
little access to familiar knowledge on their own. Using what is familiar is the 
start of breaching the inscrutability of a Larundic silence.
Another helpful metaphor for explaining the prejudice is ‘hooks’. 
Ideas we already possess act as hooks like the microscopic hooks on a single 
wool fibre. A spinner uses these hooks to draw one fibre onto the next to 
supply the initial attachment and strength for the strand of wool she is 
spinning. In this sense, familiar ideas can hook onto new and foreign ideas, 
and pull them through the spindle onto the bobbin as a single strand of yam. 
For example, one must learn how to count 1,2... before understanding that 
1+1=2. Thus, novel ideas are eventually understood through connection to 
familiar ideas, and the entire set of ideas is a ball of yam, strong and secure17. 
The work is more complex when it comes to silence because silence is 
slippery. There are few hooks with which the spinner can draw it into the yam 
of understanding. The interpreter is thus required to make a greater effort in 
the interpretation and must make a study of the surrounding ideas which will 
consist of personal opinions, context and previous knowledge of the subject of 
interpretation. These will be the hooks for interpreting the silence.
One carefully hooks together all the surrounding ideas, creating a 
tether of understanding from the interpreter to the subject. Still, it is necessary 
to be aware that the hooks which are useful can also be the cause of error in 
interpretation. Every ball of wool yam has stray fibers which did not enter the
i  n
This image is similar to Wittgenstein’s example of meanings related to one another like the 
fibers of a rope, not necessarily directly connected to one another but held together by 
intermediary fibers. I hope to show that my analogy is somewhat different in what follows.
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twist tightly enough and stand away from the strand. These may be said to 
represent false paths in interpretation; they start off one way but do not lead to 
the solution at the heart of the new idea. They are here abandoned or there left 
hanging in mid-air. But these strays are not altogether unacceptable as they 
are the part of the wool which give it softness and fluff, just as mistakes are 
useful for greater understanding. Both are functional to the overall project. 
Still, expertly spun yam is said to have few loose strands of this sort, and the 
best way to avoid them is to ensure each fibre is carefully hooked to its 
predecessors. So in interpretation, the best way to reach the correct conclusion 
is to hook on to ideas previously known to be accurate, ideas properly hooked 
to the subject at the heart of the interpretation. With silence this means 
context, previous knowledge of the subject, previous knowledge the 
interpreter possesses and generalisation of understanding which hook 
themselves to the silence and make it understandable.
Nevertheless, there will always be cases in which the interpreter makes 
a wrong assumption regarding the object of interpretation, especially when 
that object has few hooks like slippery silence. This will be particularly true 
when the interpreter is given very little interpretative evidence to go on, such 
as when the interpreter is not well acquainted with the subject of 
interpretation. The more familiar the subject, the easier it is to make an 
accurate interpretation of it. It is not necessary for the interpreter to become 
an expert about the subject of interpretation, only that the interpreter be aware 
that the subject cannot be understood merely from the interpreter’s own ideas. 
The subject, like a word, has and offers its own meaning which sets up limits 
for the interpretation, as we have seen.
“The appeal to a nature of things refers to an order removed
from human wishes.... ‘the nature of things’ is something that
asserts itself, something we have to respect.”18
18 Gadamer 1960, pg: 71.
179
It is required that the interpreter acknowledge and use the perimeter created by 
the meaning of the thing-in-itself in order to gain a good understanding of the 
subject. Like words, if she exceeds these limits the interpretation is wrong. 
Thus, the interpreter is required to use personal prejudice wisely and be aware 
of its propensity to mislead. We will see how this can be done later on.
8.3 The Hermeneutic Circle:
We have already noted the roles of prejudice and the thing-in-itself in 
establishing interpretations of meanings in Gadamer’s theory. What has not 
been mentioned specifically is the to-and-fro motion involved in using these 
elements during acts of understanding. Gadamer claims understanding is like 
a conversation. A dialogue between the interpreter and the object of 
interpretation, where each of their claims to truth are tested against one 
another and an interpretation eventually emerges. As we have said, this 
requires an attitude of openness so that the new information in the truth claims 
can be recognised and assimilated. It is also necessary to ensure that the 
interpretation is relevant to the object of interpretation, be that a work of art, a 
text or a silent utterance. The to-and-fro-ness comes from the action of the 
dialogue where claims from both sides -  the interpreter and the interpreted -  
are made, accepted and assimilated.
8.3.1 Openness and silence:
From a practical perspective Gadamer’s call for openness is highly 
relevant to silence. To illustrate this we might look at a helping interview, for 
example between a doctor and a patient. Where the doctor is prepared to 
listen, silences can be a useful tool for eliciting information from the patient.
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The doctor’s openness permits the patient to fill the silence. In ordinary 
conversations silences can be awkward; someone always wants to fill a 
silence. From a positive perspective the silence is turned into an invitation; 
where there appears to be an empty spot someone is invited to fill it. When a 
silence occurs in the doctor-patient interview it is just such an invitation and a 
skilled doctor will allow the invitation to be directed toward the patient. This 
allows the patient to fill the silence with information the doctor might not have 
thought to ask about. In other words, silence on behalf of the doctor is a clear 
indication of the doctor’s openness to the patient and willingness to listen. 
Open silence is an act of generosity which can provoke excellent returns when 
the patient offers information to fill it which helps the interview to proceed 
productively.
Openness has a second function, that of being receptive to the 
soundness of the subject being interpreted. And in the case of silence, it 
serves the function of allowing recognition that a silence is Larundic and 
therefore meaningful. The interpreter is required to adopt this degree of 
receptivity so that the subject will be noticed as having a serious claim to 
present, and that a Larundic silence will be noticed at all. Without openness, 
prejudice fails to acknowledge the full meaning of the subject. Therefore, as 
we saw earlier, openness is an essential aspect of interpretation. Hence, 
prejudice without openness is likely to result in opportunistic radical readings 
of the subject.
However, we may be suspicious of openness because it appears to 
eliminate the possibility of assuming a critical attitude to the truth claim made 
by the object of interpretation. If being open entails acceptance, then it may 
mean judging the claim as true by virtue of the fact that it is being made. The 
advantage to this is that openness prevents opportunistic interpretations 
clouded by our own prejudices. However, this kind of openness might cause 
acquiescence to, and acceptance of, claims to truth which are either false or
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distorted, and in some cases even morally reprehensible. It is not clear how 
openness can be defended given this possibility, but Gadamer does attempt to 
detail a safeguard which permits critical judgement to function alongside 
openness.
Gadamer’s reply to the loss of critical judgement inherent in openness 
is by way of reference to the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic circle is a 
theory of how we accomplish understanding and it involves steps to act as fail- 
safes to the hegemony of personal prejudice and the truth claims made by the 
object. In fact, they act as checks against one another. In order to preserve the 
open attitude from accepting the unacceptable, Gadamer increases the number 
of participants in the conversation; to the elements of prejudice and openness 
already mentioned, he adds tradition and history.
Just as our ontological selves are determined by the prejudices we 
acquire, the prejudices themselves are founded on our historical situatedness. 
The experiences of our lives form our personal histories. But our personal 
histories in turn take place within the context of history in general, namely the 
history of our cultural heritages and the traditions which are constitutive of 
them19. These traditions have as much bearing on our perceptions of the 
world as our personal prejudices do, but because they have been accepted by 
the community in general they are greater than any one individual and, 
therefore, are of great importance where interpretations are concerned. 
Gadamer claims that we tend to defer to tradition naturally, and adds that we 
ought to do so because tradition enhances our cohesiveness to our community 
and protects us from constructing idiosyncratic or opportunistic 
interpretations. Tradition is, therefore, an equal participant in the dialogue of 
understanding.
This dialogue is the hermeneutic circle. The to-and-fro motion is the 
movement from the object to the interpreter and then to tradition, in any order.
19 Gadamer 1967.
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Each of the elements present claims to truth which the others must be open to, 
but these claims must also be tested against those made by the other elements 
in order to determine their veracity. In this way, each of the elements acts as 
an obstruction to any of the other elements interposing an opportunistic or 
idiosyncratic interpretation. Thus Gadamer restrains the domination of any 
one element by ensuring that each element coheres with the truths of all the 
others. For instance, an individual is prevented from using the words of a 
language to mean anything she wants them to mean because she is restrained 
by tradition and by words themselves. The tradition and the etymological 
history of the words enforce a certain type of usage upon the individual so that 
she is not free to use a word in any way she chooses. However, words have 
been known to change their meanings over time, indicating that tradition and 
history can bend to individual interpretation. Thus, no single element has 
authority over the others, and they must all be open to one another. 
Hermeneutics encourages questioning of one’s prejudices in
“...constant self-reflections and attempts at self-awareness.
Thus only through hermeneutical reflection am I no longer 
unfree over against myself but rather can deem freely what in 
my preunderstanding may be justified  and what 
unjustifiable.”20
This helps us to see that “tradition is no proof and validation of 
something, in any case not where validation is demanded by reflection”21. So 
reflection provides a check against non-reflective submission to tradition. On 
the other hand, Gadamer adds that “authority is not always wrong”22, so 
agreement with tradition or history can be appropriate when it is reflected 
upon first, even if this happens unconsciously. “Reflection on a
20 Gadamer 1967, pg: 38.
21 Gadamer 1967, pg: 34.
22 Gadamer 1967, pg: 33.
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preunderstanding brings before me something that otherwise happens behind 
my back:.”23
A person confronting a Larundic silence will be prohibited from 
imposing upon it just any interpretation because the elements of the 
hermeneutic circle will block opportunistic interpretations. This is why we 
can say that a person who enters a crowded temple where everyone is silent, is 
wrong if she interprets the silence as meaning that no one there likes her. It is 
a better interpretation of the silence if the tradition of silent prayer is 
considered in the interpretation, and the silence perceived as an act of devotion 
and respect to the deity rather than a snubbing of the late-comer. This gives 
the interpretation more relevance or fit to the context of the silence at hand.
8.3.2 Playing Games:
The activity of understanding is therefore a dynamic one which 
engages the interpreter in the to-and-fro motion of a dialogue with tradition 
and the object, and from which an interpretation emerges. The importance of 
each of the elements is illustrated by Gadamer in his metaphor of a game24. 
He says that the game exists in and of itself only to the extent that it provides 
the rules which delimit it from the rest of life. Thus, abiding by the rules 
means that one is playing that particular game and not performing any other 
activity. However, this requires someone to play the game, otherwise the 
game cannot be realised and remains nothing but a set of rules. The players 
and the game are therefore of equal importance to the game’s existence.
One is transported out of ordinary existence when playing a game. 
Players put ordinary parts of their lives aside while playing25. The game, and 
its to-and-fro movements, become the subject or focus of the activity replacing
23 Gadamer 1967, pg: 38.
24 Gadamer 1962, pp: 44-58.
9 c
Patients in acute care hospitals do the same for a while.
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the individual and her concerns. This involves temporarily ‘entering a 
normatively binding domain’26, which takes precedence over other concerns.
“Whatever is brought into play or comes into play no longer 
depends on itself but is dominated by the relation that we call 
the game....[The individual] conforms to the game or subjects 
himself to it, that is, he relinquishes the autonomy of his own 
will.”27
“The game thus has authority over its players and even 
specifies a range of appropriate attitudes and responses.”28
Rules dictate actions. Once again this requires openness to the truth of 
the claim made by the object, allowing it to provide some of the rules for 
action. During acts of interpretation the same effect is achieved. Once one 
submits to the truth claim of the object one has become one of the players 
following the truth claim as if it were the rules of the game29.
The description is not complete without the addition of the players. 
Games require players to bring them to fruition; so games dictate the play, but 
cannot exist without someone to perform the required actions. Thus, players 
are also creators of the game. But, the players do not determine the rules of 
the game. Therefore, the game requires what it brings and what the players 
bring to it to carry it to fruition30. The act of interpretation is the same. It is 
not enough to grant authority to the object of interpretation, but we must also 
give credit to the participation of the interpreter. The interpreter uses her 
entire ontological structure in the act, and she is just as much responsible for 
the creation of the meaning as the object and its creator are.
26 Warnke, Georgia: Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Polity Press; 
Cambridge; 1987. Pg: 49.
27 Gadamer 1962, pg: 53.
28 Warnke, pg: 49.
29 Gadamer 1967.
Of)
This is like festivals, non-existent until they are celebrated, but they are celebrated because 
they are there. Warnke, pg: 50-1.
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The interdependence between interpreter, author and the thing-in-itself 
is reflected in the existence of the game. Games change at each playing 
because the conditions, i.e. players, place etc., change each time. Each one is 
not a different instantiation of the game, but an actual change to the concrete 
existence of the game. The meaning of the object of interpretation can also be 
said to change in this sense with every interpretation of it. Yet something 
remains the same; there is a continuous thing which is the type of the game 
repeatedly being played. The object of interpretation, like the game, remains 
the same while constantly changing. Its meaning is not determinate but 
variable; very much like the identity of a person who is also a changing person 
over time.
But why do we need anyone other than the author to give the object 
(text or text analogue) or game concrete existence? Why must there be an 
audience to interpret the thing-in-itself? Gadamer says the audience, like the 
players, are important because they help give the meaning of the object or 
game “clearly separable and identifiable content.”31 It is a condition of a 
game that it be played by players, in the same way that being seen by an 
audience is part of a work of art’s “self-representation”, whether the work be a 
sculpture, a symphony or a piece of theatre.
“What distinguishes works of art that must be performed from 
those that can be experienced directly by an audience is thus 
simply that the former must undergo two processes of 
concretization. The work is concretely realised first in its 
performance and second in the experience of its audience. But 
in both cases the audience turns out to be as essential to it as its 
original creator.”32
This demonstrates why meaning is more autonomous than can be 
accounted for by merely applying author’s intent. Authors can intend to create
31 Warnke, pg: 53
32 Warnke, pg: 54.
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a work that has meaning, but often these intentions are frustrated by 
interpretations which differ from or exceed it. It is equally possible for an 
author to create an object whose meaning goes beyond that of the author’s 
intended meaning; a work that stands alone33. In order for this to be possible 
there must be more to the object of interpretation than the author’s idea of it; 
the author and the object supply the rules, but the audience must play the game 
in order to realise the meaning. Thus, the object requires an audience to give 
it meaning, and the work requires more than its individual creator to give it 
meaningfulness. The meaning of the object contains more knowledge than the 
knowledge in its authors’ intentions34. Thus, we cannot be restricted to 
authors’ intent for meaning as this meaning exceeds the authors’ knowledge. 
In the same sense, a poem can be understood by a reader to have a meaning 
the poet could not have known because the experiences of the reader and those 
of the poet are different. Similarly, a Larundic silence can be understood by 
its interpreter to have meaning which its utterer did not intend or know was 
possible. Author’s intent is therefore not enough to provide meaning.
“...the words we find capture our intending, as it were, and 
dovetail into relations that point out beyond the momentariness 
of our act of intending.”35
Still, this does not permit radical or opportunistic readings of a 
Larundic silence. Larundic silences assert meanings of their own which are 
part of the conversation in the hermeneutic circle. The specific meaning of the 
Larundic silence may not be given hegemony, but it does apply to restrictions 
on the final interpretation.
' l ' l
Warnke, pg: 55. Warnke also refers R. Dworkin, “How Law is Like Literature” in A 
Mater of Principle, Harvard UP, Cambridge, 1985, pp: 157-8.
34 Warnke, pg: 55.
35 Gadamer 1962, pg: 56.
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8.4: The Fusion of Horizons:
Gadamer expands on the restrictions in the hermeneutic circle by 
claiming that understanding challenges the audience to become involved in the 
object they seek to understand, the way players are involved in a game. 
Understanding requires temporarily entering the normatively binding domain 
of the object; making the object their world and abandoning their own worlds 
in favour of this one for a short time, but with an enduring change in the world 
to which they will return.
“It seems, rather, to be generally characteristic of the 
emergence of the hermeneutical problem that something distant 
has to be brought close, a certain strangeness overcome, a 
bridge built between the once and the now.”36
For Gadamer, understanding is participation. There is no canonical 
reading of a work because the game of understanding engages each individual 
player/spectator in a different way.
“Interpretation belongs to the essential unity of understanding.
One must take up into himself what is said to him in such a 
fashion that it speaks and finds an answer in the words of his 
own language.”37
Each act of understanding is an unique experience, depending on the unique 
information and experience the individual brings to it. This is because we 
learn from the work differently, according to what we bring to it. Thus, we 
understand things differently depending upon what our past holds and who we 
are in the present; our prejudice affects how and what we will learn in the 
future. It is because of these personal differences that the content of a game
36 Gadamer 1967, pg: 22.
37 Gadamer 1962, pg: 57.
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can change according to who is playing it, just as its form can change. Also 
cultural and historical differences create changes in how we perceive and 
understand. Hence our historical position will allow us to see things in a work 
that would not have been conceivable at an earlier historical time38.
The participation of the individual in the act of understanding is what 
Gadamer calls the “fusion of horizons”39.
“By this he means the integration of one’s understanding of a 
text or historical event with its relevance to one’s own 
circumstances in such a way that an ‘original’ or ‘intended’ 
meaning cannot be differentiated from the meaning of the text 
or event for oneself.”40
This requires a “fusion of the interpreter’s perspective and the object.”41
“What Gadamer means by the ‘fusion of horizons’ is the 
integration of our historically determined concerns with the 
object of understanding in such a way that this integration
determines the content of the object for us.”42
The fusion of horizons constitutes a fundamental dialectic between the 
interpreter and the subject of interpretation. It is within this dialogue that an 
agreement on the interpretation emerges.
8.4.1 The dialectic o f the hermeneutic circle:
A dialogue between the elements of the hermeneutic circle takes place 
within the fusion of horizons. The elements check one another and eventually
38 Warnke, pg: 65-8.
on
Truth and Method pg. 271-4 and Philosophical Apprenticeships, Robert R. Sullivan trans. 
MIT Press, Cambridge 1985, pg: 49.
40 Warnke, pg: 69.
41 Warnke, pg: 69.
42 Warnke, pg: 103.
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a version of the meaning of the subject emerges. This version is thereby the 
agreed truth regarding the meaning of the object, and is as close to objectivity 
as is possible. The dialogue could not occur if one of the participants was 
empty and had nothing to contribute. The interpreter contributes by bringing 
prejudices to the act of interpretation. The subject contributes its meaning. In 
this sense we can then see how the meaning inherent in a Larundic silence 
participates in the construction of the interpretation of it. The Larundic silence 
is an equal member of the dialogue and is supported by history and tradition. 
This is how all the elements of the hermeneutic circle contribute to the 
dialogue in order to establish a non-radical interpretation of the subject.
No individual element takes a dominant position in the process of 
understanding. Neither one’s p re ju d ice , tradition, nor the object of 
interpretation, takes precedent; they are all equal. Thus, it is possible to keep 
each element in check by reference to the opinion offered by the others. Thus, 
the new understanding emerges from the joining of those which preceded it43. 
There is always an implied acquiescence to tradition’s hold over us “in the 
sense that we are part of it and oriented by it.”44. The 'classical' is history 
preserved and distilled through renewed proof which allows it to continue and 
be reapplied from context to context45. This is effective history which has a 
hold on us whether we acknowledge it or not. Something is preserved even 
through its modification. But there is room for modification and this is where 
tradition is affected by the elements of prejudice and the thing-in-itself within 
the circle. Thus, we are held by tradition but we can change it through
43 Warnke, pg: 105.
^Warnke, pg: 106.
45 This is much like Kuhn’s idea of paradigm shifts which are dramatic ideological changes 
but which contain overlaps that make sense of the history as a whole. Kuhn, Thomas S.: The 
Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2nd ed. International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science: 
Foundations of the Unity of Science: vol. 2, no. 2. University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 
111.; 1970.
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experience, and vice verse. Thus, no individual participant in the dialogue can 
be shown to have greater control than any other.
8.5 Conclusions:
The above is a description of how individuals understand the objects 
they seek to understand. It has been shown how this ought to be accomplished 
with the help of critical elements of prejudice, the thing-in-itself, history and 
tradition. Each of these elements serves as a check against the interpretation 
of any single one being ascribed the canonical position.
The relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics for silence is this. Silence 
offers few clues toward the successful construction of non-radical 
interpretation. In order to prevent a Larundic silence from being mistaken for 
a Harpocratic silence the percipient must recognise that the silence does 
contain a meaning. The use of prejudice of the sort Gadamer supports, 
provides the foundation from which the silence can be recognised as 
meaningful. The clues the silence has to offer hide beneath its surface 
disguise of meaninglessness and emptiness. But one’s prejudices remind one 
that silences can be meaningful because they have been so in past experience. 
Prejudices can then act as the hooks upon which to begin to add new 
information found within the context of the silence. However, the prejudices 
can also obscure information by preventing one from seeing what cannot be 
hooked to the prejudices as they are. As a result, the interpretation founded 
solely on prejudice can be opportunistic and radical. Thus, a fail-safe must be 
added, and it is already present in the form of tradition and history, which 
guides the interpreter to ideas previously understood by others. A second 
safe-guard is present in the thing-in-itself, the meaning of which is specific 
and delimits the possible readings of it. The entire system is engaged through
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the to-and-fro motion of the hermeneutic circle, and occurs during the fusion 
of horizons between the interpreter and the object of interpretation. Larundic 
silences are thus secure from radical readings by asserting a meaning which 
takes the role of the thing-in-itself. It is an equal participant in the 
hermeneutic circle, and is therefore part of the negotiated understanding which 
forms the composite interpretation.
The following section will suggest further methods for preserving the 
integrity of the meaning of Larundic silence. Then, in chapter 11, it will be 
demonstrated how the element of agreement can assist in creating critically 
open non-radical readings during the act of interpretation.
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CHAPTER 9
RELEVANCE
There are two senses in which relevance is a significant element in 
constructing non-radical interpretations of silence. The first sense is one that 
relates well to the ideas in Gadamer’s theory related above. The problems 
associated with prejudice , in Gadamer’s use of the word, are not much 
different from those associated with prejudice in general. Namely, that radical 
and opportunistic readings of an object are likely to occur when prejudice 
interferes with the act of interpretation by obscuring the thing-in-itself. 
Accordingly, Jaworski, and Sperber and Wilson recommend that these 
problems will be avoided where interpreters take care to recognise the 
relevance of the meaning of the silence; thereby identifying the meaning as 
the thing-in-itself and an equal participant in the dialectic of interpretation. 
Their position is that we do not attempt to understand what we do not perceive 
as meaningful; thus interpretation must begin with acknowledging the 
meaningfulness of a given Larundic silence. Without this acknowledgement, 
we shall see, the Larundic silence will be mistaken for Harpocratic.
The second sense of relevance arises from the same set of problems. 
In this case it is necessary for interpretations to remain in some sense faithful 
to the object of interpretation. This will ensure that the interpretation fits the 
object in a suitable manner. It is the elements of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of 
interpretation that inspire this understanding of relevance. His suggestion is 
that an object deserves to be seen in its best light, in order to perceive it as 
coherent and sound, before being critical of it. Then one must ensure that the 
interpretation fits  with the meaning inherent in the silence as the object or
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thing-in-itself. This will ensure that the interpretation is relevant to the 
meaning of the silence.
The two senses will be examined separately, and can be summed up as 
the difference between the ‘relevance o f  and the ‘relevant to’, as follows:
1) In constructing a non-radical reading of a silence one must 
recognise the relevance o f  the meaning of the silence.
2) In constructing a non-radical reading of a silence one must 
ensure that the interpretation bears relevance to the 
meaning issued by the silence as the thing-in-itself.
9.1 Prejudice and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance:
Sperber and Wilson1 demonstrate the importance of the connection 
between old and new information in their psychologistic cognitive theory of 
relevance. They suggest that human beings will not recognise new 
information if it does not somehow touch the knowledge they already possess 
and are able to access at the time. The readily available old information 
provides the context which is touched by the new information, and this 
information is processed and stored if and only if doing so does not require 
great effort. This cognitive effect is what the authors refer to as relevance. Its 
implications are clear: we require some knowledge base to acquire new 
knowledge, without it we do not even know to recognise the new information 
as having any bearing on us. The consequence of not observing the relevance 
of a new piece of information is that the new information is ignored. But 
when there is a hook to pull our attention toward it, then we draw the new 
information in and it becomes part of the collection of processed information 
we carry with us. The collected processed information is what Sperber and
1 Sperber, D. & Wilson, D.: Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Basil Blackwell; 
Oxford; 1986.
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Wilson call our encyclopaedic knowledge2, and what Gadamer referred to as 
prejudice.
9.1.1 Contextual Effect:
Relevance is determined by two elements. The first element is 
contextual effect which involves our natural tendency to contextualise new 
information by uniting it with old information3. In this way, new assumptions 
can be strengthened by old ones, implications can be derived, and conclusions 
can be made. The context itself is constituted by the previous knowledge base 
and, importantly, the set of assumptions derived from that base. If the context, 
i.e. encyclopaedic knowledge and a previous set of assumptions, is altered by 
the contextualisation of the new information then we have a contextual effect4. 
This is a modification of the original set of assumptions possessed by the 
individual. Contextual effects are elements of the context which change our 
assumptions and issue new ideas by the conjoining of old and new 
information. Hence our prejudices are the means by which we acquire and 
process new information with the contextual effect.
It is important to note that the conclusions derived by this method can 
only be as strong or certain as the assumptions upon which they have been 
made; thus a weak assumption base leads to weak conclusions5. Weakness 
can be resolved by adding logical implications to the assumptions in order to 
support the conclusions further6.
“Interpreting an utterance involves more than merely 
identifying the assumption explicitly expressed: it crucially
2 Sperber & Wilson, pp: 87ff.
3 Sperber & Wilson, pg: 108.
4 Sperber & Wilson, pg: 117.
5 Sperber & Wilson, pg: 111.
6 Sperber & Wilson, pg: 114.
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involves working out the consequences of adding this 
assumption to a set of assumptions that have themselves 
already been processed. In other words, it involves seeing the 
contextual effects of this assumption in a context determined, at 
least in part, by earlier acts of comprehension.”7
So far, Sperber and Wilson’s description of relevance is very close to 
Gadamer’s theory of personal prejudices which are altered by the experience 
of understanding by being challenged by the thing-in-itself. Prejudices are the 
knowledge base and set of assumptions which Sperber and Wilson refer to as 
context. The truth claim made by the object provides the challenge of new 
information as it is presented to the previous set of assumptions and the 
context in which they occur; the prejudices are altered through contact with 
the new claims, and this produces the changes or the contextual effect. 
Sperber and Wilson go deeper into this area and produce a theory of relevance 
which I believe is a useful addition to Gadamer’s theory where it is applied to 
interpretation of Larundic silence.
9.1.2 Economy o f effort: a cost -benefit approach:
The second element in determining the relevance of new information is 
one of economy (different from the principle of economy mentioned above). 
Processing information and building assumptions from it requires effort, effort 
that Sperber and Wilson insist we are reluctant to make. As a result, an 
audience will tend to assess a new piece of information to determine the 
amount of effort it will require to process and the amount of benefit they will 
derive from doing so. If the benefit outweighs the cost, the information is 
considered relevant and is processed. The effort is considered ‘less’ when the 
individual is prepared for the type of information being offered. This is the 
case when the context of knowledge at the forefront of the audience’s attention 
is related to the new information on offer; in other words, if the individual is
7 Sperber & Wilson, pg: 118.
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thinking about a related topic at the time or considers the topic important. The 
effort is considered ‘great’ when the context is not prepared in this way.
“An assumption is relevant to an individual at a given time if 
and only if it is relevant to one or more of the contexts 
accessible to that individual at that time.”8
The correlate step in the assessment involves a quantitative appraisal of 
the benefits gained from assimilating a new piece of information. The benefits 
of processing the information are ‘great’ when the contextual effect produces 
new information which connects to the context at hand and can produce a 
useful set of new assumptions; the benefits are found to be ‘less’ when the 
new information produces little or no new and useful assumptions. The 
resulting definition is,
“Relevance:
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the 
extent that its contextual effects in this context are large.
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the 
extent that the effort required to process it in this context is 
small.”9
Once again, it is possible to draw a comparison between Sperber and 
Wilson’s theory and Gadamer’s. Gadamer said, “what we reject has nothing 
to say to us -  or we reject it because it has nothing to say to us.”10. This 
means that we ignore what does not appear important to us or, to use Sperber 
and Wilson’s terminology, what seems that it will take too much effort to 
process because it offers no obvious cognitive effect.
8 Sperber & Wilson, pg: 144.
9 Sperber & Wilson, pg: 125.
10 Gadamer 1966, pg: 4.
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9.1.3 The problem of surprise information:
The difficulty with Sperber and Wilson’s definition is that it does not 
obviously account for surprise information. We do have the ability to process 
new information which does not appear to have the necessary relevance and 
contextual preparedness they require. For example our ability to process and 
understand non-sequiturs. When one asks (1) Q: “how many graduate 
students does it take to change a light-bulb?” it follows somewhat from the 
question, and our past experience with similar jokes, that the answer A: “One, 
but it takes five years” is appropriate even if it is ironic. In some sense the 
context for the answer is provided in the set up of the joke. However, another 
similar joke (2) Q: “how many surrealists does it take to change a light-bulb?” 
A: “a fish”, provides less context for the reply. This notwithstanding, joke (2) 
is still processed and understood, even though one wasn’t thinking about fish 
at the time. How, then, do we come to regard surprise information as 
relevant? Why is it that the audience does not ignore the non-sequitur answer 
and wait to hear some more relevant answer?
Sperber and Wilson’s reply to this would likely be that the audience 
intuitively assesses the benefit derived from expending the effort required to 
process the non-sequitur. Hence, presumably the pleasure in finding the 
humour resolves the cost-benefit analysis in favour of making the effort to 
understand the joke. If the effort is made but the joke is not understood, then 
presumably the audience eventually makes the decision not to expend any 
more energy and gives up. But that raises the problems of questions which are 
not easily understood, and yet are never given up upon; for instance, 
philosophical problems like defining justice, or theological questions about the 
existence of God. Why do we continue to expend energy on what appear to be 
unanswerable questions? Sperber and Wilson do not seem to have an answer 
for this, and the best that one can tell from the theory is that the questions are 
themselves relevant enough to be posed and somehow provide enough benefit
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to earn the effort of trying to solve them. Presumably the pleasure and 
implications derived from deliberation upon these problems, even if they 
cannot be solved, is enough to make the effort worthwhile.
The cost-benefit analysis can have significant consequences for 
understanding silence as well. Silence is greatly dependent in relevance for its 
communicative capacity, as can be demonstrated by the following example.
(1) Gwyneth: (pause) it’s nice.
The pause or silence in Gwyneth’s utterance is indeterminate because we have 
no context upon which to attach an interpretation of its meaning. As a result 
the audience can pay it very little attention because it appears to be irrelevant. 
Instead we want to know more about why Gwyneth has made the statement at 
all. What is she saying is nice? Why does she use that rather weak and much 
maligned adjective to describe it? But all of that leaves the silence ignored 
and uninterpreted because the effort of doing so appears to have less benefit 
than the effort to interpret the words.
The silence takes on a greater sense of relevance when the example is
adjusted to give it a context, as follows:
(2) David: what do you think of this jacket?
Gwyneth: (pause) it’s nice.
From the change in the example the audience is given some clue as to 
the context of the utterance containing the silence. Because of the context 
provided it is possible to assess the meaning of the pause preceding the 
linguistic statement as an intentional or unintentional suggestion of the fact 
that, for instance, Gwyneth doesn’t really believe that David’s jacket is nice.
So we might provide an alternate phrasing of the example as follows:
(3) David: what do you think of this jacket?
Gwyneth: I don’t want to hurt your feelings, but it’s ugly.
Until the context for the example was provided it was not clear that the 
pause in Gwyneth’s utterance was possessed of any relevant meaning for the 
audience. Instead, we are more concerned with the words in the utterance, and
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try to interpret their meaning because they provide the clues or hooks that 
make them more likely to produce the most benefit for the least amount of 
effort. The silence can therefore be ignored as irrelevant. However, when the 
silence is placed in a more extensive context its meaning becomes more 
important and it is not as easily ignored as irrelevant. In fact, the silence in (2) 
if perceived as relevant provides the basis for a more profound and accurate 
interpretation of Gwyneth’s utterance which would not have been available 
otherwise.
We can see that there might be a relevant difference between example
(2) and example (4),
(4) David: what do you think of this jacket?
Gwyneth: it’s nice.
where the absence of the pause implies Gwyneth is likely to appreciate 
David’s taste in jackets after all.
This leaves us with a very important bit of information for the task at 
hand: because silences are slippery, they will be ignored as irrelevant more 
readily than words are and this can cause misunderstandings. If a silence is 
not considered relevant it is easier to ignore than words, even words which are 
assessed as irrelevant, because silences are slippery and have no hooks to draw 
in the audience’s attention. But ignoring a silence can lead the interpreter to 
ignore information which affects the degree to which they can make an 
accurate interpretation. This is why relevance is so vital to understanding 
silence. When silences are not considered relevant the information they carry 
will be lost. Even so, some silences are silences which are impossible to 
ignore, like one of the many silences encountered by Eva in Isabel Allende’s 
novel Eva Luna11.
11 Allende, Isabelle: Eva Luna, Margaret Sayers Peden trans. Bantam Books; New York; 
1989. Pp: 167-8.
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“At eleven I awoke, frightened by the silence; the crickets had 
stopped chirping and the air was still; not a leaf was stirring in 
the patio.”
This is a Larundic silence of portent and meaning but only because it is given 
relevance by its context; in this case the crisis of a failed love affair and an 
omen of tragedy. But silences of crickets and stillness of air will be ignored if 
they are not relevant to the context of the audience. Thus, the problem exists 
when relevant silences are mistaken for irrelevant silences and their message 
goes unnoticed.
The solution to the danger of mistaking a silence as irrelevant is 
sourced in context, as we saw earlier. Context will help us receive the 
meaning of a silence and show us its relevance. The solution will equally rest 
on the interpreter’s prejudices or encyclopaedic knowledge because it provides 
the context from the position of the interpreter -  the foundation for the 
interpretation. But this might cause conflicts between meaning of the 
Larundic silence as the thing-in-itself, and relativistic opportunism in which 
the interpreter might favour her own context and prejudice and ignore the 
context of the silence itself. To avoid this we will rely upon a different 
conception of relevance, as outlined below.
9.2 Dworkin and A Second Kind of Relevance:
Sperber and Wilson’s formulation of relevance provides important 
insights for understanding how Larundic silence works. Moreover, this 
conception can be easily reconciled with the elements of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic project as it will be applied to interpretations of silence. But 
there is an additional understanding of the concept of relevance. Relevance 
need not only be a signal to the audience that it is worth their effort to
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construct an interpretation, it may also be a requirement for how the 
interpretation is made. In order to avoid miscommunication the interpreter of 
a silence ought to attend to the relevancy of the interpretation to the object: is 
the interpretation coherent with the significant features of the silence, such as 
its utterer, the context, the relationship between utterer and audience, and so 
on? Interpretations using the first understanding of relevance require openness 
on the part of interpreters in preparation of noticing that a silence has a 
meaning and that that meaning is worth the effort of being understood. To 
construct interpretations which are relevant according to the second notion of 
relevance, the interpreter will be required to stay within the perimeter of the 
object interpreted. This is the difference between relevance o f and relevance 
to.
9.2.1 Dworkin ’s contribution:
Relevance to the thing-in-itself as object of interpretation requires that 
the interpretation f it  the meaning of the object being interpreted. Fit is an idea 
from Ronald Dworkin’s work, Law’s Empire12, designed to ensure that 
interpreters find coherence in the information on offer -  before they build an 
interpretation of it. This permits the interpreter to see the object in its best 
light: as coherent; and helps ensure that the interpretation is relevant to the 
object itself. Fit and best-light will be shown to be highly useful elements of a 
method for constructing non-radical readings of silence. They will help ensure 
that interpretations do not exceed the boundaries, or what Dworkin calls the 
integrity, of the thing-in-itself.
Dworkin’s emphasis on integrity is a theoretical element for 
understanding and interpreting law and political practice. Nevertheless, his 
theory can extend beyond these areas. Dworkin draws a great deal of his 
material from theories of creative or artistic interpretation, especially
1 9. Dworkin, Ronald: Law's Empire. Fontana, Belknap Press; 1986.
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interpretation of creative texts such as novels. It can be argued that Dworkin’s 
ideal of integrity can be extended to any act of interpretation, including 
interpretation of silence. In fact, integrity will be very useful for our purposes 
because of the implicit insistence that interpreters respect the object of their 
interpretation in order to produce the best possible understanding of it. 
Integrity, as it is defined by Dworkin, entails the dual notions of best light and 
fit which permit the kind of consideration for the object we require (and which 
is advocated by Gadamer13). Seeing the object in its best light ensures that the 
interpretation fits the integral whole of the object. This relies on openness and 
respect which help the interpreter understand the object before being critical of 
it. Such understanding does not have to exclude the prejudicial content of the 
interpretation, but it does help keep prejudices from obscuring the object’s 
integrity. This prevents the interpreter from making the object into what she 
wants it to be, instead of what it is. Not respecting the object’s integrity leads 
to what Dworkin calls, and we have been calling throughout this thesis, 
construction of a radical interpretation. Thus, applying best light and fit 
protect the integrity of the thing-in-itself by ensuring that the interpretation is 
relevant to the object.
Integrity is composed of two almost opposing facets: that of 
consistency, and that of flexibility (related to Aristotle's practical wisdom, 
Phronesis). In the best of circumstances one ought to respect the internal 
consistency of the object of interpretation. Doing so will accord the object the 
consideration which in turn prevents unintentional (or intentional) 
opportunistic obscuring of the object of interpretation. Seeing the object in its 
best light requires the interpreter to assume that the object is internally 
consistent and meaningful. It must be said that staying consistent with the 
integrity of the object does not preclude taking a critical stance toward it. It is
11 Kuhn also makes the argument that we ought to try to see a theory as making sense and 
being coherent before trying to criticise it.
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only the first necessary step in understanding the object. It is an internal 
appreciation for the object as a whole which ensures that interpretations fit it 
as the thing-in-itself.
The problem that ideas can be taken out of context and have their 
meanings changed illustrates why consistency is a virtue, at least some of the 
time. Lifting thoughts out of their ordinary or initial contexts and taking them 
away from their integral whole, distorts and transforms them and is not 
respectful of what they are. It is true that in some cases taking an idea out of 
its context can rescue good ideas from bad contexts, as it were. But doing so 
has transformative effects on the ideas, and this transformation is contrary to 
respect for their integrity as a whole.
Integrity and consistency are different concepts. It is important to 
understand that integrity is not identical to consistency, rather, consistency is a 
valued though sacrificeable part of integrity. Integrity does not require 
continuation of precedence or traditionally held opinions. It is not adherence 
to bare logical consistency, but to general principles. In law, for example, 
these may be justice and fairness14. Thus, integrity is consistent only to the 
extent that it is faithful to certain basic principles which are worth maintaining 
overall.
The most significant difference between the two is that integrity 
includes flexibility, whereas consistency shuns it. Flexibility permits one to go 
beyond what is consistent with the history of an object of interpretation, for 
example a law or legal system, in order to maintain its integrity to the general 
principles the system wishes to uphold. These principles are more significant 
than overall consonance and deserve preserving no matter what the cost to 
consistency. Flexibility in integrity permits organic change within a custom, 
which is practical in cases that are difficult to resolve. When there is no 
obvious way of dealing with a case and preceding solutions do not help in
14 Dworkin, pg: 185.
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solving it, the interpreter, a judge perhaps, must rely on an ability to be 
flexible and reason the problem out.
Here is where Aristotle’s idea of phronesis becomes most germane. 
Phronesis is usually translated as ‘practical wisdom’. Flexibility requires one 
to make use of practical wisdom: the ability to apply general principles (and 
other accessible knowledge) to situations where it has not been used before. 
Successful application of general to particular, old to new, familiar to foreign, 
encourages creativity so that a solution to the problem can be found. Integrity 
is different from consistency because integrity requires this flexibility. It 
requires one to be faithful to the overall principles of the system, even at the 
expense of being consistent15. As a result,
“integrity is a more dynamic and radical standard [than 
consistency]...because it encourages [an interpreter] to be wide- 
ranging and imaginative in search for coherence with 
fundamental principles.”16
This allows integrity based-interpretations to be radical in order to 
uphold the fundamental principles17. However, it does not give the interpreter 
free reign to create radical opportunistic interpretations of the object. 
Flexibility must be restricted by the same kinds of limitations Gadamer and 
Wittgenstein pointed out: namely, common language, culture, history, 
tradition and the object of interpretation itself. For Aristotle, flexibility arose 
in the way that one applied general principles to particular situations, but 
always with the restriction that the principles must be considered absolute and 
unchanging18. Dworkin appears to accept these sentiments when he says that 
we are both free and constrained in our interpretations because the freedom
15 Dworkin, pg: 219.
16 Dworkin, pg: 220.
17 Dworkin, pg: 221.
18Aristotle, 1142a27.
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and the constraint check one another19. When there are many competing 
interpretations of an object, flexible reasoning helps the interpreter choose 
between them based on which fits the object better, and which makes the text 
better. This is in fact free and constrained because it requires interpretation 
and personal choice, but also includes the constraints described by Aristotle, 
Wittgenstein and Gadamer.
Furthermore, we have ‘internal’ or ‘subjective’ restraints which keep 
us from allowing our fancies to roam wild20. Dworkin says our internal 
“convictions actually check one another”21 and prevent us from accepting just 
any information. To use Gadamer’s terminology, the internal constraints 
permit our prejudices to be critical, while also ensuring against prejudices 
becoming opportunistic. Once again it is clear that Dworkin’s ideas have 
connections to Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle where external constraints of 
tradition and history work with the internal constraints of prejudice to keep 
opportunism at bay.
9.2.2 Purpose:
The constraints to radical interpretations can be condensed into the two 
central elements from Dworkin’s theory already discussed: fi t  and best light. 
Dworkin states that the best way to decide between competing interpretations 
of an object is to determine which interpretation fits best with the history of 
the object as it has been interpreted, understood and used over time. “We all 
enter the history of an interpretative practice at a particular point...”22, and this 
produces certain restraints upon the interpretation in the form of “brute facts of
19 Dworkin, pg: 234.
90 Dworkin, pg: 235. This recalls Gadamer’s view of how the elements of the hermeneutic 
circle safeguard against the dominance of any one element.
21 Dworkin, pg: 237.
22 Dworkin, pg: 91.
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history”23. These constitute the identity of the object of interpretation or the 
thing-in-itself. The goal of a good interpretation is to be able to fit in with this 
history as much as possible. But fit is not all there is. Dworkin insists that the 
interpretation must show the object in its best light. Which means it must be 
consistent at least with the general principles to be upheld and it must be 
represented as “the best it can be”.
“I offered this general and very abstract characterisation of 
interpretation: it aims to make the object or practice being 
interpreted the best it can be.”24
Looking at the object in its best light requires one to find the purpose 
of it. In Dworkin’s use of ‘purpose’ the interpreter understands the choice of 
the constituent words of the sentence as well as the reason why the words have 
been chosen, and this gives the sentence meaning. Interpreting a text or 
anything creative is an act of attributing fit to the overall object of 
interpretation: trying to see it in its best light as having internal integrity, and 
thereby seeing the purpose in it.
By this Dworkin is referring to the opposite of Wittgenstein’s notion of 
sense25. We know the sense of the words in a sentence when we understand 
their individual meanings as well as their meaning as constituents of the whole 
sentence. The main difference between sense and purpose is that Wittgenstein 
does not describe sense as being imposed from outside by the interpreter, 
rather the interpreter has it imposed on her through the understanding of the 
meaning of the sentence. Dworkin, on the other hand, states that the 
interpreter imposes purpose on the sentence in an attempt to make sense of it.
Dworkin, pg: 255, Dworkin refers to the brute facts of legal history, but I have extended 
this as is explained elsewhere.
24 Dworkin, pg: 77.
25 See Wittgenstein: Tractatus, §3.3 &4.022; and Investigations, §20, 33, 117 & 197.
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“...creative interpretation takes its formal structure from the 
idea of intention, not (at least not necessarily) because it aims 
to discover the purposes of any particular historical person or 
group but because it aims to impose purpose over the text or 
data or tradition being interpreted.”26
This “aim to impose purpose” is the intention of the interpreter to view 
the object in its best light as having integrity to its history, and thereby ensure 
the fit of the interpretation. Furthermore, Dworkin claims that when people 
interpret a conversation the act is a purposive one, in the same way as when 
they interpret texts. The intention of the interpreter is to
“...assign meaning in the light of the motives and purposes and 
concerns it supposes the speaker to have, and it reports its 
conclusions in a statement about his ‘intention’ in saying what 
he did.”27
For this reason interpretation also differs from causal explanation, because it is 
purposive and imposes purpose on the object.
It must not be supposed to follow from this that the object has no 
meaning of its own until one is imposed on it. The interpreters’ external 
understanding of the purpose of the object cannot be permitted to be a radical 
or opportunistic reading imposed on the thing-in-itself. Permitting this would 
have relativistic implications we seek to avoid. In order to prevent 
opportunism, the interpretation is subject to the same limiting boundaries 
which restrict the interpretations of words. Thus, sentences have internal 
sense which is understood by way of reaching a purposive understanding of 
the sentence without obscuring it. Opportunistic imposition is therefore 
limited by the requirement of seeing the object in its best light as fitting with 
its own meaning and the history of imposed external meanings which 
accompany it.
26 Dworkin, pg: 228.
27 Dworkin, pg: 50.
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However, as we have already said, seeing the object at its best does not 
mean one is committed to accepting it. It is still possible to be critical of the 
object. Once the idea is understood in its best light with regard to 
completeness and integrity, the percipient can then take a different perspective 
and be critical of it if so desired. It is simply that the first step of the 
interpretative understanding entails seeing the object as a whole, and as 
consistent as possible, before the critical reaction to it can begin. This does 
not harm the critical position, and in fact helps it. We do not have to agree 
with the object once it is understood, but understanding it helps us to know it 
more thoroughly. “Know thine enemy” serves as a good model for critical 
judgement here. Not that the object needs to be seen as an enemy, but that 
knowing it fully helps the critic to see its failings more thoroughly, and makes 
visible its points of weakness. Understanding the integral whole of the object 
indicates where it’s integrity is suspect.
9.2.3 Interpretations o f art:
According to Dworkin, the act of interpretation is somewhat different 
in artistic interpretation. Interpreting art is more constructive than purposive; 
it seeks less to determine authorial intent than to attempt to see the object at its 
best28. Interpretation of art adds to the dialogue from which the artistic 
statement issued. It is constructive in that the interpreter’s choice of what is 
the best light in which to view the object will involve some personal choice 
and will reflect personal attitudes29.
“This brings the interpreter’s sense of artistic value into his 
reconstruction of the artist’s intention in at least an evidential 
way, for the interpreter’s judgement of what an author would 
have accepted will be guided by his sense of what the author 
should have accepted, that is, which sense of which readings
28 Dworkin, pg: 52.
29 Dworkin, pg: 52-3.
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would make the work better and which would make it 
worse.”30
In this sense the interpreter is as involved as the author in creating the meaning 
of the object. The interpreter would view a best light interpretation as one 
which she would apply to her own work31. Thus, personal attitudes are an 
inescapable part of constructing interpretations because the interpreter is 
always caught in her own history which distorts interpretation, and even best 
light attempts at viewing the world do not escape this32. This again is in 
agreement with Gadamer’s theory that we cannot avoid prejudicial content in 
interpretative acts.
In constructing interpretations of novels, Dworkin says that the 
“distinction between author and interpreter [is] more a matter of different 
aspects of the same process.”33 Dworkin uses the notion of a chain novel to 
illustrate this sort of author/interpreter relationship. Here, authors must be 
interpreters of previous chapters written by other people before adding to the 
novel by becoming authors of the next chapters. This confers a special 
obligation upon the current author who must act as interpreter before adding 
anything constructive to the text. The current author is required to remain 
faithful to the limitations which have already been imposed by the previous 
authors in the chain, ensuring there is fit and that the novel is shown in its best 
light.
“Each novelist aims to make a single novel of the material he 
has been given, what he adds to it, and (so far as he can control 
this) what his successors will want or be able to add.”34
30 Dworkin, pg: 57.
O 1
Dworkin, pg: 58.
32 Dworkin, pg: 62.
33 Dworkin, pg: 229.
34 Dworkin, pg: 229.
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This is similar to writing sequels, such as books about Sherlock Holmes 
written by authors other than Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Authors are restricted 
in the kind of information they are allowed to apply to the characters; so 
Holmes lives at 23B Baker Street not 1313 Mockingbird Lane, and Watson is 
a doctor not a lawyer, etc. This is because the information, like Wittgenstein’s 
idea of words, provides the perimeter within which the interpretation is 
defined as faithful and marks where additions are wrong. In order to succeed 
in creating an interpretation which both fits and is the best it can be, the author 
must have an idea of the overall whole of the novel and some idea of how the 
characters will progress and what they will do.
“He must think up some view of the novel in progress, some 
working theory about its characters, plot, genre, theme, and 
point, in order to decide what counts as continuing it and not as 
beginning anew.”35
The chain novel example shows that there is no way of telling when 
the interpretative role ends and the authorial role begins, as the interpretative 
role is often authorial because it brings new information to the constructed 
text36. This is partly why interpreters have to be careful to not allow too much 
of themselves to interfere with the understanding of the text, but it is also why 
we ought to respect what the interpreter brings to the act of interpretation. The 
interpreter’s creativity can bring new and important revelations to the 
interpretation.
How then do we ensure against radical opportunistic interpretations? 
Interpretations are kept in check by staying within the perimeter of the object 
of interpretation and by trying to give it integrity by seeing it in its best light. 
However, some personal attitudes will find their way into the interpretation.
35 Dworkin, pg: 230.
36 Dworkin, pg: 232.
211
“Your assignment is to make of the text the best it can be, and 
you will therefore choose the interpretation you believe makes 
the work more significant or otherwise better.”37
As a result, any interpretation can be multifarious, because the object 
can be approached from many different view points38. Differences in 
individuals result in a plurality of interpretations. But rather than weaken the 
system, these help strengthen it by permitting dialogue which tests and 
transforms the interpretations. The idiosyncrasies of personal taste and 
prejudice are the cause of disagreement, says Dworkin. However, this is a 
functional characteristic of interpretation because differences of opinion spark 
the debate which strengthens the system overall. Can one interpretation be 
better than another? Not necessarily. However, Dworkin will reply that the 
best interpretations of an object are the ones which present it in its best light 
and which fit the object most comfortably. The different ideas of the object 
create the possibility of the dialectic Gadamer suggested. Each participant in 
the dialogue checks the other to ensure that no one is more prevalent than the 
others. Ultimately the interpretation will rely on agreement based on this 
dialectical process.
9.2.4 Context leads to agreement:
Consideration must be paid to a final aspect of Dworkin’s theory. He 
claims that context is an important part of interpretation: context of the 
interpreter and context of the object. Context makes agreement possible 
because we are all to some extent part of the same context. There is an 
overlap available in the form of shared language, history, tradition or culture, 
in the same way that Wittgenstein and Gadamer have suggested. This overlap
37 Dworkin, pg: 233.
38 Dworkin, pg: 230.
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provides the similarities which make agreement possible. Similar outlooks 
can create similar understandings and customs39. “...[A] variety of forces 
tempers...differences and conspires toward convergence”40, which makes 
agreement possible. The “forces” are paradigms and principles which inspire 
community agreement, “...and this fact discourages radical interpretations”41. 
An example of limitations to opportunism is precedent in the legal context. 
However, the theory extends beyond law, as Dworkin includes intellectual 
environment and common language as contextual limitations. These are 
shared influences within the participants’ context. There is therefore enough 
overlap room in the shared context to nurture agreement.
Integrity permits diversity because individuals can bring their own 
ideas regarding fit and best light to the act of interpretation42. However, there 
are still limits to personal prejudice, making idiosyncratic interpretations less 
likely. Historical context is one such limitation. Even though flexibility will 
be more important than consistency43, interpretations must still have fit to the 
historical context of what is interpreted44. So, for example, the history of the 
word ‘holocaust’ always entails its meaning as it pertained to the Second 
World War, even when it is applied to other events. Thus, when other events 
are described as being holocausts, it is usually with the Second World War 
idea in mind and with the author’s desire to invoke this as part of its meaning. 
This permits a mutual understanding between the author and the audience in 
the form of overlapping historical context.
Dworkin, pg: 63.
40 Dworkin, pg: 88.
41 Dworkin, pg: 88.
42 Dworkin, pg: 243.
43 Dworkin, pg: 257.
44 Dworkin, pg: 255.
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However, the traditions and linguistic rules that serve to create 
agreement can also lead to irreconcilable divergence. The elements on which 
we rely for agreement can change over time45 partly because of disagreement 
on how they are to be used and understood, and these changes may produce 
schisms which cannot be healed. To help prevent this, there must be a balance 
between divergence and similarity as too much of either can weaken the 
interpretative project46. Too much divergence lessens mutual understanding, 
whereas too much agreement prevents critical discernment and the fruitful 
debate it incurs. Moreover, we should not rely on immutable truths as there is 
a history of great changes in conventions over time. Hence we cannot assume 
consensus on conventions or truths47. This is why flexibility plays such an 
important role in interpretation. Dialogue and agreement provide the balance 
between input from the object and input from its interpreter. Chapter 11 will 
further reveal the significance of agreement for interpretation.
9.2.5 Conclusions on Dworkin’s contribution:
If we distil the elements of Dworkin’s theory for our purposes we can 
see which are most helpful for interpreting silence. ‘Relevance to’ in this case 
means preserving the integrity of the object by viewing it in its best light and 
ensuring the interpretation fits with the history of the object. History is the 
information referred to earlier that is part of the thing-in-itself and defines the 
perimeter outside which an interpretation is considered radical. We recall that 
it is Larundic silences that offer perimeter that must be respected. Respecting 
the perimeters of a Larundic silence will protect it from radical readings. 
Hence integrity and its constitutive elements are useful in interpretations of 
Larundic silences.
45 Dworkin, pg: 77.
46 Dworkin, pg: 89.
47 Dworkin, pg: 137.
214
But preserving integrity requires a degree of flexibility in its 
application. Flexibility in integrity ensures that we remain constant to the 
purpose of the object, while also allowing for consideration of the information 
brought by the interpreter. Permitting the interpreter’s contribution allows the 
foundational knowledge which leads to noticing the relevance of the object. 
Moreover, the flexibility involved in ‘relevance to’ is especially important to 
interpreting Larundic silences because it ensures that proper attention is paid 
to the meaning of the silence, even though the percipient will add to it during 
the act of interpretation. This combination permits the fusion between the 
thing-in-itself, the Larundic silence in this case, and the interpreter’s 
prejudices. The fusion takes place in the overlap of shared context between 
the interpreter and the interpreted, the result of which is the agreed upon 
understanding of the subject.
The respect which follows from integrity, seeing the object in its best 
light, the importance of fit to context, and the other elements of Dworkin’s 
theory, are highly significant for silence because silence so easily falls victim 
to misunderstanding and lazy or radical interpretations. The slipperiness of 
silence frustrates interpretative attempts and can lead the interpreter to decide 
that the silence is not worth the effort, as we have seen above in the discussion 
of Sperber and Wilson’s work. Furthermore, the effort and frustration might 
cause the interpreter to take a dim view of the silence and construct a negative 
interpretation of it, as is illustrated by the effects of stammers in the court 
room and pleading the Fifth Amendment in the USA48. Reminding 
interpreters that they ought to try to construct the best interpretation of the 
silence they possibly can would encourage more positive interpretations of 
silence and alleviate the debilitating effects misunderstandings can have. 
Dana Jack has shown the debilitating effects self-silencing can have on
48 See chapter 16 “Silence in the Court”.
215
women, leading to depression and anxiety49. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that those around the victim of self-imposed silence further silence the 
individual by imposing opportunistic interpretations on her identity and 
making her into what they need her to be. This creates a confusion of 
misunderstanding which leads to abuse and objectification of the silent women 
due to the interpreters’ lack of effort at trying to construct accurate 
interpretations of the silence. Rather than blame the victims of 
misunderstanding we should to set up mechanisms to prevent these 
misunderstandings, and to this end Dworkin suggests reliance on integrity, 
best light and fit.
This is a rough sketch of how Dworkin’s thesis contains supportive 
elements for the model of interpreting silences. We will see how they link 
with the other elements in the conclusion to part n.
9.3 Relevance and Silence:
We have seen how relevance can be seen in two distinct manners: 
‘relevance of’ in Sperber and Wilson’s sense, and ‘relevance to’ as it is 
derived from Dworkin’s theory. Both these ideas of relevance have a 
significant role to play in the model for interpreting silence. The first type or 
relevance discussed is important for Larundic silence because it alerts us to the 
fact that a communicative attempt is being made. This attempt presupposes 
inherent meaning in the silent utterance because, as was revealed in part I, 
there must be something that is being communicated. Once the percipient is 
alerted to the presence of a meaning, it is incumbent upon her to interpret that 
meaning in order to discern what is being communicated. This requires effort
49 See Dana Jack: Silencing the Self: Woman and Depression; Harvard University Press; 
Cambridge, Mass.; 1991, on constructing identities for the silent.
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on the part of the percipient, and we are told, most percipients are reluctant to 
make this effort. Thus, they rely on information close to hand and risk 
building lazy, radical interpretations. The danger of this for silence is even 
greater than it is for spoken utterances, because silence is slippery. As a result, 
it falls prey to opportunistic interpretations, and at the extreme, may be 
mistaken for empty and then be ignored.
In order to protect silences from percipients’ constructing radical 
interpretations of them, the conditions of the second form of relevance can be 
applied. In this sense of relevance the percipient is alerted to the problems of 
interpreting silence, and cautioned to ensure that interpretations are relevant to 
the silent utterance. This, as we have seen, includes maintaining the integrity 
of the silence by seeing it in its best light and ensuring that the interpretation 
fits the Larundic silence in question. However, we are cautious to prevent the 
non-critical acceptance that this would entail. Thus, the role of the interpreter 
is to apply her personal prejudice in a contextual overlap that combines the 
meaning of the Larundic silence with the input from the interpreter. This 
occurs in the dialogue that balances the two perspectives in an attempt at 
agreement on the interpreted meaning of the silence. We now turn to the 
element of agreement.
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CHAPTER 10 
AGREEMENT. CONSENSUS AND MEANING
10.1 Introduction:
A number of philosophers have argued for the importance of 
agreement in communication and truth evaluation. Among them, Richard 
Bernstein stands out where these ideas are to be applied to silence. He has 
explained how negotiation and persuasive argument permit the formulation of 
an interpretation which is considerate of the claims made by all the 
participants. Thus, a Larundic silence will be less likely to have its perimeter 
infringed upon where agreement precedes interpretation. But agreement is not 
unique to Bernstein. Gadamer demonstrated the role of agreement in 
understanding; while Wittgenstein begins from the other end showing how 
agreed upon rules for language make understanding possible through 
familiarity and custom. The work of these authors shows a significant degree 
of overlap in their reliance upon agreement, custom and tradition in 
communication theory. Their work also coincides with Dworkin’s demand for 
flexibility in understanding and communicating, and this leads to the 
importance of practical reasoning or phronesis, at least as far as this project is 
concerned. Agreement will be a further element to the collection from which 
we shall construct a model for the interpretation of silence.
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10.2 Richard Bernstein and the Agreement Theory of Truth:
The agreement theory o f truth is central to Richard Bernstein's book Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis1. Bernstein 
claims that the world is suffering from a malaise which he calls the Cartesian 
Anxiety. This anxiety is based on the Cartesian need for objective foundations 
of rationality and judgement of right and wrong. Attempts to address this 
need, and critiques of these attempts, have created a dichotomy which consists 
of two extreme concepts on what Bernstein considers is a single continuum: 
the extremes of objectivism and relativism. In order to ease the anxiety that 
has overtaken us, Bernstein suggests we must find an alternative to the two 
extremes. Neither extreme has successfully solved the problems that weaken 
Cartesian foundationalism nor presented a suitable alternative. Hence 
Bernstein suggests an alternative that lies beyond the dichotomy of 
objectivism and relativism, somewhere in between.
The alternative to the dichotomy which is the seat of the problems of 
Cartesian-influenced modernity (not just in philosophy), is to be found in 
hermeneutics. Bernstein relies on the works of many recent philosophers 
including Kuhn, Geertz, Winch, Habermas, Rorty, and Arendt, but especially 
Gadamer. Gadamer’s epistemological research on hermeneutic understanding 
and interpretation offers a middle road between the stringency of objectivism 
and the chaos of relativism. Gadamer suggests a way for individual subjects 
with very different ontological structures (belief systems, cultures, up­
bringings, prejudices...) and separate identities to communicate with one 
another in meaningful and creative ways. To reiterate, Gadamer says that the 
supposed incommensurability described by relativism is a myth. Differences 
can be overcome by means of dialogue and meaningful communication. This
1 Bernstein, Richard J. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and 
Praxis. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia; 1983.
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requires openness between individuals and a willingness to be aware of one’s 
own prejudices, and if necessary change them when they are wrong. Once 
this kind of communication is established there is no longer any need for 
external foundations, nor any other objectivist tool, to make agreement 
possible. Bernstein echoes Gadamer’s sentiments and claims that we can rely 
on agreement instead objectivism. Agreement can be produced by meaningful 
communication and debate designed to persuade listeners and justify 
propositions on the basis of rational or good argumentation. Strong arguments 
produced in favour of a given idea will persuade others to accept it, if not 
immediately then at least over time. Agreement will involve community, and 
community will create further agreement. In the end, the hermeneutic circle 
will heal the dichotomy by offering an alternative to universally fixed criteria 
for judgement. So, establishing the meaning of a silence, or other object of 
interpretation, can be done through agreement within the dialectic of the 
hermeneutic circle.
10.2.1 Three elements for agreement:
Bernstein’s conclusion arises from the possibility of meaningful 
communication between individuals and persuasion toward agreement. He 
says Cartesian anxiety will be eased by three elements working in 
combination. The three elements are:
Reciprocal or Communal Judgement 
Practical Discourse 
Rational Persuasion
Reciprocal Judgement is best described in Bernstein’s section on 
Hannah Arendt. He says,
“Judgement is not the expression of private feelings or 
idiosyncratic subjective preferences. Neither is it to be 
identified with the type of universality that [Arendt] takes to be
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characteristic of ‘cognitive reason’. Judgement is communal 
and intersubjective; it always implicitly appeals to and requires 
testing against the opinions of other judging persons.”2
Reciprocal judgement requires flexibility and reasoning; it is practical wisdom 
joined with community. Propositions of practical wisdom are discussed 
within a community and agreed upon. Thus, consensus grows from those 
propositions which are most plausibly argued.
Bernstein suggests that reciprocal judgement emerges from the other 
two parts of the trio: practical discourse and rational persuasion. The three 
are, therefore, inextricably intertwined. You cannot have reciprocal 
judgement without practical discourse about the proposition; and the eventual 
agreement relies on rational persuasion to make it plausible. The discourse 
makes the proposition clear; the persuasion creates the catalyst for agreement. 
Finally, the judgement evolves from all of this.
At this point, Bernstein’s argument becomes political3. He says there 
must be established a political community that lives by the three elements, and 
in which all citizens would be equal and free to participate in the agreement 
procedure. Bernstein cites Habermas in saying there is a strong inherent need 
in human nature to create and rely upon these three elements, but this is 
frustrated by the lack of the correct kind of community to support and 
encourage their use. We yearn for it and turn toward it with every linguistic 
effort, every attempt at mutual understanding.
“Habermas shows how deeply embedded the claim to 
communicative reason is in our everyday forms of social life 
and reproduction, how it develops a stubbornly transcending 
power even when it is violated and silenced again and again.”4
2 Bernstein, pg: 219.
3 Bernstein, pg: 230.
4 Bernstein, pg: 228.
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An ideal community based on the three elements represents an end to 
“distorted communication”. Distorted perhaps by not adhering to the rules of 
hermeneutic understanding outlined by Gadamer. The secret to effective 
communication is persuasion coupled with undistorted communication; each 
of these ideas is drawn from Kuhn and Gadamer.
Bernstein uses Kuhn’s explanation of the process of scientific 
revolution5 to explain how persuasion and agreement occur. Far from being 
limited to the scientific context, Bernstein claims that Kuhn’s model of 
revolution can extend to any situation where a community makes changes to 
the accepted ideologies and paradigms of their time. Essentially, new ideas 
help to break down and change old paradigms until a shift occurs and the 
paradigm is exchanged for one which better suits the new ideas. The world 
view shifts to a new view which is described as incommensurable with the old 
one(s); but this incommensurability does not have to imply complete 
exclusivity between the rationales of the different paradigms. Instead it 
includes some overlap which makes communication and even understanding 
possible between world views. Thus, Newtonian physics can be understood 
within the context of the Einsteinian paradigm. The actual shift implies this 
kind of mutual comprehension. Hence, the person trying to persuade a 
colleague to concept paradigm A, that some proposition under paradigm B is 
true, must be able to argue in a manner which can be understood by both 
paradigms. Ultimately, the transferral is made on the basis of persuasion and a 
leap of faith from one paradigm to the next, but the leap requires the 
momentum of persuasive argument. Sound, strong arguments are made in 
favour of one position and the leap is made because the arguments hold 
enough persuasive force to encourage the transferral -  but the arguments need 
to be understood before they can be persuasive. However, this is a general
5 Kuhn, Thomas S.: The Structure o f Scientific Revolution, 2nd ed. International
Encyclopaedia of Unified Science: Foundations of the Unitv of Science: vol. 2, no. 2. 
University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 111.; 1970.
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political theory. For it to be applicable to silence, it must be relevant to 
interpersonal communication as well. In order to show how this is possible on 
a personal individual basis Bernstein relies on Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
Gadamer's hermeneutics is the explanation for the mutual- 
comprehensibility between persons from different paradigm perspectives, such 
as between Einsteinian and Newtonian physicists. Bernstein stresses the 
importance of two factors from Gadamer’s theory as it pertains to mutual 
understanding: 1) the appreciation of tradition and prejudice, and 2) openness 
or receptiveness to new ideas. Tradition and prejudice, as we have seen, form 
the personal ontological structure of every individual; this is what Gadamer 
calls our horizons. To recap, our individual horizons consist of two main 
ingredients: influences of the past transferred through language (what
Gadamer refers to as historical consciousness), and the formation of personal 
preferences, dislikes, opinions and beliefs which form individual identity and 
the prejudices of our ontological structures. We are not simply trapped by this 
horizon, we are the horizon, so there is no point in trying to separate ourselves 
from it in order to distinguish objective truth from subjective opinion -  this 
would be impossible. Instead, we have to learn to work with what we have 
and use the horizon to reach interpretative understandings of the world. This 
will be done through openness or receptiveness to new ideas, which is the best 
we can do since we are incapable of separating ourselves from prejudice. 
However, rather than interfering, prejudices have been shown to help us 
understand the world because they provide the anchor with which to ground 
ourselves, and the perspective from which to view the new ideas. 
Nevertheless, sometimes prejudices are wrong or inappropriate for the 
understanding of a given idea. When this happens it is necessary to examine, 
transform or relinquish the old prejudicial beliefs in favour of new ones. 
Openness clearly facilitates this procedure by allowing one to see and 
recognise useful prejudices from useless ones. This makes persuasive
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argumentation a real possibility because it implies people are capable of 
changing their minds, of accepting new ideas while rejecting old ones.
Bernstein’s project with Gadamer’s hermeneutics is to show that it is 
possible to reach agreement between paradigms or horizons. Reaching an 
agreement is facilitated by historical consciousness applied through 
communication. Language is imbued with a plurality of concepts which 
evolve within it through traditional usage, and which are maintained over 
time. Nevertheless, additions can be attached due to the variance of usage 
throughout history. Thus, we can account for agreement between Kuhnian- 
type paradigms by pointing to similarities in the historical bases of the 
language used to express new and old ideas. In other words, the language 
used by a Newtonian physicist is the foundation of the updated language of the 
Einsteinian physicist. They both use more or less the same language 
containing common historical knowledge. The shared language, therefore, 
provides the basis for communication and transferral of new ideas. We see the 
world through our prejudices and express ourselves with the personal 
language that reflects them. Nevertheless, we are open to change through 
debate and can be transformed through persuasive argument. The shared 
information is the catalyst for transformation. This is because the leap of faith 
is less daunting when something familiar is attached to it, viz. traditional 
linguistic tools and personal beliefs. So agreement is possible between 
paradigms because of the presence of shared language.
10.2.2 How agreement halts radical interpretation:
Bernstein’s cure for Cartesian Anxiety is to abandon the search for that 
which is absolute in favour of consensus and agreement through rational 
discussion. It is not necessary for this to extend toward scientific truths, 
although Bernstein will say that it does. For our purposes the agreement 
theory of truth is interesting because it solves the classic interpretative
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problem: In cases where no understanding can be produced without it being 
wholly or partially biased, the notions of persuasion and agreement help 
prevent radical and opportunistic readings. Persuasion requires deliberation 
and dialectic reasoning, which ought to allow for testing toward agreement. 
Thus, a meaning is constructed over time. This is most obvious in artistic 
fields where the meaning of a piece of work develops as critics discuss it and 
observers view it. Further examples can be found in politics where consensus 
building is of obvious necessity; and in science where a ‘fact’ is determined 
through repeated testing until a hypothesis becomes a truth.
In the area of silence, agreement escapes the limitations caused by few 
clues for interpretation, and the tendency toward not noticing the relevance of 
a silence. This occurs as follows. A proper dialectic expects openness on the 
part of the participants so that their prejudices will not be allowed to be 
opportunistic in reaching the understanding, at least not without being 
challenged and transformed if necessary. The challenge and transformation 
ensures interpretations will be carefully reflected upon, and that consideration 
will be given to all participants involved. Once this dialogue is begun, 
persuasive argument will cause transformation of opinions and prejudices, as 
well as of the history and traditions involved, and ultimately an agreement will 
be reached. Gadamer refers to this as reaching an understanding6, which is an 
apt description of how this sort of communication through interpretation 
works. The participants arrive at a common understanding in which the 
prejudices of the interpreter come to comprehend the silent thing-in-itself, as 
object of interpretation, while remaining within the perimeter set up by it. The 
agreement is not just a submission of one party to another but a mutually 
arrived at understanding of the object; therefore a critical perspective is still 
possible. This is especially important for slippery Larundic silence which, 
already in danger of being overlooked as irrelevant, is also in danger of being
6 Wamke, Georgia. Pg: 103.
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misinterpreted by percipients who are unable or unwilling to make the effort 
of remaining within its perimeter. Agreement implies respect for all the 
parties concerned as they discuss and persuade until the understanding has 
been reached.
Prejudices are acceptable aids in the course of understanding and 
communicating through agreement. Which means that communication can 
take place without the need for objectivity, something important for our 
purposes. We are trying to construct a method of interpretation which permits 
communication without needing to eliminate the input of personal prejudice. 
Prejudices are part of us and cannot be eluded or put aside while engaged in 
the sorts of judgements required for understanding silences. These are value 
judgements like ethics and aesthetics, and cannot be dealt with on a purely 
rational basis. However, prejudices provide the basis for recognition of the 
relevance of a Larundic silence. Without them, the Larundic silence will not 
produce the cognitive effect that encourages effort at interpretation and 
understanding. Thus, there must be room for the irrational, the judgmental 
and the prejudiced ,. This is exactly what agreement provides, only not 
without some way of preserving the object from radical readings. To that end, 
the agreement theory of truth uses practical discourse, as described below. 
Which makes it an effective method of constructing interpretations that satisfy 
our requirement that prejudices be maintained.
Practical discourse is necessary in an account of interpretation of 
silence because of the negotiation it entails. Silences are slippery methods of 
communication which deserve the effort of understanding because they can 
yield vast amounts of useful information that cannot or will not be 
communicated any other way. The negotiation implied in agreement restricts 
radical readings and ensures silences are considered carefully before they are 
assigned a final interpretation. Agreement also ensures that the prejudices of 
the interpreter can be afforded a degree of respect in an act of interpretation, so
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that a negotiation takes place in which all perspectives are considered and the 
agreed upon outcome includes aspects from all the members of the 
negotiation. To use the language of ethics, agreement is the fairest way to 
establish an interpretative meaning in which all parties may participate.
An example of this is the silence of an unopened letter which may 
contain the contradiction of a presumed unrequited love or its confirmation. 
Imagine a scenario where a tragic lover bums the letter unopened because its 
silence is more comforting than confirming her suspicions that her love is 
unrequited. The lover cannot know that she has been rejected, but by burning 
the unopened letter she presumes an interpretation which she neither seeks to 
confirm nor contradict. Instead she relies exclusively upon her prejudices to 
interpret what is inside. Hence, by burning the letter she leaves no room for 
the negotiation toward agreement which ideally precedes interpretation and 
could render a suitable meaning to the silence. This melodramatic example 
illustrates the tragedies which can arise when an interpreter does not make 
sufficient effort to construct a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of a 
Larundic silence. Agreement assists construction of non-radical 
interpretations of Larundic silence because it ensures that all participants in the 
dialectic of interpretation are considered to have equal force. This 
consideration permits the participation of the thing-in-itself by ensuring we 
remain faithful to the perimeter its meaning establishes. It also allows the 
interpreter to add to the meaning with the relevant prejudicial information she 
brings to the interpretation. Although, it also ensures that this is not the only 
information considered. Exclusively applying p re ju d ice  leads to 
misunderstanding, as the example of the letter showed.
Agreement can preserve problematic silences from suffering from 
radical or opportunistic interpretations imposed upon them. The relative 
safety which agreement creates for silence eliminates the need for absolute 
certainty. Certainty is then replaced with a dialectic toward understanding.
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This is necessary when interpreting silence because there can be no absolute 
certainty in any rational sense about the realm of communication which 
Wittgenstein said was beyond the rational. “Whereof we cannot speak, thereof 
we must be silent”7 refers to a world distinct from linguistic rationality and 
certainty which entails common understanding through the use of words. 
Larundic silence can communicate and a mutual understanding can be 
reached, but this occurs through agreement rather than through rational 
certitude. And this is significant because it permits silence the freedom and 
flexibility to mean more than one thing, and to go beyond transliteration. To 
stop at a mere transliteration of a silence is to underestimate it because a 
silence can be filled with more thoughts than a word can possess, as we have 
seen. The best understanding of a silence we can hope for is an agreed to 
interpretation of its likely meaning(s). Certitude of the meaning of a silence 
will always elude us. Therefore, using a system of understanding and 
communication which does not require certainty is ideally suited to silence.
We have established that agreement presupposes dialogue and 
negotiation between the participants. An agreement, including practical 
discourse is one where each participant’s content is offered, considered and 
negotiated. This is why it is within the dialectic that precedes agreement that 
radical readings will be intercepted. We will see later on how this element 
works with the those described in previous chapters. Before this, we will 
explore how the effort involved in constructing non-radical readings of a 
silence requires a degree of flexibility, insight and openness, as described 
above. The following section is a discussion of the Aristotelian concept of 
phronesis as it is required for this type of reasoning, and can be applied to 
interpretations of silence.
n
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. C.K. Ogden trans. Routledge 
Press; London England; 1922.
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CHAPTER 11 
PRACTICAL WISDOM OR PHRONESIS
11.1 Introduction:
Many of the theories described above rely on what has been referred to 
as flexibility in reasoning. This idea derives from the notion of phronesis 
discussed by Aristotle1 in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, and from 
Gadamer’s usage of phronesis in connection with understanding. The term 
‘phronesis’ is often translated as practical reasoning or practical wisdom, and 
has arisen in different forms in the above discussion of the works of Gadamer, 
Wittgenstein, Dworkin and Bernstein.
11.1.2 The concept:
The ideal practical aim in Aristotle’s theory of virtue is the pursuit of 
eudaimonia, or the good in human existence. For him eudaimonia meant the 
pursuit of happiness as a principle of temperance rather than hedonistic excess. 
To achieve temperate happiness the virtuous individual must habitually choose 
to apply the principles of virtue in cases where a moral choice is required. The 
ability to successfully apply universal principles of virtue to particular cases, is 
called phronesis. It is concerned with universals as well as particulars, “for it 
is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars.”2 Thus, phronesis can 
be characterised as the application of general rules to individual cases.
1 Aristotle: The Basic Works of Aristotle. Richard McKeon ed. Random House; New York, 
N.Y.; 1941.
2 Aristotle, 1141bl6.
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“But ethics is manifestly not just knowledge of universal 
principles, it is also knowledge of how to apply them correctly 
in particular circumstances in order to achieve eudaimonia.
And this, of course, is where phronesis comes explicitly into 
the picture.”3
Phronesis is “a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to 
the things that are good or bad for man.”4 The definition of the phronomis 
person, then, is one who is able to deliberate well about what makes the good 
life in general5. Careful deliberation allows the phronomis enough flexibility 
to apply first principles of virtue in variable situations, even in difficult cases.
As we can see, phronesis involves a degree of choice. Practical 
wisdom is the capacity to choose with deliberate desire to conform to the 
general principles of virtue.
“the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is 
to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former 
asserts...; ...of the part [of the intellect] which [is] practical and 
intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right 
desire.”6
So the first principles are not blindly submitted to, rather, the phronomoi has 
the rational and deliberate intention to apply them because they generate 
eudaimonia. Deliberate choice using practical reasoning is, therefore, the 
“strongest of all states for resisting following opinion and making mistakes.”7 
Practical reasoning is a freedom to make choices that are appropriate for 
bringing about eudaimonia.
3 Reeve, pg: 2.
4 Aristotle, 1140b5.
5 Aristotle, 1140a24.
6 Aristotle, 1139a27.
7 Aristotle, 1146a3.
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It follows that phronesis is more concerned with means than ends. 
Good action is the end in itself for practical wisdom, “...virtue makes us aim at 
the right mark and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.”8 Thus, 
phronesis is closely associated with praxis, or action, as it is the choice which 
informs right action. It is therefore possible to make errors in practical 
reasoning that do not produce good or right effects. The main advantage tin 
permitting this is that it preserves freedom of will in the phronomoi. 
Phronesis is the ability to choose among first principles in such a way as to 
produce the most virtuous good.
How does one become aware of the first principles in the first place? 
Through nous. Because phronesis is involved in the teleological pursuit of 
eudaimonia, it must also be associated with the more fixed idea of nous. Nous 
provides the person with knowledge of the first principles in order to chose the 
right means to apply them. In order for one to desire the good it may be 
helpful to know what the good is, and this is discovered through nous either by 
experience and deliberation or as an intuitive flash of insight9. Nous is the 
faculty possessed by the virtuous individual to know what the first principles 
of virtue are. Gadamer calls nous “the ‘seeing’ of what is immediately to be 
done”10, and he sees it as containing the information of tradition and history. 
When nous informs phronesis the individual chooses right means on the basis 
of first principles and cannot help but produce the good as a result.
A further natural association for phronesis, then, is understanding. 
Understanding is the faculty by which we judge, and practical reasoning 
requires judgement of a particular situation in order to discern the correct 
means for applying first principles to it. To judge what is true is to understand
8 Aristotle, 1144a8.
O Q
Reeve, pg. 62, refers to a notion of nous as insight after experience and deliberation; though 
the term is often more closely associated with intuitive insight of a priori principles.
10 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method", Garrett Barden & John Cumming eds. 
Crossroad Publishing Co., New York, N.Y. 1985; pg: 287.
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it; thus, to understand a thing is, at least in part, to see how it fits with the 
ideals of virtue11. Once the thing is understood, phronesis can discern the 
right means for achieving its desired end in keeping with the first principles of 
virtue.
Phronesis naturally entails a degree of flexibility in the context of 
application. To apply the universal first principles to particular cases requires 
that the phronomoi be capable of understanding and judging which principles 
apply where, and how to best make this application. There are no rules to 
follow as phronesis is not techne, practical reasoning which is neither an art 
nor science. There is no guaranteed method of applying the first principles. 
Also, each particular case is unique, if even just to a minor degree, so no 
general rules could be constructed which would fit all cases. So there are 
universal principles, but no universal method of exercising them. As Gadamer 
puts it,
“What is r ig h t... cannot be fully determined independently of 
the situation that requires a right action from me, whereas the 
eidos of what a craftsman desires to make is fully determined 
by the use for which it is intended.”12
First principles must be general in order to be applicable to many different 
cases. This is why phronesis needs to be informed by understanding and 
judgement regarding how to apply the first principles in any given situation. 
Through the act of understanding, the first principles are flexibly applied to 
particulars. But this occurs only after deliberation and practical reasoning 
about how this ought to be done. This is the process of phronesis.
11 Aristotle, 1143a5.
12 Truth and Method, pg: 283.
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11.2 How Phronesis Applies to Interpretations;
Phronesis is characterised by its requirement of deliberation on the part 
of the one attempting to employ it. It is therefore sensibly associated with 
dialectical reasoning of the sort we have used to describe persuasion toward 
agreement13. The dialectic toward agreement entails rational argument 
designed to persuade and create understanding. This means that facts and 
information are coupled with prejudices in order to discover or construct 
meaning in a creative manner. Practical reasoning is useful for this because it 
encourages one to find new ways to approach difficult problems. Which is 
why it is useful that phronesis is more concerned with means than it is with 
ends14. Its emphasis is on seeking new ways of understanding the world to 
assist us where it is difficult to know how to act in a particular situation. It
creates novel modes of action, or praxis. Thus, it is a method rather than a 
solution. Bernstein describes this kind of reasoning as,
“a form of reasoning that is concerned with choice and involves 
deliberation. It deals with that which is variable and about 
which there can be differing opinions (doxai). It is a type of 
reasoning in which there is a meditation between general 
principles and a concrete particular situation that requires choice 
and decision. In forming such a judgement there are no 
determinate technical rules by which a particular can simply be 
subsumed under that which is general and universal.”15
Preservation of general principles requires flexibility in their usage. Flexible 
application of the rules suggested by these principles helps us deal with 
situations where universals do not easily apply to particulars. This directs us 
to solutions which cannot be found by simple rule application.
13 Bernstein, pg: 146.
14 Bernstein, pg: 147.
15 Bernstein, pg: 54.
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The flexibility of practical reasoning is an excellent resource in 
interpretative efforts of aesthetic or ethical ideas. It also applies to any non- 
rational ideas of the sort Wittgenstein said silences are. This is because 
phronesis embodies the flexibility to use what is at hand in order to construct 
interpretations with creativity. This means that one’s prejudicial information 
is not excluded from the act of interpretation. Rather, it aids one to go beyond 
the standard rules for understanding, and to create interpretative meanings 
where the ordinary rules simply do not apply. There are no set rules to follow, 
so anything goes.
Nevertheless, this still does not give the interpreter free reign to 
construct radical interpretations. In Gadamer, phronesis is the ability to 
engage in “free play within set limits”16. He says that the information used to 
construct interpretations is not irrelevant information17, rather it provides the 
basis for learning new ideas. To ensure against opportunism then, phronesis 
requires an ability to discern the fit of information used in constructing an 
interpretation, and the fit of the interpretation itself. This means recognising 
relevance in the second sense we have defined it, as relevance to the object of 
interpretation. Thus, the flexibility of phronesis is tempered with the need for 
relevance, which is the key for preventing radical readings.
Interpreting the meaning of a silence depends on phronesis because 
silences are not readily dealt with under ordinary rules for interpretation. They 
require far greater effort and negotiation to be understood than words do, even 
when the words are indirect, such as when used as metaphors (and in these 
cases the meaning of the words is arguably silent, as was pointed out). Words 
always establish fairly clear perimeters about their meanings; silences usually 
only establish vague perimeters, when they establish them at all. So the 
flexibility of practical reasoning is required in face of any silence, whereas
16 Truth and Method, pg: 285.
17 Truth and Method, pg: 279.
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verbal utterances can be understood more readily through general application 
of the definitions and rules of language. We do acknowledge the type of 
Larundic silence which one might say ‘speaks louder than words’, and this is 
very true in some cases, as we have seen. But even these very clear, loud 
Larundic silences fall prey to misunderstandings more easily than do words. 
This is because they are more readily overlooked or misinterpreted even when 
they are acknowledged. Therefore, Larundic silences rely on flexible 
application of rules after deliberation. In other words, they rely on phronesis.
Phronesis is a necessary part of this proposed theory of the 
interpretation of silence because it permits flexibility in the use of rules for 
understanding ordinary acts of communication. We cannot easily apply the 
rules of language to silence because the rules of language do not fit instances 
of silence, even obvious communicative Larundic silences. Definitions cannot 
be applied to silences either, as a dictionary of silences would lack the 
ostensive referential element dictionaries use to point out which word is being 
defined. There would be only blank space where the word itself would be, 
turning the whole thing into a list of different emptinesses or 
absence/presences.
So the rules for language cannot be applied to silent utterances unless 
we use the rules with the flexibility which permits them to be used in this way. 
In order to do this the interpreter must be prepared to use practical reasoning, 
and apply the rules of language to something which is not linguistic or 
grammatical in the ordinary sense. Nevertheless, application of the rules of 
language to Larundic silence does bear fruit, as we have already seen. 
Phronesis is therefore ideal in difficult cases where rule application must be 
performed creatively, or when rules must be set aside altogether. Dworkin and 
Gadamer each speak of this sort of phronesis in law, where judges confronted 
with difficult cases find it necessary to apply laws in ways that may not have 
originally been intended, or if applying a law would produce an unjust
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outcome. Phronesis here provides the basis for exploring ways to better 
protect the universal principles of the justice system, as we have seen in the 
passage on Dworkin above. And it is in a similar sense that phronesis will 
help in the processing of silent communication.
Phronesis teaches us to be creative within restrictions, and in the case 
of silence we want to be able to do exactly that. We must be creative when 
interpreting silence to the extent that we must seek new ways of understanding 
that do not rely on words. However, our creativity ought not to be boundless 
where Larundic silences are concerned. Larundic silence restricts possible 
interpretations by offering its own meaning to be interpreted. A successful act 
of communication through Larundic silence will be one that conforms to the 
boundaries set by the Larundic silence to a great degree. So, Larundic silence 
requires finite creativity for interpretation, and this is much like phronesis.
This final element is important to the model because of the way it both 
limits and permits creativity in interpretation. Phronesis restricts creativity by 
application of specified rules which restrict the percipient. Its creativity is 
bound by principles which set up restrictions for the interpreter. On the other 
hand, phronesis also introduces creativity to the act. For, whereas the other 
elements of the model are prescriptive, this final element reminds us of the 
limited value of prescriptions and encourages a degree of flexibility in their 
application.
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CHAPTER 12
DRAWING THE THREADS TOGETHER IN SILENCE:
12.1 Summary of Part II:
We have examined many different elements in this part of the thesis. It 
is now necessary to draw the various threads together into a single theory. It is 
with this in mind that the model for constructing satisfactory interpretations of 
silence will be assembled, using these many elements. The most significant 
elements appropriated for this model ought to come together to form a theory 
of interpretation which permits the following details: 1) It must allow for a 
kind of dialectical process between the percipient and the silence or silent 
utterer that, 2) precipitates a relevant understanding of the silence. 3) The 
understanding must be agreed upon between them, and 4) must satisfy the 
integrity of the silence as object of interpretation while 5) respecting the 
interpretative elements brought to the act by the percipient. In other words, 
the dialectic will permit an agreed upon interpretation which respects all 
players: the utterer, the interpreter and the silence itself. This will require 
flexibility in the application of the general elements of the theory in order to 
accommodate individuality. Nevertheless, some guidelines will need to be 
rigid enough to ensure that the perimeter afforded by the object of 
interpretation is not breached. To accomplish this the interpreter must be open 
to recognising the relevance of the silence and ensure that the interpretation 
fits in the context of the best, most charitable understanding of the silence. 
This will require the interpreter to be flexible when applying the model of 
interpretation, encouraging the play of practical wisdom (phronesis) to prevent
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rigidity and prejudice from obscuring the relevance of the interpretation. It 
will also require effort on the part of the interpreter to keep opportunistic or 
lazy interpretations at bay. This, in a nutshell, is the model for interpretation 
of silence which will be argued for in the rest of this thesis.
12.1.1 A summary o f the problem:
It is clear that there are inherent difficulties in any attempt at 
understanding through interpretation, and this is especially true for silence 
because it is slippery. These difficulties notwithstanding, silences must rely 
on interpretation in order to be understood. As a result, we are left with 
having to rely on a problematic medium of understanding in order to make 
communication through silences a possibility. It is because of this that we 
must make an attempt to construct a model for interpreting silence which 
responds to its slipperiness and protects it against lazy, radical or opportunistic 
readings. The restrictions which the model applies to interpretative acts will 
have to accommodate the various elements discussed in the preceding 
chapters, and be sensitive to the limitations of interpretation in general. It is 
suggested, then, that the model be primarily a set of principles which can be 
applied to particular silences but which can be used flexibly or not at all if 
need be. Thus, we outline a set of principles for the interpretation of silence 
which can be applied through practical reasoning and which helps prevent 
radical readings and misunderstandings of silence.
We have already suggested that rules for interpreting Harpocratic 
silences are not likely to be necessary as such silences offer no limitations to 
the percipient, thus allowing free creative interpretation to blossom. A vacant 
silence is like the tabula rasa upon which the percipient may apply any 
understanding. It permits imaginative use of prejudices , encyclopaedic 
knowledge and even the external forces which serve as checks to freedom in 
communicative Larundic silences. There are no restrictions to Harpocratic
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silences except the ones the percipient brings to them. Thus, it is a silence of 
imagination which can be constructive in the way Descartes silence was for 
him. The only prescriptive note to attach to the interpretation of a Harpocratic 
silence is to notice this silence and recognise it, not with dread, but with the 
courage to be creative. Its emptiness is fathomless, but unlike the existential 
abyss, it does not have to swallow one up. Rather we can impose meaning 
upon it and place it under our own control. This creativity in the face of the 
mystery of Harpocratic silence is exemplified in the creative reaction humans 
have toward the ultimate silence of death. In order to make sense of death we 
apply meaning to it, either in the form of a possible after-life, or in the 
meaning the living give it: 'it was for the best, her suffering has ended and she 
is in a better place now.'
The problem, as mentioned throughout the thesis, arises when 
Larundic silences are mistaken for Harpocratic silences. In such cases, the 
percipient mistakes a full silence for an empty one and applies radical readings 
to the silence which do not respect the limits the Larundic silence imposes. It 
is obvious how such mistakes can be made. If Sperber and Wilson are right 
about the natural desire not to make too great an effort at understanding an 
utterance, then silences which do little to call attention to themselves will be 
easily ignored or go unnoticed altogether. Our natural tendency to avoid the 
effort will obscure the presence of the silence. In addition, silences that make 
their meaningful presences known may still suffer because their meanings are 
not obvious and little effort is made to interpret them faithfully. Treating a 
Larundic silence as though it were Harpocratic, negates the meaning it brings 
with it and escapes the perimeter within which an interpretation might be said 
to be accurate or respectful.
On the other hand, the informative claim made by the Larundic silence 
must be interpreted to be understood and interpretation entails some input 
from the interpreter. As a result, the limits of the meaning the silence brings
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with it must also admit to some change by the imposition of the interpreter’ 
prejudices, and traditional and historical beliefs which accompany the 
interpretative act. This requires adequate consideration of all the claims 
brought to the interpretation of the silence which will be achieved through 
dialectic and agreement.
All of the participants involved in the act of interpretation bring 
information and truth claims with them, all of which interact with one another 
in a dialectic of argumentation, persuasion and eventual agreement. The 
debate includes postulations of hypotheses which are accepted or rejected on 
the basis of implicit persuasive dialogue. This is usually accomplished silently 
and can be instantaneous where there is no struggle to create an adequate 
interpretation. Remember that an adequate interpretation will be one which 
accommodates both the meaning put forth by the silence and the information 
the interpreter brings with her. None of the elements are given priority over 
the others; there must be a give and take, a to-and-fro, which satisfies all 
participants concerned. Thus, the interpretation will consist of a transformed 
synthesis of the information brought by the percipient and by the object of 
interpretation.
The mechanisms considered in this thesis are numerous. They are the 
checks against external forces of history and tradition; the significance of 
considering context and remaining within the limits the context helps set up; 
the importance of viewing the object in its best light in order to produce an 
interpretation which fits and is relevant; and the agreement founded on 
persuasive dialectics and consensus. All of these mechanisms require 
flexibility and practical reasoning from the interpreter to ensure that only 
relevant information is considered in the act of interpreting a silence. Each of 
the elements will be employed in the interpretative act in the ways described 
below.
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Context:
Context serves as an excellent mechanism for avoiding 
misunderstandings in the interpretation of silence. Awareness of context is 
one of the methods of locating information which surrounds a given silence, 
and which will help make it less slippery. If the silence itself does not speak, 
its surroundings will. Thus, the percipient may consider the information 
which accompanies the silence such as who or what produced it, when it was 
produced, what initiated the silence, what, if any, gestures or feelings are 
associated with it, and so on. The context is instrumental in defining the 
perimeter within which the meaning of the silence resides. Interpretations that 
remain within the perimeter established by the contextual information are 
more likely to be accurate because they consider the informative claims 
associated with the silence. Therefore, once established, the perimeter 
facilitates creation of an interpretation which is accurate because it is relevant 
to the silence. A good example of a silence understood through its context is 
the silence of the patient in Michael Ondaatje’s The English Patient*, where 
the English Patient is silent about his identity until Caravaggio detects it 
through the information he does give and other information which Caravaggio 
possesses. Here we plainly see how contextual information mixes with 
information already in one’s possession (see prejudice) to construct an 
interpretation and clarify the perimeter within which the interpretation must 
remain. Such detective work is what is required of the percipient of a silence 
in order to understand its meaning.
1 Ondaatje, Michael: The English Patient. Vintage Books, Random House Publishing; 
Toronto, Ont.; 1992.
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Prejudice:
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is favoured as an interpretative 
model for silence because it contains many of the elements required for 
constructing safe interpretations, and can accommodate those which it does 
not already contain. Primary among the pertinent aspects of Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics, for our purposes, is his acceptance of prejudice 
and his rejection of the notion that understanding can happen without 
prejudice. The percipient brings information to the act of interpretation. The 
information she brings is composed of her personal prejudices, as well as the 
history and tradition inherent in her language. These will necessarily play an 
important role in an interpretation, and because they are part of her identity 
they cannot be put aside nor done without. It is this ontological baggage 
which permits the percipient to identify the presence of a meaningful silence 
in the first place. As we have seen, it is part of the nature of understanding 
that the relevance of an utterance must be recognised before it can be 
interpreted; and silences are especially reliant upon this because they are easily 
ignored or misidentified as meaningless. The way we notice relevance is by 
connecting it to knowledge we already possess, hence we cannot avoid the 
necessity of prejudice as it is exactly that part of our being which contains 
knowledge. Prejudice is the hook which catches hold of new ideas and 
permits understanding.
The experiences that constitute prejudice and traditional expectations 
provide the information by which to recognise that a Larundic silence has a 
relevant meaning. This is accomplished as follows. We are used to the idea 
that silences can communicate since we traditionally use them to do so, and 
these traditional expectations are supported by regular experience of 
successful communication through silence. So it is immediately clear that 
prejudices and traditions about silence facilitate communication through it and 
interpretation of it. Without these preconceived notions that silence can
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communicate we would not notice the relevance of any silence and would 
therefore fail to construct interpretations of them. Thus, prejudice and 
tradition are necessary aspects of communication through silence.
Having argued in favour of the application of prejudicial knowledge to 
the act of interpretation, it is necessary to consider the dangers of allowing it 
too much freedom in the act of interpretation. It has already been shown how 
misunderstandings arise when a Larundic silence is mistaken for a Harpocratic 
silence, and the same problem holds when a Larundic silence is simply 
misinterpreted. The source of this problem is the same on both counts; namely 
that the individual percipient’s prejudices interfere with the construction of an 
appropriate interpretation of the object. This difficulty is especially common 
with regard to silence, because silences offer few clues to facilitate 
interpretation and preserve them from false application of prejudices. As a 
result, it is easy to create radical or opportunistic interpretations of silences, 
and silences can do little to stop these from occurring because of their inherent 
slipperiness; hence, they offer very little evidence to indicate that the 
interpretation is wrong. It follows then that silences, perhaps more than other 
acts of communication, must rely upon a mechanism of protection against 
radical and opportunistic interpretations.
Tradition and History:
Gadamer introduced the elements of history and tradition as tempering 
measures to the possible domination by prejudice. These external forces 
become internal to the individual through language use and acquisition. Once 
internalised they prevent prejudice from imposing personal, by inserting 
traditional and historical attitudes and beliefs into the dialectic of 
understanding. Hermeneutic interpretation of a silence involves the fusion of 
horizons between the interpreter and the silence as object of interpretation. 
The interpreter is prevented from simply imposing her own prejudicial beliefs
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upon the object by the fact that the interpretation must accommodate and fit 
with the information that tradition and history provide through language. 
Thus, any interpretation must achieve a certain degree of fit with the external 
events of history and traditions, even if the fit is designed to show where 
traditional or historical interpretations are wrong. Furthermore, one might 
interpret a traditional or historical belief as inappropriate because it 
perpetuates an abuse. It would follow that the traditions ought to be 
transformed, as history shows they can be. Any transformation would then 
vindicate the interpretation which acknowledges the inappropriateness of a 
tradition, and does not accept it. The change would show how traditions can 
be transformed by new attitudes. All the participants involved in the 
interpretation engage in a dialectic toward a synthesis of the beliefs of all 
those involved. The silence communicates something that the percipient 
interprets in a way which contradicts tradition and history; tradition and 
history try to persuade the interpreter to change the interpretation to fit them; 
but the silence will not be subsumed under traditional and historical attitudes 
without compromising the integrity of the meaning it bears; and the 
interpreter, recognising all of this, rejects custom and chooses instead to build 
an interpretation which better fits the silent object of the interpretation.
The same description can be used to show that prejudice  can be 
persuaded to change its interpretation to conform with tradition and history. 
This happens frequently when students change their convictions about a 
certain subject after researching it and discovering that the historical 
information tells a different story.
Fit, Best Light, and Relevance:
Remaining within the perimeter established by the contextual 
information surrounding a silence is essentially a request for relevance in the 
interpretation. An interpretation is less likely to be radical or opportunistic if
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there is clear and definite fit between it and the object of interpretation. 
Silences can therefore be preserved from misinterpretations if the interpreter 
ensures that the ideas included in the interpretation are ideas which do not 
contradict the object or show it to be internally inconsistent. This means 
making the effort to see the object in its best light before developing a critique 
of it. For example, we do better to interpret the silence of a student as 
thoughtfulness rather than stupidity, as this puts the silence in its best light and 
best fits the model of educating instead of humiliating. This way of thinking 
is another safety mechanism against free reign of prejudice interfering with the 
interpretation. If consideration is given to the degree to which the 
interpretative effort fits with the context and meaning of the silence, and an 
effort is made to see the silence in its best light as coherent and meaningful, 
then prejudices will be forced to confront contradictions which prevent it from 
making opportunistic readings. Faced with contradictions, percipients must 
reconsider their understandings and attempt to reconcile themselves with the 
information provided within the perimeter of the context of the silence.
Agreement and openness:
It is not necessary for an interpretation to be the absolute and 
immutable truth about the silence. As Wittgenstein pointed out, the standards 
of absolute truth established by the rationality of scientific understanding 
cannot hold in matters which are beyond language and are non-rational. 
Instead of absolute truth, then, we are more concerned with an interpretation 
which fits with the various elements involved in the interpretation, and this is 
where agreement plays a significant role. It is within an act of achieving 
agreement that prejudice, tradition, history and the silence being interpreted 
put forth claims about the meaning of the silence and where these claims are 
debated and synthesised.
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Reaching an agreement about a silence requires a dialectic of the 
assertions regarding its meaning, the critiques of the assertions and the 
persuasions, in an attempt to come to a mutual understanding among all 
concerned. No one claim need be settled upon, rather the optimal outcome is 
one which considers all claims equally and forms a synthesis which includes 
aspects of all the claimants combined. Agreement requires openness on the 
part of each of the participants to seeing each other’s claims fully and in their 
best light, so that the participants emerge from the dialectic transformed by 
what they have learned from one another. The end product of the dialectic is 
an agreement about the interpretation which has considered and included all 
the claims on offer.
Phronesis:
The elements described above are the many mechanisms which an 
interpreter can use to help produce the best possible understanding of a 
silence. This means constructing an interpretation which respects both the 
object and the interpreter, while ensuring that the interpreter does not mistake 
her own personal prejudicial reading for the best possible reading of the 
silence. To accomplish a good interpretation, then, is a difficult task that 
requires juggling of all the aspects described and discerning which ones ought 
to apply where and in what ways. In order to perform what on the surface 
appears to be a Herculean task, the percipient must be able to apply the general 
principles described above to particular cases where a silence needs 
interpretation. And to achieve this the interpreter must use phronesis or 
practical reasoning. Practical reasoning will direct the interpreter to the best 
means of achieving the desired goal which is to create the best possible 
interpretation of the silence. Phronesis permits the flexibility to use the 
suggested rules for interpreting silence in what ever way may be necessary for 
the given case of silent communication. Thus, the mechanisms can be played
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with until an interpretation is reached which can be agreed upon by all the 
members concerned.
Radical and opportunistic interpretations of silence can be avoided, 
provided that all the above mechanisms are adhered to, to some degree. There 
will probably always be problems with constructing interpretations of silences 
because their slipperiness cannot be helped. However, as we have seen in the 
first chapter, its inherent ambiguity and vagueness is what makes silence a 
useful tool for communicating or not communicating as the case may be.
12.2 The Case of Sir Thomas More’s Silence:
To illustrate how the model for interpreting silence works it will be 
applied to the example that inspired it. This is the silence of the Sir Thomas 
More character in Robert Bolt’s play A Man fo r  All Seasons. The play 
involves More’s trial after he was arrested for treason against King Henry 
VIII. More would not publicly support the King's appropriation of the title of 
Head of the Church in England. He did not support the King’s choice because 
he believed the King's reason for usurping the position was immoral; namely 
that Henry wanted to divorce his wife Katherine after she had been unable to 
produce an heir. But because More was aware of the punishment for 
denouncing the King, and because he did not want to sacrifice the integrity of 
his religious convictions, he chose to remain silent on the issue. This was of 
little help. He was arrested anyway. The trial focuses primarily on the nature 
of More’s silence. In the play, Robert Bolt shows some of the frustration 
associated with interpreting and distinguishing between Harpocratic and 
Larundic silences. In this scene, Thomas Cromwell offers a fair description of 
the former:
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“But, Gentlemen of the Jury, there are many kinds of 
silence. Consider first the silence of a man when he is 
dead. Let us say we go into the room where he is 
lying; and let us say it is the dead of night -  there’s 
nothing like darkness for sharpening the ear; and we 
listen. What do we hear? Nothing. This is silence, 
pure and simple.”2
This is Harpocratic silence: empty, passive, and meaningless. As we have 
seen, interpreting this kind of silence is futile, because it is empty. The most it 
can do is make itself known to us so that we may use it creatively. On its own 
it means nothing, and it would be wrong to read any more into it.
Later on in the same speech Cromwell describes two examples of 
Larundic silence. He claims they are both meaningful, and his argument 
hinges on the fact that there exists a very subtle similarity between them.
“Suppose I were to draw a dagger from my sleeve and make to 
kill the prisoner with it, and suppose their lordships there, 
instead of crying out for me to stop or crying out for help to 
stop me, maintained their silence. That would betoken! It 
would betoken a willingness that I should do it, and under the 
law they would be guilty with me. So silence can, according to 
some circumstances, speak. Consider, now, the circumstances 
of the prisoner’s silence. The oath was put to good and faithful 
subjects up and down the country and they had declared His 
Grace’s Title to be just and good. And when it came to the 
prisoner he refused. He calls this silence. Yet is there a man in 
this court, is there a man in this country, who does not know Sir 
Thomas More’s opinion of this title? Of course not! But how 
can that be? Because this silence betokened -  nay this silence 
was - not silence at all, but most eloquent denial.”3
Cromwell shows what he believes to be a similarity between the 
hypothetical situation of the judges not preventing an action, and the real case 
of More refusing to take an oath supporting the king’s claim. The similarity is 
that both silences are communicative, what we call Larundic silences, and he 
is right about this. However, there is a crucial discrepancy in the way he
Bolt, Robert; A Man for All Seasons; Bellhaven House, Toronto, Ont.; 1963: pg: 91.
3 Bolt, pg: 91.
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applies his belief to the two cases. The first case is an act of omission, easily 
interpreted as an acceptance by the judges. They do nothing to stop the 
murder, hence they are likely to have no objection to it. However, if the 
judges’ silence is interpreted as acceptance, then it is only consistent to 
interpret Sir Thomas’ silence the same way. But, Cromwell does not do this. 
Instead he says the judges’ silence is an act of assent, whereas More’s is an act 
of dissent, even though More claimed otherwise. So, in fact, Cromwell was 
applying his understanding of Larundic silence in two different ways, a 
discrepancy that had bitter consequences for More.
More’s defence rested on this point, and on the then current rule for 
interpretation of silence in the law. He says:
“The maxim of the law is: ‘Silence Gives Consent’. If
therefore, you wish to construe what my silence ‘betokened’, 
you must construe that I consented, not that I denied.”4
Cromwell applied this rule to the judges, but did not support it in 
More’s case. So Cromwell’s interpretative method was inconsistent and 
opportunistic in order to make his case against More. By going beyond the 
then recognised rules for interpreting silence Cromwell illustrates the 
hardships associated with doing so, and the outcome of the trial shows how 
dangerous these can be. At the end of the play, one feels Sir Thomas More 
was unjustly treated by Cromwell’s claim to be able to interpret More’s 
silence. Moreover, More was not the only one unfairly treated -  the law itself 
was degraded by Cromwell's inconsistent use of an already established rule. 
However, this misunderstanding could have been avoided if the elements of 
the model for interpreting silence had been properly applied.
Cromwell based his confidence in his interpretation on of the 
contextual information he regarded as relevant to the silence. But his choice
4 Bolt, pg: 92.
249
was made at the expense of other relevant contextual information. That is, he 
claimed anyone who knew More’s reputation would agree that More in fact 
did not support the King’s new title, and because this was such common 
knowledge, this refusal to support the King was tantamount to treason. What 
Cromwell did not consider was the self-preservatory aspect of More’s 
position. More was not suicidal in his choice of silence, rather he preferred to 
agree to disagree with the king and not say anything one way or the other. 
The contextual information Cromwell ought to have considered was More’s 
love of life, his love of his wife and daughter and his love for his religion. 
Had Cromwell considered these factors his interpretation would have had to 
be transformed. In its best light, More’s choice was not a self-destructive one, 
but a self-preservatory one. Cromwell did not overlook the significance of 
contextual information, but he did limit the information he paid attention to to 
information that would further his own goals. Examination of context is 
important, but it must be full and it must not be obscured by prejudice. 
Context requires some safety mechanism to protect it from the kind of 
opportunistic distortion Cromwell exercised. Thus, context is a useful but 
insufficient basis for establishing non-radical interpretations of a person’s 
silence.
In this case, Cromwell’s prejudicial information caused him to 
overstep the bounds of More’s silence. But his prejudicial belief was not 
entirely incorrect. He could have employed it in a useful negotiation toward a 
less radical interpretation, as we shall soon see. The beginning of his 
interpretation is inarguably correct. It is clear from contextual information 
about More’s faith and beliefs that he did not accept King Henry’s claim to the 
head of the church. At least to this extent, the prejudicial knowledge 
Cromwell used to make the interpretation was appropriate and had to be 
considered. However, the prejudice that caused him to believe that More was 
being deliberately treasonous and trying to incite wider dissent was incorrect.
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More had no intention of being open about his disagreement, so he could not 
have sparked a revolt. The hooks of Cromwell’s prejudicial knowledge base 
were correct but he was too free with the deductions he drew from them. So 
this particular prejudice of Cromwell’s would have been better left out of the 
interpretative act as it was partly responsible for its failure.
Hence, the primary deficiency of Cromwell’s interpretation is that it 
lacked relevance to More’s silence. This is true only of the second sort of 
relevance, not the first. After all, Cromwell noted the cognitive effect of the 
strain of a silent statement from More. In other words, Cromwell noticed the 
silence, and that it bore communicative content. Thus, he noticed the 
relevance o f More’s Larundic silence. What Cromwell did not consider was 
whether his interpretation of More’s Larundic silence had relevance to the 
meaning asserted by the silence. To a certain extent Cromwell’s interpretation 
did have fit to More’s communicative attempt. He did mean to disagree with 
the King. However, Cromwell did not satisfactorily view the meaning of the 
silence in its best light. If he had done so, his interpretation would have been 
more charitable. As we said above, More’s actual intention was to agree that 
he disagreed with the King’s choice but would do nothing to prevent it. If 
Cromwell had considered More’s silence in its best light, the parameters set up 
by the silent meaning would have directed him to this less provoking 
conclusion and consequently would have saved More’s life. Cromwell's 
interpretation was partially correct, but because More denied the allegation it 
is clear that some contextual information was left out of the interpretation. 
Thus, the conclusion was not entirely relevant to More’s silence, and this 
resulted in tragedy for More.
What was required of Cromwell was that he assume the correct attitude 
of openness toward a less radical understanding of More’s silence. This 
attitude would have permitted negotiation between the participants, and the 
trial would have facilitated the dialectical process toward agreement. An
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agreed interpretation would have permitted proper consideration of More’s 
entire position, and once again would probably have saved his life. Instead, 
Cromwell’s position was allowed to dominate More’s position, and equality of 
consideration was lost. This demonstrates the importance of openness and 
respect for all the participants involved in a communicative act that depends 
on interpretation.
It is interesting to note that Cromwell’s unintentional application of the 
elements for non-radical interpretations is not entirely wrong. This at least 
shows that the elements are to a degree natural and applicable. We do, in fact, 
employ them in regular communicative and interpretative efforts, and they are 
an inherent part of all interpretative efforts. In this case, Cromwell naturally 
turned to both the contextual information and his own prejudicial or 
encyclopaedic knowledge to construct the interpretation. He also noticed the 
relevance o f More’s silence, and noticed that the silence was Larundic rather 
than Harpocratic. So at least these elements appear to be natural and even 
obvious aspects of interpretation of silence.
Nevertheless, Cromwell did not naturally apply all the elements of the 
model. What Cromwell did not do is to engage in the negotiative dialectic that 
included consideration of the meaning extended by More’s silence. The 
dialectic would have generated the agreement upon an interpretation that was 
relevant to More’s silence because it considered its extended claim. If this had 
been admitted, another defence would have been in place to rescue More. But 
Cromwell ignored the possibility of negotiating his position. Perhaps this is 
an indication that the element of dialectic is less natural and more likely to be 
excluded from acts of interpretation. If this is the case, then an argument must 
be made to support the need for the contrivance of making the effort to 
consider the views of all participants. Herein lies the normative aspect of the 
thesis, that the interpreter is responsible for respecting the parameters 
established by the silence. Performing this will ensure that the interpretation
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is relevant to the silence because it establishes fit and views it in its best light. 
This obligation will be a moral obligation because it is more likely to establish 
safe, non-radical readings of silences, and prevent the sorts of 
misunderstandings that lead to dangerous consequences. It was to this end 
that the sections of part II argued for including the varied elements of this 
model for interpreting silence.
The case of Sir Thomas More's Larundic silence illustrates well the 
need for standardised rules for interpreting silence. Silence is too ambiguous 
to be left without such standards because it is open to abuse through 
misinterpretation, neglect and distortion. Had More verbalised his statement, 
it would not have been so easy for Cromwell to reverse More’s expressed 
intent. However, the verbal statement would also have incriminated More. 
He chose instead the safety of silence, for its vagueness. This quality should 
have helped More by making his thoughts partially known, while preserving 
the diplomacy of ambiguity in the process. Instead, rather than being 
appreciated, the vagueness of More’s Larundic silence was abused by 
Cromwell and used to support his own ends. This example demonstrates how 
the ambiguities of silence make it necessary to curb liberties taken by its 
interpreters. Hence the compilation of the elements for establishing non­
radical readings of silence as they appear in this thesis.
12.3 Conclusions:
We have seen how each of the elements can be used to promote non­
radical interpretations of silence. The elements are to be used together to 
ensure that each acts as a defence against the hegemony of any one element 
over the others. The Larundic silence as object of interpretation is respected 
as a bearer of communicative content, while the interpreter is also permitted to
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contribute to the final meaning by using prejudice as the knowledge base from 
which the interpretation can be built. Both the object and the interpreter are 
considered, because while the object’s claim must be respected, prejudice 
permits discrimination on the part of the interpreter. There is room for 
consideration of all ideas brought to the interpretative attempt, and each acts to 
check the other’s truth claims. This occurs in the dialectical process of the 
hermeneutic circle, where the horizons of the participants join to produce a 
conclusion that is agreed to by each, and therefore relevant to the silence. It is 
the interaction of the elements that restricts radical interpretations and 
facilitates communication through Larundic silence.
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CONCLUSION TO PART II
Silence is a far more complex concept than we are generally aware of. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explore the various aspects of silence and 
show how it is possible that silences can communicate information. We have 
seen that silence is a general term which can be categorised and sub-categorised 
into many different senses, from pure Harpocratic silences that are austere or 
mysterious, to meaningful Larundic silences which communicate information 
without words. We have not tried to define silence as its multifacity defies a 
single definition, however we have seen what some of the characteristics of this 
multifacity are.
If we accept that silences can be meaningful in the ways described by 
Grice and Searle, then it is necessary to show how it is possible to know what 
their meanings are and how these can be communicated. Obviously, the method 
of communication through silence is different from that of spoken 
communication, and very often silence requires more effort to be understood. 
Because of this added effort it is likely that silence will be ignored or disdained 
as a tool for communication. It is therefore important to see why silence can be 
as valuable as speech as a method for conveying information. To this end we 
have demonstrated the uses of silence and shown how silence can express what 
is verbally inexpressible. This makes silence a highly valuable aspect of 
communication.
It has also been shown that silence can be a tool for oppression and as 
such is powerful and destructive, as for example when people are silenced 
under political regimes or social control. Self-imposed silence, or self-silencing 
can lead to depression in certain cases while it is useful in other cases (such as
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when doctors silence themselves in order to maintain the Hippocratic role, or 
when an individual refrains from speaking in order to be a generous listener). 
The final aspect of silence, explored in chapter one, showed that silence may be 
part of a continuum with speech. We showed that silences sometimes even 
occur when someone is speaking. For example when one tries to avoid a 
subject by being silent about it, and diverting attention from the silence by 
talking about something else. Silences were also shown to act as spoken 
metaphors do by replacing direct speech when it failed, and by using ambiguity 
in a useful and expressive manner.
However, using silence as a tool for communication can be problematic 
because of its slippery nature. As a result an attempt was made to design a 
series of general mechanisms to act as principles, if not rules, for the 
interpretation of silence. To this end we explored the theories of Gadamer, 
Wittgenstein, Sperber and Wilson, Dworkin and Bernstein in an attempt to 
discover the best mechanisms for constructing sound interpretations of silence, 
which are not compromised by its slipperiness.
The romance between Larunda and Hermes is an excellent analogy for 
the aim of the model for interpreting silence. Ideally, the hermeneutic attempt to 
understand the meaning of a Larundic silence will respect that silence and the 
meaning it contains. The romantic version of the myth of Larunda includes the 
respect which permits this. Nevertheless, the original written version of the 
myth from Ovid is equally telling and applicable for our purposes. In the 
original, Hermes’ passion for Larunda is unrequited and villainous. Hermes 
violates Larunda, taking advantage of her inability to call for help. In the same 
sense, Larundic silences can fall victim to hermeneutic attempts that betray the 
parameters set by the silence. If the model for interpreting silence is not adhered 
to then the radical reading that can result is a violence done to that Larundic 
silence. The model offers a sound hermeneutic for building non-radical 
readings of Larundic silences; as a result there is normative value in giving
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careful consideration to the elements of the model described above.
In an attempt to illustrate some of the information provided in parts I and 
II of the thesis, and to provoke new thoughts, the following sections deal with 
cases of applied silence. The sections on applied silence highlight areas in 
which silence arises in a significant manner, examine the various aspects of 
these silences and the difficulties which arise in their interpretation. This is not 
meant to be an exhaustive list, rather it is just a sampling of significant ways in 
which silence arises in general activity.
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PART III: 
APPLIED SILENCE
CHAPTER 13
MEDICAL SILENCE
13.1 Introduction:
The significance of silence in medical care has generally been restricted 
to the topic of truth-telling and deception in the doctor-patient relationship. 
Though important, these notorious issues rather limit the breadth of the 
relevance of silence to medicine, restricting it to a strictly pejorative meaning. 
On the contrary, silence has been demonstrated to be morally neutral, and in 
general its moral value to be derived from its particular context. Narrowing the 
field from general silence to the particular context of medicine does not make 
valuation any more obvious. Medical silence is no more morally determinate 
than any other applied silence. In other words, even in medicine there will be 
times when silence plays a benevolent role and other times when it has negative 
moral implications. In a medical setting these implications may be serious since 
the silences of patients and care-givers can mean the difference between good 
treatment and bad, and the opportunity to live a truly autonomous life or live in 
the shadow of doubt and surprise. In this section I intend to examine some of 
the reasons why silence is problematic in health care, but also to explore reasons 
for accepting silence on the grounds that it has a function and is inevitable.
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13.2 Where silence is bad:
There are any number of factors which explain why silence can have 
harmful effects in care-giving. Three negative elements of silence which 
sometimes intertwine are: 1) not telling patients the truth about their conditions; 
2) not explaining to patients what is happening during procedures; and 3) 
silencing the humanity of patients and care-givers. The list does not end with 
these three elements, but these three complement one another and are likely to be 
the most common.
13.2.1 Truth-Telling:
The most notorious negative element of silence is where it is associated 
with deception. Dr. Jay Katz in his book The Silent World o f  D octor and Patient 
claims that silence has always been a way for physicians to maintain positions 
of power in the care-giving relationship1. Katz shows how historically silence 
was a necessary tool for continued faith in doctors’ abilities before “medical 
arts” became more scientific. In the past, doctors preserved healing trust by not 
admitting how very new and untried their skills and tools were. A conflict 
existed between doctors admitting their ignorance and the clinical benefits of 
faith in the healer. Thus, began what Katz refers to as the deep-rooted tradition 
of silence in medical care. From here doctors continued their secretiveness by 
justifying it as being in the best interest of the patient, and in the placebo effect 
derived from blind, almost religious faith in medicine. Patients were offered 
little room for autonomous decision. Once doctors were consulted, patients 
were in their hands, losing the freedom to make decisions partly because the 
doctors were silent about information needed to make informed decisions.
1 Katz, Jay M.D. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. New York: The Free Press, a 
Division of MacMillan Inc., 1984.
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As medical science has grown so has the cry for patient autonomy, but 
the degree of complexity of information required for making informed decisions 
has grown as well. Thus, much information is still inaccessible to patients, and 
doctors must act as advocates for patients, helping them make decisions as 
interpreters of the information silent to the lay-person. Nowadays, doctors with 
the best of intentions may provide some information, but they also remain silent 
because they either cannot or will not impart all they know. Sometimes they 
argue that patients will not be able to understand the information, but not all 
information needs to be explained in order for the patient to make an informed 
decision; if it were, the patient would be lumbered with too much detail to make 
a clear decision. Thus, care-givers cannot be expected to explain everything to 
their patients. However, this is different from the situation where they will not 
impart information which the patient could understand. In this case they may 
deceive their patients and could be described as lying for withholding 
information which will affect the patients’ decisions.
Arguments have shown how silence on the part of a physician who has 
full knowledge of a patient’s case but deliberately refuses to disclose it to the 
patient, is in fact lying. Nevertheless, it is not clear that not saying anything at 
all is the opposite of telling the truth - that being silent is the same as lying. 
Surely there is a difference between responding to a question with an overt 
assertion which one believes to be false, and not saying anything at all. This is 
primarily because we tend to have stronger reactions to lying than we do to 
silence, which appears to be a weaker form of deception when it deceives at 
all2. When silence does deceive (whether intentionally or unintentionally), it is 
usually described as an act of omission instead of an outright act of lying. The 
legal argument about acts of omission is that they carry culpability though not to 
the same extent that criminal acts do; thus, the person who commits an immoral
2 Jackson, Jennifer. “Truth telling” in Journal of Medical Ethics, vol.17 #1, 1991; 5-9.
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act (such as lying) is more deserving of punishment than the person who said 
nothing to stop it. Nevertheless, in some cases, the person who does not stop 
the immoral act may still be thought of as guilty though to a lesser extent. 
Remaining silent about a serious crime, omitting to stop it, can implicate one as 
an accomplice to it. Thus, silence, though not as significantly wrong as lying, 
may still carry with it the guilt of an act of omission.
The implications of this argument are that there is a difference between 
remaining silent and lying because silence lacks any overt assertion intended to 
mislead. However, that silence is different from lying does not mean silence 
cannot produce harmful effects. In a recent article, Higgs gives an unsettling 
example of a man who was not informed of his lung cancer until fifteen years 
after it was surgically treated, and then only accidentally, via a concerned 
general practitioner who hoped the man would give up smoking3. Higgs’ 
example demonstrates how the silence of doctors toward their patients can have 
as grave moral relevance as lying has. It is morally disturbing that a person can 
undergo such serious treatment as the removal of a lung, and not know the true 
reason for it nor be allowed to change his habits accordingly. It is clear that the 
patient would have a right to feel that a breach of trust had occurred between 
him and the attending physicians. And, although they may not have deliberately 
lied to the patient, it is equally clear that the doctors’ silence had significant 
moral import to him. This is at least one case where silence as a deliberate act of 
deception did harm trust, even though it was committed with the best of 
intentions. So although the distinction between silence and lying is useful, we 
cannot ignore the fact that even if its deception will not always harm trust it can 
do so some of the time. Thus silence, though different from lying, can still 
damage the doctor-patient relationship, and decrease the patient’s autonomy, 
and in such cases is morally wrong.
Higgs, R.: “Truth-telling, lying and the doctor-patient relationship. In Gillon, R, ed. 
Principles of Health Care Ethics. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1994.
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13.2.2 Telling Risks:
Katz’s reference to the historical mask of silence surrounding fledgling 
medical techniques raises an interesting issue for contemporary medicine: is it 
still acceptable for physicians to avoid telling patients when they are being given 
new or experimental treatments? And, how much information need be 
explained, considering the doctors may not know all there is to know about 
possible side effects and risks.
Recent changes in expectations about information sharing would suggest 
that it is no longer appropriate to withhold any relevant facts from patients, but 
this is tricky for obvious reasons: we do not know what ought to be said, and 
how much to say. Even with the best established treatments it is hard to know 
what information is truly worth sharing, especially given the effort it would take 
to disclose all the information available. Moreover, disclosure can take time and 
great effort, as patients are not all likely to be able to understand everything they 
are told. The time and energy used for this task could possibly be put to greater 
use elsewhere, as these are resources in scarce supply. Of course, this does not 
mean we ought to eliminate all information sharing, but at some point it looks as 
if the balance would tip in favour of not disclosing everything. That leaves us 
with the problem of what information ought to remain silent and what ought to 
be shared.
Say, for example, that in Country A it is required that any patient about 
to undergo surgery be told that the risks of iatrogenic illness and death from 
general anaesthetic are 20%. In Country B these problems are less likely to 
occur (only a 10% chance), so most doctors do not mention the possibility, as 
they feel it would cause patients unnecessary anxiety. This seems reasonable, 
as a 10 in 100 chance is far less troubling than 20 in 100. But what isn’t clear is 
at what point we draw the line. When are the chances so low that remaining 
silent about the risks is considered acceptable? The answer to this is itself
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silent, and this is not an isolated case. There will be many questions which are 
currently unanswerable or to which the answers are better left silent.
If we work with the assumption that knowledge of risks causes 
unnecessary anxiety to patients, then couldn’t we conclude that we ought not to 
disclose the risks under any circumstances? Or does the balance tip at some 
point so that the degree of responsibility entailed in telling is greater than the 
possible anxiety it would create? On the whole, when they are high, remaining 
silent about the risks of a treatment seems irresponsible; whereas not being 
silent about very marginal risks is likely to appear equally irresponsible if it 
causes undue stress to the patient. Where to draw the line between these is 
likely never to become clear; they are extremes on a continuum and do not easily 
admit to borders. However, in the case of experimental or new treatments, 
where the risks are not yet known, the morally correct choice is a bit more 
obvious. Not telling an individual that he or she is about to undergo what is 
essentially an experimental or untried treatment would be a blatant disregard for 
the patient. By not advising him or her that the possibility of harm as a direct 
result of the treatment is unknown, the physician cancels out the patient’s 
freedom to exercise her autonomy and decide for herself if the risk is 
worthwhile. In this case silence is the morally unacceptable choice.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the placebo effect of silence in 
such cases would have three positive results: 1) patients would not suffer from 
unnecessary anxiety due to a lack of faith in an untried treatment; 2) the lack of 
knowledge would make patients better subjects for experimentation, like the 
subjects of a blind experiment; 3) it would alleviate the burden of long 
explanations in a situation where the doctor would have to admit ignorance and 
thus possibly injure the trust between doctor and patient.
The first reason appears morally justifiable at least to the extent that it 
shows concern for the patient’s condition. We have only to recall Katz’s point 
that historically care-givers placed a great deal on the faith of their patients to see
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how important faith is in encouraging successful treatment. At one point in time 
at least, faith in a noble silence was part of good patient care. However, the 
objection to this is clear: faith requires trust between doctor and patient. Such 
trust would be easily destroyed if a patient realised that the doctor had placed her 
in a harmful, or potentially harmful situation without explaining the possibilities 
and giving the patient the opportunity to refuse. It is not clear that this kind of 
paternalism can ever be fully justifiable.
The second point has long been an issue of debate among researchers 
and regulators. It is probably true that information, especially about side- 
effects, would be more clearly and honestly discovered if the subject was 
unaware of the experiment in the first place. They would not be engaged in 
second-guessing, searching for effects, and worrying about every change to 
their bodies or emotions. This would have any number of beneficial 
consequences, not the least of which would be reduced anxiety in the subject, 
and lower costs of research because it would reduce the amount of sifting 
through information. Nevertheless, the reasons against blind experimentation 
of this sort are far too compelling to let the factors weigh in its favour. First, 
not respecting a person’s right to consent or to refuse to involve themselves in 
possibly dangerous situations shows a disrespect for their autonomy and 
personhood. For proof of this we have only to look at the effects of 
experimental drugs such as thalidomide, or the experiments the USA ran of 
LSD on psychiatric patients during the 1950-60’s. Counter-arguments to the 
points in favour of this type of blind experimentation are easy to find. The 
likelihood of spotting side-effects which the patient did not consider relevant 
would be reduced if she or he was not aware of a need to be looking out for 
anything in the first place. Thus, the subject can help the research by looking 
out for changes which may be possible side-effects. But, most importantly, 
disclosure about the experimental nature of a treatment preserves the dignity and 
autonomy of the subjects and saves them from possible victimisation. So,
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where previously in this thesis silence was a property belonging to victims, now 
we see contexts where it is a property of the victimiser.
The third point has already been addressed above. The explanations 
required for full disclosure cannot be avoided even where a treatment has had a 
long and highly regarded history. Patients will always have to be told what 
treatment they are about to undergo, and the side-effects it might have. This is 
unavoidable. Full or at least partial disclosure of the experimental nature of a 
treatment is equally unavoidable if we intend to preserve patients’ freedom to 
make autonomous decisions. This is why silence on the part of physicians is 
morally wrong in situations where possible risks are unknown. Admission of 
ignorance would not cause a breach of trust because the trust between doctor 
and patient can be better preserved by at least this much honesty than by the 
deception of silence. The fact is, that a patient who discovers her doctor has put 
her in a position of unknown risk is less likely to have faith in that doctor than a 
patient to whom the limited knowledge has been explained and the reasons for 
choosing it shared, so that she may make the decision herself.
We can only conclude that silence about the unknown risks of 
experimental treatment would be harmful to the patient. It is beneficent to tell 
the patient that the risks are unknown, and at least non-maleficent to explain that 
it is a new treatment in experimental stages and let patients infer what they may 
from this.
13.2.3 Silencing Humanity:
The attention placed on the relevance of silence in truth-telling and lying 
in health care ethics is certainly useful, but its centrality detracts from other 
ways in which silence is relevant. Silence will have negative effects in the 
context of medicine where the social notion of ‘silencing’ emerges. The idea 
that something can be suppressed or repressed either in ourselves or in others 
entails silencing aspects of voice or self. In the medical context it is primarily
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the humanity of a given situation that is silenced in this way. This occurs in two 
senses as either the silencing of the humanity of the patient through repression 
of their feelings by the coldness of the situation; or alternatively, it can be the 
humanity of the care-givers that is silenced, when they suppress their own 
feelings in order to maintain professional distance and attitude. These two 
negative elements of silence will be best understood with the help of an 
example. Imagine this scenario: a physician is concerned about the possible 
negative effects to her patient should she tell him he has a terminal illness, an 
illness for which he is not yet noticing any symptoms (a silent illness). She 
decides to keep silent about his condition. During an examination she may 
discuss his family and job with the patient, but in order to protect her secret she 
tells him nothing about what she is doing nor why she is doing it. Instead she 
pokes and prods the patient as he becomes confused by the need for the new 
tests. In the end the doctor allows the patient to go on living without knowledge 
of his illness so he may have ‘as normal a life as possible’ until it can no longer 
be ignored.
First of all, when a care-giver is silent about procedure during a medical 
examination it is alienating and trying for the patient. The vulnerability of the 
patient stripped of clothing and normal companionship, in a cold foreign 
environment can be eased by the sharing of information about the procedure. 
This would bring comfort to an event which has sometimes been described as 
an assault because it lacks the mutuality of normal human interaction. Usually 
the kind of contact involved in a medical examination is reserved for personal 
social activity with prior consent; this includes a silent and implicit agreement 
that acts which are uncomfortable can be refused. In a medical examination the 
patient is being performed upon, not with, and the silent contract permits the 
physician to do whatever is necessary to promote health. In order to facilitate 
the care-giver’s work the patient will submit to the examination procedure, but 
only at the expense of a certain amount of dignity, submitting to things they
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would ordinarily not submit to. This is a necessity, as it is intended to benefit 
the patient in the long run, but the way in which it is done makes the difference 
between respect for the patient as a person and treating the patient as an object of 
study. Silence about the procedure silences the humanity of the situation, and 
silences the patient’s human reactions to the procedure.
Treatment within hospitals can be equally alienating and silencing. Once 
a person checks into the hospital, various parts of their individuality and 
personal identity are put aside as they acquire the role of ‘the patient’. This is an 
immediate silencing of their ordinary life role, which some people find 
disconcerting to the point of depression4. Information becomes silent, even 
from the initial care-giver's not explaining how to get to the hospital. Many 
patients express a feeling of uselessness because they are restricted to the role of 
the ill person. This is especially poignant for people with long-term illnesses 
and those being hospitalised due to the need for care as they age. It can be 
suggested that rules for the chronically ill ought to be qualitatively different from 
those for the acutely ill. Patients whose health is not expected to improve are 
encouraged to continue to assert their own identities and be as independent as 
possible; whereas patients who are expected to become well again are urged to 
abandon their normal roles in favour of the sick role, and those who do not are 
considered ‘bad’ or ‘non-compliant’ patients. Thus, our identities are silenced 
in the acute care setting, and once again the situation silences our humanity.
13.2.4 Good and bad patients:
In the past, patients have been labelled as good patients and bad patients 
partly on the basis of their silence. The definition tended to be that good 
patients were quiet patients, but noisy patients who asked many questions and
4 It is interesting to note that those who are known health-care professionals, or who are 
famous for their professional identities are often treated with more deference to their 
individuality than those of us who are merely patients.
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wanted to discuss their illnesses were called bad patients. The patients who felt 
a need to grapple with the illness and the significance it had upon their lives 
were considered difficult and demanding. This is an image of the patient role as 
silent and passive. It stems from the idea of a doctor/patient contract which 
patients enter voluntarily in search of expertise they do not possess. The result 
of the voluntary contract is that the doctor as expert has authoritative control of 
the situation and the patient assumes a passive role in order to benefit from the 
expertise as much as possible. The assets of this kind of relationship are that 
patients do not have to learn or understand what is necessary to improve their 
health; this is particularly useful as medical information is massive and complex 
and not something one would want to have to learn at a time when one felt 
frightened and unwell. It is just common sense that we should listen to those 
we have consulted for their expertise, otherwise we would not have to consult 
them: we call the plumber when our pipes don’t work, consult lawyers when 
we need legal help, and this extends to doctors and other medical professionals 
as well.
However, there has been a change in this attitude over the last ten years 
or so. People wary of being taken advantage of are taking control of situations 
and we are willing to fire our plumbers and even sue our lawyers. In the case 
of a medical issue we are more inclined to want to make our own decisions on 
issues which may have significant effects on our lives. As a result, the 
doctor/patient contract has been transformed into one where the patient has a 
less passive role and the doctor less control. This makes the noisy patient 
appear ‘less bad’ than before, because patients are being expected to make 
important decisions on their own behalf and are encouraged, to a certain extent, 
to ask questions and discuss their health. There is some irony in the possibility 
that in the not too distant future the good and bad roles will be reversed, and the 
passive silent patient will be considered bad for not assuming enough 
responsibility.
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13.2.5 Silencing Care-Giver Humanity:
We have considered the negative effects of silence on the patient, now 
we move to the point of view of the doctor. In the case above, the physician 
has suppressed her humanity to some extent as she chose to remain in the 
Hippocratic role of the ‘healer who does no harm*, believing that the patient’s 
negative reaction or depression would be injurious to him. It can be argued of 
course that humanity is conveyed through the Hippocratic role. However, the 
demands of that role can in fact narrow the physicians’ human reactions and 
have debilitating effects; hence doctors are frequently accused of hiding 
humourlesly behind their white lab-coats. The physician in the above example 
suppresses her natural human reactions because she presumably believes that 
physicians should not show the emotions they would show in personal 
contexts. Suppressing her ‘only-too-human’ reactions in favour of Hippocratic 
benevolence in fact harms the care-giver by preventing her from acting as a 
human being with personal feelings about such situations.
If the doctor feels powerlessness or guilt associated with the incurability 
of the illness, she may further silence her humanity by not admitting these 
feelings to her patient; an effort which, to her credit, would help maintain the 
faith necessary for a working healing relationship. This may be useful because 
the nature of the relationship requires that care-givers do not burden patients 
with their own problems and insecurities. However, silencing human reactions 
can be painful for the care-giver so it may be necessary to create some form of 
release mechanism to protect care-givers from repressing their emotional 
reactions to moving issues. Silencing one’s humanity to a professional level is 
useful; beyond that it can be harmful.
We have seen how remaining silent about a patient’s condition can have 
serious negative consequences and thus should be avoided in order to preserve 
patient autonomy. The notion of the good patient who is silent was shown to be
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out of place in the contemporary medical ideal. Moreover, silence was also 
demonstrated to have adverse affects on the care-giving relationship and on the 
care-giver. It remains to be seen how silence can be beneficial in care-giving.
13.3 W here Silence Is Good:
There can be comfort in silence throughout care. Sometimes it is a more 
eloquent method of communication than words: as in the Larundic silence 
between a dying patient and a palliative care-giver. Sometimes it is a more 
suitable vehicle for healing: such as when a physician respects the Larundic 
silence of a patient who has just received bad news. Many examples show the 
benevolence of silence in care interactions. We shall examine just a few.
13.3.1 Truth-Telling Revisited:
Truth telling is generally justified by the preservation of patient 
autonomy through informed consent. But there is another side to this, for 
example when patients would rather not know all the information about their 
cases. A cancer patient once told me “happiness is not having a diagnosis”, and 
though this may be an extreme position, for some it may be true. Certain 
patients refuse to allow anyone to explain all the details of treatments they will 
undergo. They may feel sufficiently aware of their conditions and not want any 
more information. Such people feel less secure the more they are told and 
prefer to leave the gory details to silence.
There is freedom in not knowing all there is to know about one’s own 
illness. At a certain point it no longer serves the benefit of autonomy to force 
information on patients when they are perfectly capable of functioning without 
it. Here the sensitive care-giver will recognise that patients’ autonomy is 
sometimes better preserved by allowing them to chose not to confront what they
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can do nothing about. Allowing this silence about facts and inevitabilities leaves 
room for thought about more important things such as life plans. It also creates 
space for thought about things that cannot be articulated aloud, like certain 
hopes, fears and resolutions; thus converting a threatening Larundic silence into 
a safe and productive Harpocratic silence. In the palliative setting silence about 
a patient’s health creates room for what may need more attention at that time. 
Such silences are part of the healing process either of one’s health or, in the case 
of the dying patient, of one’s life. So, though it is important to recognise the 
necessity of imparting all relevant knowledge in order to ease the fears of some 
patients, still others will prefer not to know all there is to know about their 
conditions for precisely the same reasons. Both positions can be autonomy- 
preserving in that patients with less knowledge of their cases will have chosen 
not to know and be free to concern themselves with other things.
13.3.2 Silence at the end of life:
Silence plays a significant role in palliative care. It is somewhat 
comforting to imagine a time in one’s life, toward the end of it, where nothing 
more needed to be said, where all the issues had been resolved as far as they 
could be, and a reprieve given from explanation, justification and resolution. 
There is freedom in simply letting things lie as they are without desperately 
seeking to resolve them, knowing that what is imparted wordlessly through a 
Larundic silence is enough to let those around us know that everything is 
alright. I doubt whether it is reasonable for us to expect this kind of peace at the 
ends of our lives, but it does provide something to aspire to; a time where 
silence is enough to uncover the beauty of death as a release from suffering and 
turmoil. In the end there is truly nothing words can adequately express and 
even attempts are imbued with meanings more in what is not said, what is 
inexpressible, than what is said. Silence is enough when there is nothing more
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to say. The silence of dying may be a comfortable prologue to the ultimate 
silence of death, provided those around us will allow the silence to be.
At times fear, loneliness and insecurity do not allow patients to distract 
themselves with short bits of small-talk from care-givers who run in and out of 
their rooms distracted by duties, in such circumstances it may be useful for a 
nurse, for example, to simply sit in silence with the patient, perhaps doing her 
work at the bedside for a while. The quiet company can provide great comfort 
by making the silence less lonely and filling it with human warmth5. There are 
times when care need not or cannot be articulated. It should not be perceived as 
a failure to say nothing at a time when nothing can be said. Instead it is an act 
of generosity to perceive the need for silence and not fill it because of one’s own 
discomfort.
13.3.4 Silence experiences in a role-play setting:
Incidents which occurred at a communication training class of second 
year medical students at the University of Glasgow offer insights into the 
benefits of silence in the doctor/patient relationship. The class was set up as a 
series of mock first meetings between actors as patients and medical students 
playing the new GP’s. The actors had fixed agendas, parts of which were 
hidden and would only be revealed if the doctors discovered and pursued the 
clues offered them. Afterwards each of the doctors was asked for a self- 
evaluation and an MD tutor and communications specialist offered some ideas of 
their own. When all the students had had the opportunity to play the doctor, the 
actors returned and offered their own evaluation of the meeting.
First and most obviously was the importance of silences and pauses as a 
means of allowing patients time to speak. Many of the patients were 
uncommunicative or “were not aware” of their own problems. The first
5 McDermitt, Reena R.N.: Talk given at the Brantford Hospital Palliative Care Conference in 
Brantford, Ontario; 1993.
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interview was between a young female GP and a 26 year old man who wanted 
sleeping pills. The patient was very uncommunicative. Because of that and 
because this was the first of the interviews, the meeting did not go very well. 
The doctor was quick to ask very probing questions which were appropriate for 
the session. She asked about employment and emotional state, etc. 
Nevertheless, the questions met with very little in response, and the patient 
remained silent for a good part of the interview. The main problem was that the 
doctor asked too many compound questions, and did not offer the patient long 
enough breaks to feel he could answer. Instead he chose to answer the easiest 
questions with as little effort as possible. As a result it was never discovered 
that the patient was a drug addict looking for a prescription to sell in order to 
buy harder drugs. Granted, he probably would not have told her his real reason 
for wanting the drugs, but had he been given a little more opportunity to talk, 
the truth might have revealed itself indirectly. In the end, the doctor gave him 
the prescription, partly out of frustration and to end her own discomfort.
Closely related to silence which permits room for speech is silence 
which permits better listening to patients. Although the two usually come 
together, it must be noted that permitting someone to speak is not the same as 
listening to them. One type of silence is passive in allowing speech, the other is 
active in seeking to listen and understand what is said. One of the 
doctor/students had a patient who in the first few minutes of her interview had 
volunteered that she was sent to the GP by the hospital which she had been in. 
The doctor passed over this in favour of asking the patient other less significant 
questions. It took quite a long time before the doctor happened upon the fact 
that the patient had been in hospital because she had attempted suicide. It was 
clear that this would have been revealed much earlier had the doctor been 
listening to the patient. As it was, we were given the impression that the doctor 
had her own agenda and was determined to stick to it because she thought she 
had understood the patient’s problem. As a result she did not find the true
273
problem because it was occluded by her own preconceptions, even though she 
was prepared to allow pauses in which the patient could speak. It is imperative 
that doctors be aware of the difference between silence which permits the patient 
to speak and silence which listens to what is being said. If the doctor is unable 
to silence her own thoughts and prejudices she is not listening to the patient, and 
will only hear what she wants to hear. This has the effect of silencing the 
patient as well, which does no good.
Sometimes prejudices  interfered in more obvious ways. Other 
doctor/students were not silent enough about their own feelings. It was hard for 
the students with strong convictions to avoid the trappings of their own beliefs. 
In one such case, a 23 year old male patient consulted his female GP about 
respite care for his mother who had been suffering from MS for four years, 
during which he had never taken a vacation. The doctor repeatedly asked him if 
he didn’t think he ought to postpone his vacation until later if his mother was 
that close to dying, but he insisted that he had not had a break in four years and 
did not want to be made to feel guilty about it. The doctor did not clue in to his 
expression of guilt and worry, and instead admitted to finding his behaviour 
selfish, after the session had ended. In this case, the student’s inability to be 
silent and allow her patient to communicate, and her inability to silence her own 
opinions about his behaviour interfered with a satisfactory outcome to the 
session. She did say she would arrange temporary respite care, but never really 
reached the depth of his feelings about guilt and frustration toward his mother’s 
condition. Silencing one’s own beliefs would be a difficult thing to ask anyone 
to do, but it is very important that the doctor be able to set aside certain feelings 
in order to allow the patient space to explore his. This does not imply a 
complete silencing of one’s own convictions and human reactions. As a doctor 
these are necessary for two main reasons: 1) to maintain the humane sympathy 
for patients which is necessary for a caring bedside manner; 2) so the doctor 
can keep on solid ground with regard to how far s/he is willing to compromise
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herself to patient requests (giving sleeping pill prescriptions to drug abusers, for 
example). There must be a careful balance between silencing doctors’ personal 
opinions and allowing for sympathetic and protective reactions.
13.3.5 Conclusions:
Whether good or bad, silences will arise in the medical context as a 
matter of course and present themselves in such a way that they cannot be 
ignored. It is part of medical codes that patient information is private 
information and will be withheld from others. Doctors may be silent in order to 
protect a patient by not disclosing information. Such examples show the many 
ways in which Larundic silence occurs in the medical context. Other cases 
show that patient silences can be Larundic: they may indicate confusion, 
misapprehension, intentions to deceive, and so much more. These silences 
cannot be ignored because they will arise and they contain highly significant 
information. It is necessary therefore that silence not be overlooked, ignored or 
disregarded as vacuous.
13.4 Interpreting silence:
The model for interpreting silence in part II suggests care and 
consideration must be taken in the formulation of meanings of silences. This is 
no less the case for medical Larundic silences. Medical Larundic silences arise 
in various, sometimes less than obvious places, and as with every Larundic 
silence require interpretation to be understood. Interpreting Larundic silences in 
the medical context can supply greater depth of understanding and confer 
information hidden in the silences. This information can be relevant to 
diagnosis of illness and for understanding how illness affects patients. All this 
information can be made good use of in treating and caring for patients.
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13.4.1 Silence and diagnosis:
Sometimes an illness will be silent, either to the patient or the 
diagnostician. These Larundic silences are not obvious silences, but do require 
interpretation like any other Larundic silence. It has been shown why a doctor 
ought not to remain silent about a disease which is silent to its victim; but 
problems which are silent even to the diagnostician require a special kind of 
interpretation. It is in the nature of medical interviews that much is said 
indirectly and remains silent. Informative clues for constructing diagnostic 
interpretation can thus be drawn from attentiveness during patient interviews. 
Care-givers can interpret some of what is not verbalised, just as they interpret 
what is verbalised, and draw conclusions from what the patient is silent about. 
It is therefore incumbent on the diagnostician to be open to the relevant 
information being communicated silently in the patient’s utterances.
Clues for Larundic silences can appear in the form of psychosomatic 
illnesses. These symptoms which present with no apparent physiological cause 
may telegraph silent messages about unacknowledged psychological or 
emotional riddles. When the silent problem is important enough or severe 
enough the body may betray the underlying truth of the suffering, silently 
making clear what is not overt. Nervous stomachs and tension headaches are 
obvious examples of the body silently divulging what the mind or emotions 
have yet to acknowledge. More extreme examples arise as paralysis and 
“hysterical pregnancies” which have no physical cause but which affect the 
sufferer with no less severity than the physiological versions. These symptoms 
tell us something about the person, silently betraying through a bent spine or 
hunched shoulders that something is wrong.
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13.4.2 Reading between the lines:
Silent illnesses and silent cries for help mean that care-givers are 
sometimes obliged to read between the lines and listen to patient’s stories. This 
will help them to decipher the silent implications of what patients or their 
symptoms say. Talkative patients can give away a great deal of information 
about puzzling illnesses, and noncommunicative patients can pass on a great 
deal of information through symptoms. Often what patients do not say can 
betray the most. There are many reasons patients might choose for being silent. 
In Stories o f Sickness, Howard Brody suggests some literary reasons for the 
silences of patients and care-givers6. Virginia Woolf was silent to her friends 
about having the flu because she felt they could not be truly sympathetic, as it 
would only remind them of their own past illnesses. Others, she felt, might be 
too sympathetic and sit with and bore her because “...only laggards and 
failures” have time to be sympathetic7. In Kafka’s Metamorphosis the Samsa 
family cannot make a public announcement about Gregor’s condition and must 
therefore suffer in silence8. They are confused and ashamed of Gregor’s 
‘illness’ and this prevents them from seeking aid; they are helpless in their 
silence.
Making sense of such Larundic silences requires sensitivity to the 
patient’s narrative: reading between the lines. It involves listening to patients’ 
stories about their illnesses or about their lives and deducing knowledge from 
what they tell and what they do not tell9. This does not mean care-givers should 
be able to read minds or construct fictions about their patients. It does mean that 
care-givers should try to reconstruct truths through the ideas patients’ give them;
6 Brody, Howard. Stories of Sickness. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
7 Brody, pg: 102.
8 Brody, pg: 111.
9 Brody.
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ensuring all the time that the interpretations have fit and show the meaning of the 
silence in its best light. This requires staying within the perimeters set by what 
the patient does say. Like in a child’s colouring book; the outline for the 
drawing already exists, and one has only to fill the outline with colours. 
Staying within the lines is faithful to the picture, moving outside the lines is 
creative and adds something which was not already there. The goal is to get an 
idea of the actual picture and then, if necessary, add created novelties which are 
faithful to it. Reading between patient’s lines means being careful not to go too 
far beyond them. Often what isn’t said is what is most helpful in making 
diagnoses. This is especially relevant in cases such as when a physician must 
temporarily act as social worker: having to identify abuses and victims of abuse 
without being told directly. The moral aspect of this reminds us to consider all 
relevant possibilities and ensure that the final interpretation is faithful to the 
silence and its utterer.
It may simply suffice to enquire as to the meaning of a particular silence, 
but often silences mislead. They can do so in at least two distinct ways: either 
they are not obvious and so overlooked, or their meaning is misinterpreted. The 
second problem can be illustrated by this example: Imagine the silence of a 
patient who is confused, but the silence is interpreted by the doctor as the 
patient's not wishing to discuss the case any further. The patient may intend the 
conversation to continue, but the doctor misinterprets the silence to mean she 
ought to bring the conversation to a close. It is important to realise that there are 
two sides to every assertion: its intended side and its interpreted side, and these 
may not necessarily coincide. It is the responsibility of both parties to try to 
work out the best interpretation of the intention by providing and being receptive 
to relevant information. But in the special relationship between care-giver and 
patient the patient is often intimidated or too confused to make the necessary 
moves and thus remains in the silence until coaxed out of it by sensitive attempts 
at understanding by the care-giver.
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Attempts at understanding silences may be frustrating and problematic. 
Silences are slippery, making interpretation of silence trickier than interpretation 
of words. Brody suggests a remedy for this by asking people to describe their 
life stories thus far and then how they would like that story to proceed10. This 
provides perspective for understanding the patient a little better. It fills in gaps, 
thereby creating a sharper image of the patient’s self-determined identity. From 
there silences are more likely to be correctly interpreted because the stories 
create perimeters within which the understanding may capture the slippery 
silences and begin to find meaning in them.
The inevitable silences of the medical context contain Larundic meaning 
just as they do in any other context. It is natural that they are ignored or not 
carefully interpreted, because they are seldom recognised as meaningful. It is 
for this reason that we must learn to be open to the relevance of Larundic 
silences in medical settings as in any other setting. Interpreting Larundic 
silences will bring rewards of depth of understanding and a safe-guard against 
misunderstanding provided they are interpreted with the care suggested in the 
model for interpretation. Care-givers must be cautious of how their own 
silences are interpreted, and how they interpret the silences of their patients. 
However, careful efforts at deciphering Larundic silences can reveal a great deal 
of useful information. It is therefore worth making the effort to note the 
relevance of, and to interpret the meaning of medical Larundic silences between 
patient and carer.
10 Brody 1987, pg: 166.
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13.5 Large Scale Issues:
Silence is relevant to the macro-issues in medical ethics, not just the 
micro-issues such as doctor/patient relationships. Particularly significant is the 
question of silence about the scarcity of medical resources. No system is 
without its difficulties in this area. In the USA resources are distributed 
primarily among those who can afford to purchase them, and some are donated 
to the very poor, leaving those in the middle to struggle for what they can. The 
socialised systems do better at class distribution, but ultimately fail to meet the 
needs of all their citizens. It seems as if no system is immune to the problems 
of scarcity of necessary health care resources. As a result we are left with many 
predicaments, and, more specifically, with whether or not to publicise the 
limitations and to what extent?
It is not clear what the best alternative is as there are problems with 
remaining silent about the scarcity of resources, and with admitting they exist. 
People are already voicing the not unfounded fears that they will not be given 
the treatment they require for reasons extraneous to medical care: reasons such 
as age, ability and responsibilities. Patients die before they reach the top of 
waiting lists, and some, especially the elderly, are frightened of never making it 
to the top. Informing the public of the lack of required resources for adequate 
medical care is creating a mistrust of medical professionals, and creating a state 
of anxiety which will ultimately lead to further abuses. The reason for the 
public’s fear is expressed in the cases of generally healthy octogenarians whose 
treatment is postponed in favour of younger patients, and who express fears of 
being hospitalised and left to die because they are of low-priority where the 
purses are wanting. Such anxiety creates abuses of the resources as people try 
to get all they can before it is too late; and their mistrust that they are not being 
given all that it would be in their best interests to be given leads them to make 
demands which they may not allow themselves to be convinced are
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unnecessary. Generally then, public disclosure of the fact of scarce medical 
resources has created anxiety, mistrust and abuse of resources due to 
desperation.
Being silent about of scarce resources presents its own problems, so it 
may not be the solution to publicise the details regarding scarce resources. The 
consequences of silence are more broadly political than those of disclosure. If 
the public is unaware of the scarcity then they will not be in a position to use 
medical resources responsibly, and may abuse them, albeit unwittingly. They 
will obviously not be in a position to try to change the resource allocation and 
will therefore become victims of their ignorance. Doctors will be burdened with 
deciding how the resources will be allocated, a decision which is in fact meta­
medical and outside their realm of expertise. It is not clear that doctors should, 
or even want to, shoulder this burden. They are better cast in the position of 
care-givers whose duty it is to treat anyone in need, not administrators who 
decide who is to be treated.
It looks as if the ethical choice is disclosure because it allows for better 
informed decision-making in the community at large, thus enhancing patient 
autonomy, and reducing the burden placed on doctors to make tough decisions 
which are essentially non-medical to begin with. The problems entailed in not 
being silent are significant and must be dealt with, but the values preserved by it 
tip the balance in its favour.
13.5.1 Squeaky wheels:
Silence can affect other large-scale problems of health-care associated 
with distribution of scarce resources. Some patients are afraid of silence and 
seek to fill its presumed emptiness with noise. One such example is commonly 
referred to as the “squeaky wheel” patient. A possible explanation of squeaky 
wheel patients is their fear of silence in the power relationship as described by
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Katz11. The patient’s fear of losing control of her body and life causes her to 
break the silence of the relationship in order to discover what is going on. This 
is perfectly normal and acceptable at first but in excess can become a burden to 
care-givers and may become an exploitation of valuable scarce resources. In 
this case silence may be a useful means of redistributing resources; not 
responding to the patient’s every need helps ensure that other patients are 
attended to. Although this is a clear example of how silence can have functional 
uses, it does not seem to be the most beneficent method of dealing with the 
patient whose fear of the silence is so great she needs to drown it in noise.
13.6 Difficult Questions and Silent Answers:
There are a number of difficult issues in medical ethics, and these 
invariably produce tough questions to which the answers remain contentious. 
Many have tried to produce answers to the tough questions, but there are 
schools of thought which conclude that answers will never be found. This is 
not a nihilistic response to the opacity of the moral truth of the situations. It is 
instead a reply to the criteria laid down by those who see the appeal of many 
competing rational and valuable responses to the quandaries of medical ethics. 
On the whole, they say that the questions, though compelling, cannot or ought 
not to be answered. It is an attitude inherited from legal systems which have 
attempted to reach conclusions about the issues but have failed to so far. The 
legal attitude is to deal with the issues on a case by case basis. We do not 
construct any clear legislation about the issues because of the loss of flexibility 
and sensitivity to context it would entail. As a result we are still struggling with 
the problems of euthanasia, abortion and many other issues from which it has
11 Katz, 1984.
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been impossible to wrest any clear solutions. The upshot is that the issues 
which are contentious are those for which the answers must remain silent. The 
hope is that this will also leave silent the frightening consequences of condoning 
them, while still leaving a margin of permission for the times when they are 
humane.
Leaving the conclusions to silence ultimately eliminates the need for 
definite conclusions about issues which reside in the fuzzy middle of the 
spectrum between right and wrong. Being silent about them recognises the 
obscurity of their nature and permits flexibility when necessary. Euthanasia is 
an excellent example of this because the pros and cons of it are so well-known 
and discussed. Those who resist euthanasia usually support their argument by 
an appeal to the sanctity of life and to the belief that taking life, even for the best 
of reasons, ultimately degrades its value. At this point the slippery slope 
descends into an abyss of dangerous callous possibilities such as the murder of 
the sick and elderly in order to reduce the strain on resources. Nevertheless, 
there is no desire to eliminate the kind of mercy killing which we tend to refer to 
euphemistically as the ‘intent to end suffering’, and which may take the form of 
a Brompton Cocktail or the withdrawal of life-support machines. In some 
cases, indirectly hastening a death is the only truly humane response to the 
suffering of the dying person. We have it within us to recognise this not simply 
as merciful but somehow right given the circumstances, and this is reinforced 
by the fact that we now have the technological resources to prolong life but 
recognise the difference between that and the unnecessary prolongation of 
suffering and dying. Still, we cannot quite bring ourselves to refer to the act of 
helping a person die as euthanasia because of the consequences associated with 
this idea. Instead we are silent about accepting or rejecting euthanasia and this 
leaves room for its ambiguity and consequent flexibility -  it is right in some 
cases, for some reasons, and wrong in others.
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It is not simply the difficulty of responding to these questions which 
makes silence their best response. It is that their nature is so obscure (they are 
slippery like silence) that they ought not to be restricted to any simple yes or no 
answer, and a constructed reply would have to be so ambiguous that its 
meaning would exist in a silence which required interpretation anyway. 
Admitting they are best addressed with silence is an honest way to convey the 
benefit of leaving them open and flexible, so they can be valued on a case by 
case basis. This way the significance of their ambiguity will not be forgotten. 
Every time difficult issues enter a case, the silence about their moral value will 
act as a reminder of their problematic nature, and thus encourage careful thought 
and reduce the likelihood of flippant conclusions. Being faced with silence 
encourages deliberation and reflection.
13.7 Conclusion:
The intricacies of silence in the medical context are many. Silence may 
play a positive role, a negative role, or something in between. The significance 
of silence in medical care extends beyond the ones discussed here. Other 
examples are decisions made in emergencies about which there can be no 
discussion because of lack of time; healing silences where listening to patients 
is all that is necessary; the pathologists’ role as silent care-giver; silence about 
errors to protect carers; the tendency to be silent about death; death as the 
ultimate silence; diseases that are referred to as silent killers; patients’ loss of 
ability to speak, and silent communication through advanced directives and 
living wills.
Silence has moral implications in medicine. Where silence is misused it 
has negative consequences to autonomy and the relationship between care­
givers and patients. At the very least, silence is relevant in medical care because
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it cannot be avoided. But where it is used, and used properly, silence holds a 
wealth of information and beneficence.
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CHAPTER 14
SILENCE IN THE COURT
14.1 Silence in Law:
There are several ways in which silence is pertinent to law: law protects 
silence through the right to privacy; it enforces silence, and denies it, through 
laws for the protection of privacy and state; and it both causes problems for and 
allows flexibility in the interpretation of law by addressing broad categories 
instead of specific cases. The last issue connects law to politics; for where law 
is silent it is often the job of politicians and legislators to make it speak as we 
saw in chapter 5. There are serious moral and functional consequences to 
silence in the legal world, primarily due to an absence of literature explaining 
how to interpret silences. Famous cases and historical events, such as the case 
of Sir Thomas More discussed in chapter 13, have illustrated the perils of the 
lack of legal information about silence. This oversight must be dealt with in 
order to ensure that individual liberties are not interfered with by the 
misinterpretation of silence.
14.1.1 Law as Literature:
Silence is relevant to all types of literature, and, by extension, to law1. 
A reader is often treated to more direct thoughts than is an art viewer, but much 
of what she derives from her reading is not found in the text directly, but in the 
unspoken intermingling of the author's ideas and the reader's own
1Levinson, S. & Mailloux, S. eds.: Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic 
Reader. Northwestern University Press; Evanston II.; 1988.
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epistemological and ontological structure. The reader approaches the text with 
her own knowledge, values, beliefs and references which merge with the ideas 
of the text in a silent communication between reader and what is read. This is 
not a fully creative silence, present in the act of interpretation, but it does allows 
us to form conclusions too complex to express in spoken language. There are 
too many ideas involved in the process of interpreting to be included in speech, 
so it must happen silently, in the mind of the reader. The required history 
exists in silence. The background needed for comprehension is not written 
down nor recounted every time one attempts to interpret; it is only contained in 
the gap between speaking and understanding. This is the meaningful content of 
silence.
At least one of the common methods and limits for interpretation is 
context in the form of historical background. We make use of this tool in the 
interpretation of virtually everything. The relationship is reciprocal; silence is 
important to understanding history because history is experienced through 
silence. The presumed empty space of silence is actually filled with past 
knowledge and understanding of the world, which form the bridge between 
new and foreign concepts and definitions2. The historical knowledge a person 
possesses provides necessary connections between the interpreter and the new 
ideas, turning foreign into familiar. We use history when interpreting by 
relying on the encyclopaedic information we have about the subject to provide 
us with a context for the silence. This knowledge will include historical 
knowledge. But because there is often too much information to include 
verbally, it is left unsaid, a silent buttress to the argument. However, historical 
background must be applied with discretion. The examples discussed below 
will show this. If silence is the best way to limit harm in general, it may be best 
if it is left uninterpreted.
2 Bindeman 1981, pg: 129.
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14.2 Self-Incrimination: When the Suspect or Witness is Silent:
"At one time stillness was a precious article in an unwritten code of 
human rights."3
Possibly the most famous example of silence in law occurs in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The only section of the 
Amendment that actually provides protection for silence reads:
“...no one shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness 
against himself...”4
Hence the witness is provided with a right to protection from self-incrimination 
by remaining silent.
In his textbook American Constitutional Law, Laurence Tribe says that 
the Fifth Amendment exists to protect one’s privacy, liberty, personhood, and 
to allow the freedom to “control the face one shows to the world”6. Ideally, 
silence ought not to be used as evidence of the witness’ guilt. It is implicitly 
understood that the Fifth Amendment
“...confers a privilege to be silent. The exercise of such a 
privilege can neither be equated with guilt nor be treated as a 
forbidden failure to cooperate with a proper inquiry...”5
But it is difficult to maintain this attitude, especially in jury cases. Tribe says
3Schafer 1977, pg: 254.
4 Cury, James A., Riley, Richard B. & Battistoni, Richard M.; Constitutional Government: 
The American Experience; West Publication Co.; St. Paul, M.N.; 1981: pg. A -ll.
5 Tribe, Laurence H.; American Constitutional Law; The Foundation Press, Mineola, N.Y.;
1978: pg: 893.
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that claiming protection under the Fifth Amendment is often perceived as 
furtive, guilty behaviour on the part of the witness6, which can have negative 
consequences in the outcome of the trial. As a result, even though the right to 
silence is constitutionally protected, it is not easily upheld.
The Canadian legal system has similar provisions for allowing the 
witness to remain silent both before and during the trial, but Canadian judges 
tend to take a different attitude toward the consequences of such silence. 
Section 4(5) of the Canada Evidence Act forbids comment upon witness failure 
to testify, but many rulings have clearly indicated that it is acceptable to
“draw adverse inferences against an accused because of his 
failure to testify. It is, therefore, unrealistic to speak of the non­
compellability of the accused to testify as a great protection.”7
In fact, in some cases no pretence is made of the effect section 4(5) has 
on judicial rulings. In the case of R. v. Vezeau the judge’s ruling included the 
statement:
“It is clear that the jury had the right to consider the failure of the 
accused to testify and to draw therefrom any logical 
conclusion.”8
In spite of the section protecting witness silence, the Canadian legal 
system recognises that it is unlikely that the jury will ignore witness silence, and 
will be inclined to interpret it unfavourably9. It is usually supposed that an 
innocent person would take any opportunity to explain her innocence. Failure
6 Tribe, 1978, pg: 709. See also Albertson v. SACB, 382 US 70(1965); Lefkowitz v. 
Cunningham, 97 Set. 2132(1977); Slochower v. Board of Education 350 US 551(1956).
7 Emspak v. U.S., 349 US 190(1955); Hutcheson v. U.S. 369 US 599(1962).
Q
Ratushny, Ed; Self- Incrimination In The Canadian Criminal Process; The Carswell 
Company Ltd.; Toronto, Canada; 1979: pg. 331.
9 (1971), 15 CNRS 336, pg: 338.
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to testify is interpreted as secretiveness, and therefore an admission of guilt.
The English law makes many of the same assumptions as the Canadian 
legal system does. This means that witness silence is perceived with suspicion 
in police investigation as well as in court. As a result, there has been some 
debate over the acceptability of the right of suspects to remain silent in the 
English Criminal Justice Act, and reform has been proposed. In England, 
suspects are permitted the right to silence but only with the implicit 
understanding that their silence will in all probability be taken as a sign of guilt. 
Thus, at least one of the reasons in support of the reform to eliminate the 
suspect’s right to silence is to protect the innocent from inappropriate 
judgement. As it stands, the law stipulates that anything not said during initial 
police interviews may harm the suspect’s testimony later. Thus, silence is 
viewed as suspicious behaviour. The suspicion is, again, usually founded on 
the assumption that the innocent will freely protest their case and therefore the 
silent are trying to hide something.
The proposed reform in England has spawned a number of arguments 
for and against the right to silence. Those in favour of the reform, primarily the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee and the Home Office Working Group, base 
their arguments on the following reasons10:
i. It is natural to defend oneself against an allegation made by a 
person in authority. Failure to do so is therefore suggestive of 
guilt, in the absence of some explanation.
ii. A significant number of criminals avoid being charged or, if 
charged avoid conviction, by remaining silent in interview 
thereby depriving the police of the investigative opportunities 
presented by interview.
iii. A significant number of criminals escape conviction by not 
disclosing their defence to the police and then ambushing the 
court trial by producing a new defence which the prosecution are 
then in no position to refute.
10 These are drawn from Leng, Roger: The Right to Silence in Police Interrogation: A 
Study o f Some of the Issues Underlying the Debate. The Roval Commission on 
Criminal Justice. HMSO; London; 1993; pp: 4-5.
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iv. It is a positive advantage to the police and the prosecution 
that any defence is raised in the course of interview. This 
prevents ambush defences and allows the police opportunity to 
test the defence raised in the course of the interview and to carry 
out further investigations to confirm or refute any defence raised.
v. Modifying the right to silence as proposed would carry no 
substantial risks for the innocent suspect, who is adequately 
protected by other safeguards, notably access to legal advice in 
the police station.
vi. That suspects who presently exercise the right to silence 
would be more likely to answer police questions and disclose 
any defence they wished to raise, if cautioned that if they did not 
do so they would be less likely to be believed and that it might 
have a bad effect on their case if they failed to do so.
Defenders of the right to silence have other views. Leng offers counter­
arguments to all of the above based on research drawn from “1080 cases 
collected between 1986 and 1988.”11 He states that silence is rarely resorted to, 
and that there are motives for silence beyond self-protection, most especially the 
attempt to protect others from incrimination12. Furthermore, he points out that 
in only 4% (9) of cases did silence appear to be the primary reason for charges 
being dropped against the suspect13. Besides, as the alternative to silence is 
lying, obfuscation would be no less likely to hinder police investigation14. 
Moreover, it would follow that the absence of the right to silence would 
encourage suspects to perjure themselves rather than assist in their own 
incrimination. This is especially plausible when the lie is a denial, or for that 
matter when the denial is true. As Leng says “...in many cases a denial is 
effectively as inscrutable as total silence...”15
11 Leng 1993; pg: 6.
12 Leng 1993; pg: 19, 72 & 79.
13 Leng 1993; pg: 23 & 77.
14 Leng 1993; pg: 29 & 43. It is suggested that lies provide greater opportunity for 
police to use interview techniques to test the statement. These are not useful where 
suspects are non-communicative.
15 Leng 1993; pg: 76.
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With regard to the ambush defence, Leng suggests that these are 
infrequent, and usually occur when police undervalue or fail to recognise a piece 
of information volunteered by the suspect at interview16. Moreover, because 
new evidence entered at the time of trial was previously silent, it will come 
under the same suspicions of all silent information and lose credence. The law 
is specific about the possibility of considering silence as guilt,
“...there is nothing to stop a bench of magistrates or jury from 
treating silence as indicative of guilt, but a jury cannot be directly 
invited to reach this conclusion by prosecuting counsel or the 
judge.”17
Because of these suspicions, there is little advantage in ambush defences.
Leng’s arguments, among those of others18, indicate the importance of 
safeguarding the right to silence in police interviews. Leng showed that cases 
occurred
“...in which decision to charge had been motivated by a 
conviction that the suspect was guilty, confirmed as far as the 
police were concerned by the suspect’s silence in interview.”19
And this was seen to be the case even though it is generally believed to be 
difficult to prove the guilt of a silent suspect. Leng offers two reasons for this 
difficulty: 1) because silence leaves little for police to go on; and 2) because “the 
very fact that [other] motivations can be identified substantially weakens the
16 Leng 1993; pg: 45-58 & 78.
17 Leng 1993; pg: 2. Refer to The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (198 IB), 
pra 83.
18 See Wood, J. & Crawford, A.: The Right of Silence: The Case for Retention. The 
Civil Liberties Trust; London; 1989. See also Criminal Revision Committee (1972) 
paras 108-113.
19 Leng 1993; pg: 39.
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case for treating silence as evidence of guilt.”20 Rather, Leng suggests that the 
police do not need help to overcome right-based silence, as they could develop 
legal techniques for encouraging suspects to speak. At the moment, they rely 
on catching suspects in lies and on citizens’ duty to assist the pursuit of justice 
as far as they can. However, Leng’s primary reason for resisting the reform is 
his belief based on his research that it “...would have little effect in enhancing 
the prospects of convicting guilty offenders [and] in only a very small 
proportion of cases.”21
The Civil Liberties Trust suggests other reasons for protecting the right 
to silence in trial and in police questioning procedures. They claim that it would 
protect the innocent from arbitrary and excessive questioning. These are said to 
discriminate against the innocent or first offenders who, unlike hardened 
criminals, would not be prepared for such harsh interview techniques. It is 
such people who would be confused and frightened in interviews, and would 
either make false confessions or disclose information “...while ignorant of the 
ramifications of what they may say.”22 The essential right to silence would help 
avoid such miscarriages where the innocent are wrongly convicted or are forced 
to commit peijury to prevent wrongful conviction.
Finally, the right to silence should be regarded as a fundamental right 
along with the right to privacy and confidentiality. Wood and Crawford argued 
strongly that the right to silence protects the innocent and reduces the incidence 
of peijury. Leng’s research shows that the right to silence does not hinder the 
process of justice in any serious manner. Therefore, no strong argument exists 
to support the reform, while many exist to support the right to silence.
Moreover, inconsistencies in interpreting the Larundic silences of
20 Leng 1993; pg: 72-3.
21 Leng 1993; pg: 80.
22 Wood & Crawford 1989, pg: 31.
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suspects and witnesses proves that rules ought to be encoded that protect them 
from radical readings. The Fifth Amendment appears to be better equipped to 
preserve rights to a fair trial because it is contained in the American 
Constitution. Section 4(5) of the Canada Evidence Act and the English Criminal 
Justice Act do not do so well. They do not actually forbid the use of witness 
silence as grounds for incrimination, although they do forbid lawyers’ 
comments on the silence as argument for guilt. The judge and jury are therefore 
permitted to formulate their own opinion about the witness’ silence, and draw 
negative conclusions from it if they so choose. The advantage the U.S. 
Constitution has over the Canadian Evidence Act and the English Criminal 
Justice Act is its obviously stronger protection of the witness’ right to silence; 
but no one of these is entirely satisfactory as it stands.
14.3 How Lawyers Misinterpret Silence:
Anne Graff am Walker23 studied common reactions lawyers have to 
witnesses’ silences during questioning. The results of her study show that 
lawyers connect pauses, hesitancy and silence to the trustworthiness of the 
witness24, and that their conclusions are usually incorrect. She says “the 
witness who pauses before answering questions put to him or her is subject to 
negative inference about his or her veracity”; and that “hesitation behaviour is 
an important but misunderstood feature in assessment of witnesses by 
attorneys”25.
23 Walker, Anne Graffam; "The Two Faces of Silence: The Effect of Witness Hesitancy 
on Lawyers' Impressions", Perspectives on Silence; D. Tannen & M. Saville-Troike eds.; 
Ablex Publishing Corp.; Norwood, N.J.; 1985.
24 Walker's study supports this.
25 Walker 1985, pg: 66.
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In her study of ten cases Walker found that lawyers usually associate 
hesitancy with lack of trustworthiness, but are more likely to overlook pauses 
when they believe the witness to be cooperative. Half the cases showed that 
lawyers did not notice pauses in witnesses whom they described as 
straightforward, responsive and cooperative; but were well aware of the less 
frequent pauses of witnesses described as recalcitrant, nervous, afraid, or not 
spontaneous26. Furthermore, lawyers were generally more suspicious of “silent 
pauses” as opposed to stammering or “filled pauses”, because the former were 
usually considered preparation for a lie, or the need to check the answer for 
consistency with the rest of the story. Finally, lawyers were more inclined to 
perceive the pauses positively when made by their own witnesses, and 
negatively when made by opposing witnesses.
It is ironic to note that it is common for lawyers to prepare their 
witnesses by telling them to wait five seconds before responding to any 
question, because it “...allows counsel to formulate objections; it further allows 
the witness to think through his answer.”27 The five second pause is also 
designed to avoid negative judgements of the witness’ character, because “If he 
answers some questions quickly, he will be unable to sustain the pattern, and 
may warn the examiner of areas of concern.”28 If this is truly an accepted trial 
tactic, then it is unfair and inconsistent to draw negative conclusions about 
witnesses who subscribe to it. The institution of guidelines would avoid 
punishing people who are merely doing what they have been told, or are being 
careful to answer properly.
“That does not mean, however, that the advice, ‘Think before 
you speak’ is bad advice...What it does suggest is a necessity to
26 Walker 1985, pg: 55.
27 Walker 1985, pg: 69.
28 Walker 1985, pg: 57. Walker is quoting from a textbook on trial tactics, Barist 
(1978:13).
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become more aware of how impressions are formed, what their 
origins may be, the effect they may have upon critical 
judgement, and their susceptibility to error.”29
Lawyers tend to make negative judgements about silence during 
questioning. Because they are usually wrong, these guidelines are necessary to 
avoid the mistakes which produce the kinds of injustices Thomas More 
suffered. Though Walker’s study deals with lawyers’ attitudes toward silence it 
is relevant to this project in several ways: it shows how mistakes can be made 
in interpreting silences at any level, and how this leads to unjust treatment of 
witnesses and inconsistency in legal proceedings.
Ideally, guidelines would ensure consistency among decisions about 
silence. The More case in A Man for All Seasons illustrates this point well. 
More was certain of the legal attitude toward silence, and he also believed 
Cromwell would uphold the integrity of the law; but he was wrong. Cromwell 
interpreted silence in a way inconsistent with the generally accepted rule. This 
shows how important it is to enforce the rules for interpretation. Without them, 
consistency in law cannot be assured.
Limits on interpreting what is not explicit will preserve legal integrity, 
but the More case also indicates that law’s relation to truth is situation 
dependent. More knew how the law was supposed to work and tried to use this 
knowledge to escape being persecuted. In truth he really did not approve of the 
King’s actions and therefore may actually have deserved punishment. If a 
consistently followed rule were established for interpreting silence, some would 
use it to their own advantage. The alternative, though, is not much better; 
situational judgements would not preserve the consistency needed to maintain 
integrity in the law. Laws cannot be situationally dependent, otherwise it would
29 Walker 1985, pg: 58. From textbook by Sumit (1978:110).
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be difficult to tell when one was upholding a law and when one was breaking it.
In this case Cromwell was quite openly acting inconsistently with the 
established rule, but in some cases the problem is due to ambiguity in law. This 
happens when the law is silent about a particular case. The consequences of 
silence in law can be the same as those of witness silence, though the reasons 
for it are different.
14.4 When The Law Is Silent:
Law itself can be silent. This occurs when an unprecedented case comes 
to trial, or when a case has novel elements to it. Silence of the law is both 
problematic and functional: problematic, because it lacks express direction for 
the judge, and functional because it allows enough flexibility to accommodate 
difficult cases. Both these features have a bearing on the interpretative aspect of 
judicial process, and it is the ambiguities of this silence which can make the 
judicial process dangerously capricious.
Law is the codification of rules and restrictions agreed upon by 
legislators and politicians, and which ideally reflect the values of the 
community. However, “not all law is codified, perhaps it is not all 
codifiable”30. It is not possible for a law to speak to every element of every 
possible case. The legislators cannot foresee every eventuality. Take, for 
instance, a bylaw which restricted vehicles permitted in a park, but where it was 
not clear whether this meant only large vehicles like cars and aircraft, or if 
bicycles, baby prams and other small vehicles were not permitted either. In 
cases where the law is silent regarding specifics there may be one of two 
possible solutions: Either the judge can interpret what the intent of the law or
o n  /
Atias, Christian & Rials, Stephan; "Silence et Droit"; Corps Ecrit 12: Le Silence;
Presses Universitaires de France; Paris; 1984: pg. 109. I have done my own translation.
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the legislators might have been in the particular case; or, in serious cases, the 
issue becomes political and it is left to politicians and legislators to create a new 
law.31
When it is possible for the judge to decide the question in court, she 
must interpret the silent space of the law and decide what it can reasonably be 
said to include. In effect, she reads between the lines to determine what the 
words of law are not saying in this situation, but which are relevant to it just the 
same. It becomes the judge’s role either to create or discover meaning where 
law is silent21. If meaning is discoverable, then the judge is merely uncovering 
what is silently already there. Considering law to be Larundic in this way 
permits consistency in law, and escapes the accusation of nihilism made by legal 
realists. But if the judge creates the meaning, discretion and inconsistency 
sneak in because they allow judges the freedom and control to interpret the law 
to suit virtually any purpose.
Silence can allow some judicial creativity, which makes law flexible 
enough to accommodate novelties without continually consulting the legislators. 
But too much flexibility can be dangerous because it allows judges to uphold 
their own values and beliefs instead of the community’s. Hence, judicial 
interpretation must be limited, though it is strongly debated how the limits must 
be drawn. Some will be more likely to deal with silence by attempting to 
reconstruct the attitudes of the framers, the history of the community, etc. 
While others interpret silence by looking for the true word of law, which itself 
may entail a review of community history32.
Rules for interpretation can be useful even where the law is silent, and 
for the same reasons addressed above. They would help us to decide how to 
proceed in a way consistent with previous legislation, so that we would know
o  i
See chapter 5.
32 Atias & Rials 1984, pg: 106.
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what to expect when the law does not speak to a particular case. Silence can be 
functional, allowing for flexibility, but it can also be problematic by allowing 
judicial whims to prevail. It is where these problems arise that rules for dealing 
with silence are needed, both to protect witnesses, as was seen in section I, and 
to preserve legal consistency when the law is silent.
14.5 Conclusion:
Silence can be both a symbol and a metaphor:
“As symbol, silence appears as: the absence-presence or 
emptiness-fullness of that which is kept silent about ... As 
metaphor, silence appears as active in philosophy, poetry, 
painting and music in the mode of indirect discourse or ironic 
speech, as the keeping silence that has something to say.”33
There cannot be certainty when interpreting silence because silence 
maintains its mystery no matter how much fact, past history and knowledge the 
interpreter has of the subject. Therefore, there must be guidelines for 
interpretation; underestimating its importance can lead to mistaken judgements. 
People have been unfairly persecuted due to misinterpretations of their silence. 
Limits must be imposed on the interpretation of silence in law and politics in 
order to preserve freedom.
Also, the outcome of interpretation must follow law and precedent, 
otherwise people will not be able to depend upon law for consistency. If 
interpretations were situation dependent it would be impossible to know in 
advance when one were breaking a law or upholding it. Even thieves know 
when they are acting illegally and when they are not. Establishing at least a 
vague set of rules for interpreting silence would keep law consistent, and people
33 Atias & Rials 1984, pg: 128-9.
299
would know when they could seek protection from silence and when they could 
not.
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CHAPTER 15
APPLIED HARPOCRATIC SILENCE AND THE OVERLAP
15.1 Introductory Notes:
The previous two sections have dealt mostly with Larundic silences. 
This is because the two areas discussed lend themselves best to communicative 
silences between individuals rather than the empty silences of reflection. 
However, many of the examples showed that there can be places where 
Larundic silences overlap with Harpocratic silences. Examples of this are the 
therapeutic silences at the bedside and the silences of death. Further examples 
of the overlap occur in musical silences which can be described as full or empty, 
as well as both at once. Silences which are strictly Harpocratic, on the other 
hand, are not numerous and are less identifiable. “As the prestige of language 
falls, that of silence rises.,”1 especially regarding complex or spiritual notions. 
Thus, the prime location for Harpocratic silences is in the religious and spiritual 
context, where individuals encounter empty silences most frequently. It is 
worth taking a brief look at these applications of silence to music and at the 
spiritual and healing silence of religion before concluding.
15.2 Silence. Music and the Overlap:
The beginning of every classical music performance is marked by a
1 Sontag 1984, pg: 195.
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silence. In fact, the music would not start if the silence did not occur before it. 
The music is bom out of the silence and is carried by it, the silence interrupting 
every once in a while in the form of a pause or to mark the end of the 
movement. Finally, the piece of music ends and the silence takes centre stage 
again. The audience is aware of the necessity of that silent moment before the 
first notes and accede to its importance not blankly, but with expectation, 
excitement, and respect for the music and the performers. This silence is 
therefore not an empty Harpocratic silence. Rather it is Larundic, filled with 
what the audience expects, feels, and offers. It is also filled with emotions, 
anxieties, concentration and unification on the part of the musicians and the 
conductor. Yet, somehow we don’t want to limit the meaning which fills this 
silence to only the feelings and thoughts of human beings. There is something 
of greater significance in this as well as in other musical silences, something of 
inherent value. This is where silence in music can be shown to be Larundic.
The meaning of a musical piece is silent in the same way that silence is 
the medium of communication for most art forms. Meaning in music often 
seems intangible and ineffable, and words are too harsh to express its nuances. 
Unlike literature and painting, there is sound in music, but similar to these other 
two art forms the meaning of the work is implied or conveyed indirectly through 
the art. This happens to a greater or lesser degree, so that the message 
conveyed requires greater or lesser amounts of effort to interpret. Nevertheless, 
no matter how it is communicated, the meaning of a work of art is hidden in 
Larundic silence.
This not withstanding, some art, including music, is designed to trigger 
Harpocratic reflection as well as communicate a meaning. This is where the 
nature of the overlap between Harpocratic and Larundic silence rests. Music 
which possesses meaning that sends the imagination into creative exploration is 
one example of this. There are still other pieces that cause stillness and silence 
of the mind which permits reflection in the Harpocratic sense. Bindemen notes
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that silence does not only deconstruct form, but it constructs it as well. “When 
we passively hear a silent passage in music we spontaneously attempt to fill it 
in; thus, meaning is emoted from the silence.”2 The meaning emoted, given 
our anatomy of silence, is meaning created from reflection on prejudicial and 
encyclopaedic knowledge in Harpocratic silence. Thus, such music initiates 
reflection and inspires self-exploration in those who confront it. Bindemen 
adds that we are losing the freedom of silence in a busy world; that we must 
recapture it in order to leave space to create ourselves, and that certain artists 
help us do this. Some examples of this are Mahler’s 3rd symphony3, Barber’s 
Adagio fo r  Strings, Gorecki’s Third Symphony, Satie’s lere Gymnopedie, and 
many of the works of R. Murray Schafer4.
Perhaps the most obvious example of silence used in music is John 
Cage’s “4 minutes, 33 seconds”5, a piece which is more aptly described as 
Larundic than Harpocratic. We will examine this particular piece with emphasis 
on convention to see how the model for interpreting Larundic silence can be 
applied to musical silences.
15.2.1 Convention as context:
Conventions provide clues for understanding meaning in music, and 
nowhere is this more obvious than in Cage’s famous work. First, however, 
compare the event of a rock concert with that of a classical music concert. At a 
rock concert the sound of cheers and applause seem to dominate where silence 
normally does in classical performances. The etiquette is different: rock 
musicians wait for roars from the audience to know they are attended and
2 Bindemen, 91.
5 Which Bindemen describes as an “Ode to Silence”, pg: 89.
4Schafer 1977, pg: 253.
5Cage, John: Silence: Lectures and Writings. Marion Boyars Publishing Ltd.; 1987.
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wanted; classical music requires silence for the same reason. It seems that 
whenever there is a hint of silence at rock concerts the audience is invited to fill 
it with cheers and applause. As soon as the music stops, a wave of shouting 
swells and crashes as though it were necessary to encourage the performers to 
go on. At the classical concert this is notoriously different. Silence is the norm. 
Everyone has experienced moments when, unfamiliar with the piece being 
played, someone applauds inappropriately during a pause between the third and 
the fourth movements. Are these reactions merely moments of social 
convention?
Cage’s “4 minutes, 33 seconds” may shed some light on this question of 
conventions, because, though silent, for all intents and purposes it is arranged 
like a piece of music. Everything is there, all the elements of music making: an 
audience, a musician, an instrument, a concert hall... but no music, just silence. 
It is only the context which tells you what these elements have been gathered 
together to do. The context tells the interpreter that this is a work of art about to 
be performed, that it is a piece of music. The context delimits what the author 
had in mind in calling them all together. That the author is a composer of music 
is the first thing which sets this apart from a piece of theatre or a prayer service. 
All the gestures are set forth, performed and respected. It is for all intents and 
purposes a musical performance, a recital, a concert.
Would it be fair for a spectator at this performance to feel that she has 
been cheated by it? After all, she paid money to go to a concert and she was 
given no music, heard nothing. Nevertheless, the spectacle was all there, 
everything fulfilled the criteria, and the ‘music’ could have been the sounds of 
the impure and Larundic silence around her. There was the ritual of listening: a 
definite beginning, middle, and end. People knew when to stop speaking 
because the piece was about to begin, they recognised when they were in the 
midst of the performance and they took their cue to applaud when it was over. 
So something happened in the room; a show took place. It would be unfair to
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perceive it as cheating simply because one ingredient, the music, was absent. 
Everything else was there. Thus, it appears that there were sufficient conditions 
for the event to be called a performance rather than a non-event.
This piece illustrates well the role of context in the interpretation of 
silence. It is an exaggerated case of the importance of using the surrounding 
elements to lead the audience to construct an accurate interpretation of the 
meaning of the silence. The context is so clear in the case of “4 minutes, 33 
seconds” that there is virtually no question about what has gone on - it  was a 
musical recital. No further explanation is necessary. The depth of the meaning 
intended by the presentation of the piece may take further puzzling together, but 
what the silence was intended to mean initially is completely clear from the 
evidence given.
The depth of the meaning will be harder to fathom, just as it is hard to 
fathom in a more formal piece of music, or any work of art for that matter. 
Understanding what is being conveyed indirectly, and in silence, will always 
present problems. Whether these problems are any greater for “4 minutes, 33 
seconds” is hard to say. On the one hand, there is less to go on, fewer hooks 
with which to grab hold of interpretable information. In this sense it is a more 
slippery piece. On the other hand the meaning of any piece of music is difficult 
to interpret because it is always conveyed silently, and is thus slippery as well. 
We could say it is double the silence and therefore presents double the difficulty 
for interpretation. This is true, but somehow not quite convincing because the 
context provides such overt clues for interpretation.
Imagine a situation where context is not so obvious. Say, an audience is 
gathered for a concert, and about two minutes before it is supposed to begin one 
or two of the musicians come out on stage and begin to play. They play what 
could sound like warm-up for a few minutes, then are gradually joined by other 
bits and pieces of the orchestra. They play, sometimes repeating a few bars 
after a pause, some of them taking breaks to do what they would normally do in
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a warm-up just before a performance. All this continues until finally it becomes 
clear that this is a piece of music and the concert has already begun. It 
culminates in the entire orchestra being on stage playing a melody which was 
hinted at during the earlier “warm-up” part, and then it ends. In the beginning, 
an unsuspecting audience would be part of the composition, their chatter and 
movement would be part of the music. Presumably they would quiet down 
eventually, as they caught on. The idea here is that the context is changed; it has 
been switched around so that it is no longer what was expected. For a long time 
the concert consists of everything that is going on in the room, making it more 
obvious that this is exactly what a concert is — not just the players playing, but 
the listeners involved becoming participants in the creation of the event. Here 
the hermeneutic circle is brought to life. Audience members become participants 
in the performance and are actually transformed into the concert itself, in the 
same way that the player of the game becomes the game. In this case, although 
there is sound in the concert, there is little of the convention ordinarily 
associated with a classical concert. Thus, understanding the piece as a concert 
requires greater effort on the part of the unsuspecting audience who must be 
patient in their effort to interpret the meaning of the event in which they are 
participating. Anyone whose prejudice does not permit them to be open to this 
meaning will not access the understanding as readily.
Silence occurs as a frame of reference for music in ordinary contexts. 
However, it also occurs within the music and among the notes. Some pieces 
employ silence as a echo for notes, others emphasise a note with a silence and 
still others wait for notes to dissolve in the silence which follows them. These 
silences are part of the vocabulary of the music and help convey meaning the 
same way that syntax, style and volume do. The emphasis of a note can change 
with the presence or absence of a silence around it. And notes that arise from 
silence are given an air quite different from those which arrive in the midst of 
sounds. The silence helps build the context around the note and thereby directs
3 0 6
the listener towards an interpretation of the Larundic silence of the meaning of 
the musical work. The silence constructs the syntax and context of the music. 
Thus, silence functions as a clue to understanding the Larundic silence in the 
music.
All these examples show how the anatomy of silence and the elements of 
the model for interpreting silence can be employed in musical silence. 
Openness, effort, context, prejudice are just some of the obvious elements 
which arise, showing how it is possible to consider Larundic and Harpocratic 
silence in music.
15.1.2 The Overlap:
The examples and model application above indicate how any meaning is 
partially invented by the listener and partially offered by the music itself. Thus, 
all participants in the hermeneutic circle are involved in the dialogue toward 
finding a relevant interpretation to the silent meaning of the work. The overlap 
between Larundic and Harpocratic silence occurs after a considered 
interpretation is arrived at, one which is respectful of the participants involved 
and stays within the perimeters set by the silence. After this is accomplished, 
the interpreter is free to use the interpretation to go beyond the perimeters and 
develop new creations from reflective use of the infinite possibilities in 
Harpocratic silence. Thus, Larundic silence becomes the launching point for 
Harpocratic silence.
15.2 Religion and Applied Harpocratic Silence:
This section has so far revealed applications of Larundic silence and 
examples of silence that crosses the boundaries of Larundic and Harpocratic 
silence. Now it is worth revisiting Harpocratic silence in the religious context to
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reveal some its useful properties.
"Just as man requires time for sleep to refresh and renew his life 
energies, so too he requires quiet periods to regain mental and 
spiritual composure.... Man held reservoirs of stillness in his life 
to restore the spiritual metabolism"6
Harpocratic silence can be found in meditation and spiritual reflection. 
The benefit of this is the healing which accompanies silence and stillness. 
People in distress are often referred to the Book of Job7 for comfort. Job's 
faith in God was tested by Lucifer in order to prove its strength. In the story, 
Job loses everything, his children are killed and his health deteriorates until he is 
on the verge of death. He rails about his agony but refuses to abandon his faith. 
Finally, his torment is ended and God rewards Job's fidelity with a new family 
and greater wealth. It is unclear what comfort they ought to find in this tragedy 
with a happy ending. Most real tragedies have no comfort in the end. The 
battle against a fatal illness, the loss of a child; these are events which offer only 
meagre comforts such as an end to suffering. The comfort from the story of 
Job, therefore, is silent. Nevertheless, God’s silent message may be the 
message intended for the suffering and bereaved. Harpocratic silence contains 
the properties for healing that the soul often needs. Silent reflection on loss and 
what came before can encourage understanding and the creative response 
required to go beyond pain. It also leaves space for memory to apply its salve 
by replaying what is lost. This is where Harpocratic silence has the power to 
heal. Its stillness leaves room to breathe and its emptiness permits reflection in 
which resolution and comfort can be found.
The stillness of Harpocratic silence is part of the peace of a holy life. 
Monastic silence is in part designed to be an imitation of God’s silence, and is
6Schafer, 1977; pg: 253-4.
n
Book of Job: A New Translation According to the Traditional Hebrew Text. Kethubim trans. 
The Jewish Publication Society of America; Philadelphia, Penn.; 1980 (5740).
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Harpocratic in this sense. It is a Neoplatonic requirement that like can only be 
known by like, therefore the monks imitate the silence of God in order to know 
God. However, it does not appear to be an exact imitation, because the monks 
choose an absolute stillness of the mind, a clearing of thoughts, so that their 
empty minds will have room to be filled with the soft voice of God. 
Presumably God’s mind, then, is not still and empty; it does not merely 
contemplate itself as an Aristotelian God does. God’s mind thinks the thoughts 
that would be whispered into the empty spaces in the monks’ minds. Without 
their own Harpocratic emptiness then, the monks would have no room to admit 
the presence of God.
Prayer and meditation are meant to still the active mind in order that it 
might be filled with the word of God. It was, perhaps, Job’s one error that he 
was not silent enough to hear God praising his virtue. Instead Job raged at his 
own failings and at God for making things as they were in spite of his efforts to 
be faithful. God was not being silent to Job’s agony after all; there were many 
conversations with Satan in which God praised Job for his obedience and 
tenacity. Perhaps if Job had been silent himself he would have heard God weep 
with him.
The lack of reply to prayers signifies another way in which God’s 
silence is Harpocratic. We may be frustrated by the silence that greets prayers 
and favours asked, but we can also be calmed by the simple act of praying. 
That God does not make overt response to the prayer does not mean that 
praying is a fruitless effort. Rather, we are offered a gift of reflective time, 
where formulating and constructing the prayer is part of the reply, as it helps 
order thoughts which can direct one to an answer. Already formulated prayers, 
such as Hail Mary’s and the Passover Haggadah prayers are useful in a different 
way. They focus the mind on a mantra and open space for the spiritual. In the 
focus and stillness, reflection can take place and meaning is created as it is in 
Harpocratic silence. Thus, if God does communicate with us, it is in part to
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help us notice new approaches to old information.
Quaker prayer meetings are designed to create the kind of Harpocratic 
stillness that permits the voice of God to be heard. Other traditions employ 
meditation and repetition in order to create this space. New information located 
in this reflective process can be described either as growth and transformation of 
old into new, or as spiritual revelation. The result is that some novel insight is 
gained through openness to the emptiness of Harpocratic silence.
There is something mystical about what the mind can do in Harpocratic 
silence, creating new ideas which lead to original thoughts. We follow the 
paths of familiar ideas and are led into the unfamiliar terrain of knowledge. It is 
not just that the ideas were there waiting to be found. They are created by the 
joining of ideas; they are the offspring of more familiar thoughts. This is 
creativity similar to Aristotle’s idea of practical wisdom, whence concepts bom 
of a current problem which cannot be solved by usual means require a sort of 
wisdom which creates something new by merging familiar with foreign to create 
novel. These ideas spring fully formed from our silences as Athena sprang from 
the brain of Zeus; formed deep within the silence of his mind until her presence 
could not be ignored, she popped out, unable to be suppressed any longer. It is 
the same for our silent secrets; some things will not allow themselves to be 
suppressed and force themselves to be dealt with, no longer able to be silent.
The above are images of a God as an active presence that guides 
individuals who pay attention to God’s word. There are, however, more 
passive descriptions of the relationship between God and persons. This image 
is a more scholastic model of a God who is self-reflective and uninterested. The 
image of the prime mover, for example, in Aristotle. This image is of a 
Harpocratically silent deity and provokes an understanding of God which is 
passive and reflective in Harpocratic silence.
There is spiritual content in all Harpocratic silence to some degree, 
provided one is open to it. Harpocratic silence can be met with comfort and
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rest, or it can be met with fear. The results of this meeting will usually end in 
expanded self-knowledge. However, many people are frightened by being 
alone with their thoughts, and are apprehensive about such a meeting. They 
will tend to fill the emptiness with noise in an effort to keep from reflecting on 
what they bring to the meeting. This is best described as Harpocratic angst. 
For those who learn to be comfortable with the emptiness that causes self­
reflection, Harpocratic silence becomes something to be grateful for. The rest it 
entails can be healing, comforting and expanding; and it is for this reason that so 
many feel the presence of God in empty silence. There is awe in this silence, 
just as there is awe in the silence in this quote from A Passage to India.
“Opening his eyes, and beholding thousands of stars, he could 
not reply, they silenced him.”8
Such examples are the best proof of the spiritual content in Harpocratic
silence.
8Forster, E.M. A Passage to India. Oliver S tally brass, ed. Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd., 
London, England; 1978. Pg: 241.
PART IV: 
CONCLUSION
II
CHAPTER 16 
CONCLUSION
16.1 Three Aims:
Broadly speaking, I have attempted to achieve three related aims through 
this exploration of silence. The initial aim was to uncover an anatomy of silence 
designed to draw attention to its different types and help us understand its 
enigma a little better. This resulted in a useful distinction between Harpocratic 
and Larundic silences. Harpocratic silence, named after the enigmatic god 
Harpocrates, was shown to be the empty, mysterious and reflective silence of 
meditation and creativity. This silence offers no meaning of its own and 
therefore no fetters to imaginative reflection and creation on those who 
encounter it. Larundic silence, so-called after the loquacious goddess Larunda, 
was shown to be full of meaning which it can communicate in sometimes more 
and sometimes less effective ways than language can. The second aim was to 
show that Larundic silences can communicate but only through interpretation, 
which leaves it open to exploitation. Thus a model was constructed which is 
intended to preserve Larundic silences from radical readings and exploitation. 
Finally, the sections on applied silence explored some of the ways in which 
silence is used. This focused primarily on the category of Larundic silences 
which are more likely to arise in the fields chosen. That is, they are likely to but 
not exclusively, and Harpocratic silences were also seen to arise in these 
contexts. Still, Harpocratic silence is probably better suited to other contexts, 
and we will examine some of these now.
The conclusion will further elucidate an important point that has only
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been directly addressed in respect to music. This is the presence of an overlap 
between Harpocratic and Larundic silences. Throughout the thesis it may have 
appeared that the examples described as Larundic also contain elements of 
Harpocratic silence, as if Harpocratic silence were contained within Larundic 
silence. We will look at more examples of this below. However, it must be 
noted that although Harpocratic silence occurs within Larundic silence it is not a 
subset of Larundic silence, nor is the opposite true. Rather the two are better 
understood as part of the same continuum from reflective to communicative 
silence, empty to full. This will become clear as we re-examine the aims of the 
thesis.
The three aims are beautifully illustrated in the following poem.
Death of a Son1
(who died in a mental hospital aged one)
SOMETHING has ceased to come along with me.
Something like a person: something very like one.
And there was no nobility in it 
Or anything like that.
Something was there like a one year 
Old house, dumb as stone. While the near buildings 
Sang like birds and laughed 
Understanding the pact
They were to have with silence. But he
Neither sang nor laughed. He did not bless silence 
Like bread, with words.
He did not forsake silence.
But rather, like a house in mourning 
Kept the eye turned in to watch the silence while 
The other houses like birds 
Sang around him.
1 Silkin, Jon: “Death of a Son” in The Healing Arts: An Oxford Illustrated Anthology; R.S. 
Downie ed. Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1994. Pp: 78-9.
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And the breathing silence neither 
Moved nor was still.
I have seen stones: I have seen brick 
But this house was made up of neither bricks nor stone 
But a house of flesh and blood 
With flesh of stone
And bricks for blood. A house 
Of stone and blood in breathing silence with the other 
Birds singing crazy on its chimneys.
But this was silence,
This was something else, this was 
Hearing and speaking though he was a house drawn 
Into silence, this was 
Something religious in his silence,
Something shining in his quiet,
This was different this was altogether something else:
Though he never spoke, this 
Was something to do with death.
And then slowly the eye stopped looking 
Inward. The silence rose and became still.
The look turned to the outer space and stopped,
With the birds still shrilling around him.
And as if he could speak
He turned over on his side with his one year 
Red as a wound
He turned over as if he could be sorry for this
And out of his eyes two great tears rolled, like stones, and he
died.
Jon Silkin 
1930-
John Silkin’s poem poignantly relates the tragedy of the death of his one 
year old son who never emerged from silence. The poem can also be used to
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illustrate the three central aims of this thesis. The initial aim, to uncover an 
anatomy of silence, is amplified by Silkin’s poem, where Larundic and 
Harpocratic silences are used and shown to overlap. The silence described in 
the first part of the poem is a difficult but definite Larundic silence. This 
becomes clearer when it is compared with the silence described in the second to 
last stanza which has the qualitatively empty feeling of a Harpocratic silence. 
The two are distinct, and the qualitative difference is made palpable when the 
author says:
And then slowly the eye stopped looking 
Inward. The silence rose and became still.
The look turned to the outer space and stopped,
With the birds still shrilling around him.
The differentiation is clarified by, and helps to clarify, the Larundic 
Harpocratic distinction. The author points to the very different feeling he has of 
the active Larundic silence of his son alive, as distinct from the empty 
Harpocratic silence after the child’s death. There is a perceptibly active feeling 
attached to the characterisation of silence in the early part of the poem. There is 
live meaning there, “like a house in mourning / Kept the eye turned in to watch 
the silence”, as if the inhabitants were involved in creating meaning for the 
silence. Then there is a change in the quality of the silence when “slowly the 
eye stopped looking / Inward” and the silence empties itself of meaning. There 
is something contained in the initial Larundic silence which is no longer present 
in the Harpocratic silence at the end.
Moreover, it is clear in the poem how the two categories betray their 
discreet separations. The Larundic silence is not an obvious one, so it is 
tempting to perceive the initial silence as Harpocratic; and in some senses it is, 
although not completely. The poet forces the reader to consider this a full 
silence, albeit one which is indecipherable because the walls around it are 
unbreachable. Even so, the reader is given the impression that there is life and
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activity going on behind the curtains of the house of his son’s silence. This is a 
real and independent meaningfulness which the poet and the reader must stand 
outside of and cannot gain admittance to. But it is not a still or empty silence. 
Whatever it is, this is a silence truly distinguishable from the silence in the last 
part of the poem, and the distinction is based on the activity and meaning behind 
it.
Nevertheless, the degree of privacy with which the first Larundic silence 
is guarded makes the observer retreat to the more creative methods of 
understanding better suited to Harpocratic silence. This is where the 
Harpocratic overlap lies. If, as Bindeman suggests, the human mind is fearful 
of the absurdity of emptiness, then it is likely to react in the same way to 
impenetrable but full silence. In other words, the mind will attempt to create 
meaning where none is forthcoming, whether that be because no meaning is 
present, or because no meaning is readily accessible. Either way, the reaction is 
likely to be the same, namely a creative manipulation of information that is 
available. This will necessarily include prejudicial or encyclopaedic knowledge, 
and may exclude difficult to ascertain Larundic content. The knowledge is then 
used to creatively construct a meaning which is applied to the silence, but which 
springs from reflection and imagination alone and not from consideration of the 
perimeters of the silence. Such an interpretation will not be respectful of the 
content of a Larundic silence. On the contrary, it anticipates no such content so 
it has no need to respect the perimeters set up by it. The upshot then is that if 
the silence is truly Larundic, the interpretation will be radical and not an accurate 
interpretation of the meaning offered by the silence. In order to prevent this the 
interpreter will have to consider the possibility that a given silence has relevant 
meaning, even if this requires great effort. Thus it is necessary to be open to the 
possibility of Larundic content in a silence, and to make every effort to respect 
that content even where it is difficult to ascertain.
Harpocratic and Larundic silences can overlap in a more productive way
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as well. Larundic and Harpocratic silence are not distinct categories, but 
continuous in the sense that Larundic silence often includes Harpocratic 
dimensions. This is not to imply that one is a subset of the other, rather that 
they are part of one another, so it is possible to have Harpocratic silence in 
Larundic silence and vice verse. Silkin’s poem is an example of how Larundic 
silence can support elements of Harpocratic silence. There is a beginning of a 
meaning hinted at in the initial part of the poem but the meaning evaporates not 
just at the end but each time the poet and the reader attempts to grasp it. It is at 
the edges where the meaning is very indistinct that it triggers free Harpocratic 
reflection. Just as we saw in the relation between silence and metaphor, the 
concepts of fantasy and imagination come into play. The finite meaning of the 
Larundic silence becomes a launching point for the Harpocratic silence, just as 
fancy can be the stimulus for imagination. Thus we learn the meaning of the 
Larundic silence and use it as the foundation for creative reflection in exactly the 
same way that prejudicial and encyclopaedic knowledge are the foundations for 
all understanding. Nevertheless, the perimeters of the Larundic silence must be 
respected before the Harpocratic creativity can be indulged in. It is necessary to 
understand the meaning offered by the Larundic silence and before moving into 
infinite imaginings, otherwise the communicative act is jeopardised in favour of 
creativity. Determining the meaning of the Larundic silence beforehand permits 
the act of communication and exchange of ideas. After this is done, the 
Harpocratic silence can be indulged in and creative invention pursued; always 
with the understanding that treating a Larundic silence as Harpocratic violates 
the meaning of the silence and defeats the communicative effort.
The second aim is contained within the poem as well. The model for 
safe interpretations of silence can be shown to have been applied to the Larundic 
silence of the child in the first part of the poem. Silkin’s interpretation of his 
son’s silences can be described as a demonstration of it. The initial silence is 
considered with respect by the author as containing a meaning, albeit one from
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which he feels excluded. Still, the silence is noted as relevant and the 
perimeters of its meaning are respected. The child’s life is thence accepted and 
respected as meaningful even if that meaning in indecipherable.
What is interesting for our purposes is that the silence in the early part of 
the poem is not necessarily one that is intended by the son. Rather, its meaning 
is hinted at though not invented by the poet. The poet insists that there is a 
significance in his son’s silence, and distinguishes it clearly from the second 
silence in his son’s death. There is a meaning independent of intention which 
exists in the situation and which moves farther and farther away until it 
disappears altogether. That the poet recognises the relevance of his son’s 
silence is what brings the possibility of an independent meaning into focus. The 
silence could have been described as empty by someone who was not open to 
the relevance of its meaning. But the recognition of the silence introduces the 
many possibilities of meaning described by the poet:
...But this was silence,
This was something else, this was 
Hearing and speaking though he was a house drawn 
Into silence, this was 
Something religious in his silence,
Something shining in his quiet,
This was different this was altogether something else:
Though he never spoke, this 
Was something to do with death...
A meaning is clearly present, but a meaning that is remote and difficult 
to penetrate. Still, it is a meaning that is indifferent to the poet’s perception of 
it, in that it will persist with the life of the afflicted child. This Larundic silence 
exists, independent of the son’s ability to intend to issue it, and independent of 
the poet‘s intention to interpret it. Rather, the content exists and the poet gives 
it sense. This is an important point because it demonstrates the independence
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and complexity of Larundic silence, and again leaves room for the overlap 
between Harpocratic and Larundic categories. It shows how Larundic silence 
can stand on its own and still accommodate the creativity of Harpocratic 
reactions to silence.
The third aim is not so much contained within the poem as it is 
demonstrated by it. Poetry is another field in which we find applied silence. 
Poems are silent first in the sense of being without noise, and Silkin’s use of the 
concept shows the peculiar possibility of invoking silence in a silent medium. 
This produces the effect of making the silence in the poem palpable, distinct and 
endows it with the characteristics of Larundic and Harpocratic silences. It also 
demonstrates that silence plays a significant role beyond literature: in 
relationships, medicine and death. Larundic silence has already been described 
as active in medicine and law and its importance extends even beyond these, as 
the poem suggests. Other areas lend themselves better to Harpocratic silences, 
though not exclusively as all areas will accommodate and demonstrate the 
overlapping aspects of the two types of silence. Areas such as poetry and music 
show the overlap most clearly, while exclusive Harpocratic silence is better 
suited to religion.
16.2 Whereof One Must Be Silent:
Having taken this exploratory look at silence, one thing is certain: 
silence is complex and multifaceted. Its relevance is seen everywhere, not 
strictly as a linguistic tool, but as something of its own. It is the richness of it 
which makes silence such a fascinating topic of study; it never ceases to have 
something new to offer. But it is elusive, tricky to pin down and slippery to 
hold onto. So much of what we do and learn occurs in silence. All our 
interpretative efforts, all our creative ideas, all our acquisition of knowledge
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takes place in the quiet of our own minds; or in the space around us which is 
filled with ideas that literally and figuratively play in the supposed emptiness. 
Silence is not just empty because it often communicates ideas and feelings, and 
acts as the symbol for any number of things. Silence can speak. However, it is 
not just full either. Silence creates space to be filled with ideas, like a pause in a 
conversation or the silence of a concert hall just before it is filled with music.
Silence is relevant to everything, it is the context for all we do. We 
know this is true because it seems that all our thoughts emerge out of the silent 
reaches of our minds, bubbling up from a place within us which we have no 
direct access to and which is generally silent to us and those around us. It 
sends out ideas as they are required, but without so much as a hint as to why or 
where they come from. We do seem to have some access to this part of our 
minds, although, because it does respond helpfully, sending ideas which cohere 
with the issue at hand. Even so, it sometimes surprises us with information that 
may be useful or not. Nevertheless, we do have direct knowledge of silence in 
an internal way, in the experience of thoughts we do not share with others. 
Secrets, silent streams of consciousness, internal responses are all examples of 
how we are aware of our silences. They are also proof that silence is not pure 
emptiness, but full of ideas and meanings which are indirectly communicated or 
not shared at all.
We also learn from silence. We use its creative space to teach us things 
we did not previously understand because they were hidden from our view. 
The silent retreat has always been seen as a learning process in religion. In this 
way, Descartes sought refuge from the noise of the world in solipsistic silence 
hoping to acquire new knowledge.
There is power in silence as well. We have seen how silence can 
oppress. In the political context this is done by forcing silence on certain 
groups, and ignoring what they say. In the social context, however, the power 
of silence can occur in the opposite way. The silence of a person in authority
3 2 0
can be used to intimidate and frustrate others. Thus using silence can have
| moral significance where it is designed to oppress, frighten or frustrate. But the
ii
| power of such silences is great as we have seen.
| The cultures of the deaf, the mute and those who choose silence
i
deliberately, all have a message that we have explored in depth under the 
discussion of Larundic silence. What these cultures allow us to be certain of is 
that there is content in silence that can be communicated and understood. Silent 
orders who chose to live without speech also help us uncover the merits of 
Harpocratic silence. Thus the cultures prove the worthiness of this project. 
They make palpable the significance of attempting to grasp the subtle differences 
between the types of silence explored here, and those beyond.
As a last note it must be asked: would it have been wiser to leave silence 
alone rather than try to understand it? Only if trying to understand it meant 
trying to limit it. This has not been the project of this thesis. Understanding 
has only shown how much depth there is to silence, and how little one can 
actually grasp of this vast topic. It has been nonetheless helpful to examine 
some of the facets of silence and to show how they arise is various areas. There 
is little doubt that silence is relevant to every aspect of life. It is clear that the 
topic has not been exhausted, nor that it ever can be.
The model of the types of silence described in Part I of the thesis was 
designed to help us make sense of silence. The model for interpretation in Part 
II was designed to show the importance of respecting silence. And Part m  gave 
proof of the expansive relevance of silence.
Finally, a great deal has been said about the topic. Nevertheless, in the 
end there are some things that defy language and about which it is better to 
remain silent.
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